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Abstract
Today, safety-critical systems can be found in various domains, including the
automotive industry, avionics and the medical environment. The individual sys-
tems are cross-linked via wired or wireless interfaces to provide certain (comfort)
functionalities. However, these functionalities often have weak points and thus
allow access for third parties. Non circumventing these vulnerabilities can have
fatal consequences for human lives, i.e. safety properties are violated. Therefore, it
should be regarded as highest priority to ensure maximum safety. To achieve this,
other concerns have to be considered, such as security (crime prevention) or timing
(real-time requirements). In this context, we speak about Multi-Concerns (MC).
However, the consideration of MC often leads to conflicts, as the following exam-
ple shows: In the event of an accident, an airbag has to be able to be triggered
immediately to protect the occupants from internal and external injuries (safety).
In order to not manipulate the functionality of the airbag by third parties, a secure
encryption of the data is necessary (security). In the event of a collision, however,
it can result in the airbag not being triggered in time (timing), as decrypting the
corresponding commands take too long due to a chosen encryption algorithm
which has a security level too high. Thus, in this case the safety, the primary goal,
would be in danger. To solve such conflicts, appropriate trade-offs have to be
calculated which is the first objective of this thesis. Therefore, in this thesis an
approach is presented to model MC and to calculate trade-offs. In this context,
a risk assessment and mitigation technique are considered. A methodology is
presented to determine from a set of possible alternative solutions the one that
best meets the safety-critical requirements.
(Software) products change constantly over time and the development progresses
steadily. In this context, the requirements of safety-critical components often
change as well. This usually means that existing components of a system have
to be replaced or added to meet the requirements. The calculation of optimal
trade-offs of the system under investigation is impaired due to changed security
requirements. It is therefore another objective of this thesis to identify the compo-
nents affected by a change. It is important to ensure traceability throughout the
entire process chain and to define well-defined impact rules.
To minimise the analysis of the overall system (software) products can be config-
ured individually according to the needs of the customer to guarantee variability.
In this context we often speak about Software Product Lines (SPLs) or variabil-
ity. For instance, it is possible to customise a mid-range car from several million
configuration options. Not only components such as paintwork, seats, etc. play
a role, but also safety-critical components such as Advanced Driver Assistance
Systems (ADASs) are taken into account. Each combination consisting of safety-
critical components has different safety requirements which have to be taken into
account. Due to the large number of possible combinations of safety-critical soft-
iii
ware product lines it is not possible to check each variation individually. Therefore,
it is a further goal of this thesis to model software product lines in a standardised
way taking safety-critical requirements into account. The focus is on clustering
software product line variations with identical safety and security requirements to
efficiently calculate trade-offs and the impact of changes.
iv
Zusammenfassung
Sicherheitskritische Systeme kommen heutzutage in unterschiedlichen Domänen
vor, darunter in der Automobilbranche, Avionik-Bereich oder auch im medi-
zinischen Umfeld. Dabei sind die einzelnen Systeme über kabelgebundene oder
kabellose Schnittstellen vernetzt, um gewisse (Komfort-)Funktionalitäten zur
Verfügung zu stellen. Jedoch weisen diese Funktionalitäten oft Schwachstellen
auf und ermöglichen somit den Zugriff für Dritte. Das Vernachlässigen dieser
Schwachstellen kann fatale Konsequenzen für Menschenleben haben, d.h. die
Safety-Eigenschaften werden verletzt. Daher hat es höchste Priorität, maximale
Safety zu gewährleisten. Um dies zu erreichen, müssen auch andere Concerns
betrachtet werden, wie z.B. Security (Betriebssicherheit) oder Timing (z.B. Echtzei-
tanforderungen). Daher sprechen wir in diesem Zusammenhang auch von Multi-
Concerns (MC) Die Betrachtung von MC führt jedoch oft zu Konflikten, die durch
folgendes Beispiel verdeutlicht werden: Ein Airbag muss im Fall eines Unfalls
sofort auslösen können, um die Insassen vor Verletzungen zu schützen (Safety).
Um die Funktionalität des Airbags vor äußeren Angriffen zu schützen ist eine
sichere Verschlüsselung der Daten vonnöten (Security). Dies kann jedoch im Falle
eines Aufpralls dazu führen, dass der Airbag nicht rechtzeitig auslöst (Timing), da
das Entschlüsseln der entsprechenden Befehle aufgrund eines zu sicher gewählten
Verschlüsselungsalgorithmus zu lange dauert . Somit wäre in diesem Fall die
Safety, das primäre Ziel, in Gefahr. Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es daher, entsprechende
Trade-Offs zu berechnen, um solche Konflikte zu lösen. In dieser Dissertation wird
ein Ansatz vorgestellt, um MC zu modellieren und Trade-Offs zu berechnen. In
diesem Zusammenhang wird ein Verfahren zur Risikobewertung und Risikomin-
imierung vorgestellt. Ebenso wird eine Methodik präsentiert, um aus einer Menge
möglicher Alternativen diejenige zu bestimmen, welche den sicherheitskritischen
Anforderungen am meisten gerecht wird.
(Software-)Produkte entwickeln sich stetig weiter und neue Features werden
realisiert. In diesem Zusammenhang ändern sich auch oft die Anforderungen
sicherheitskritischer Komponenten. Dies hat meist zur Folge, dass bestehende
Komponenten eines Systems ausgetauscht oder ergänzt werden müssen, um
den gestellten Anforderungen gerecht zu werden. Die Berechnung von opti-
malen Trade-Offs des zu untersuchenden Systems wird aufgrund von geänderten
Sicherheitsanforderungen beeinträchtigt. Es ist daher ein weiterer Fokus dieser
Arbeit, die Komponenten zu identifizieren, die von einer Änderung betroffen sind.
Dabei ist es wichtig, Traceability über den kompletten Verlauf der Prozesskette zu
gewährleisten und wohl definierte Auswirkungsregeln zu definieren.
Heutzutage können (Software-)Produkte individuell nach den Bedürfnissen des
Kunden konfiguriert werden, um Variabilität zu gewährleisten. In diesem Zusam-
menhang sprechen wir von (Software-)Produktlininen. Es ist z.B. möglich, sich
einen Mittelklassewagen aus mehreren Millionen Konfigurationsmöglichkeiten
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zu individualisieren. Dabei spielen nicht nur Komponenten wie Lackierung,
Sitze, etc. eine Rolle, sondern es werden auch sicherheitskritische Komponen-
ten wie Fahrerassistenzsysteme berücksichtigt. Jede Kombination mit sicher-
heitskritischen Komponenten hat dabei unterschiedliche Sicherheitsanforderun-
gen, die berücksichtigt werden müssen. Aufgrund der Vielzahl an Kombina-
tionsmöglichkeiten von sicherheitskritischen Software-Produktlinien ist es nicht
möglich jede Variation einzeln zu überprüfen. Ziel dieser Arbeit ist daher auch
Software-Produktlinien unter Berücksichtigung sicherheitskritischer Anforderun-
gen standardisiert zu modellieren. Der Fokus liegt darin, Variationen von Software-
Produktlinien mit identischen Sicherheitsanforderungen zu gruppieren, um an-
schließend effizient Trade-Offs und die Auswirkungen von Änderungen berech-
nen zu können.
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1
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide a motivation and problem outline regarding
Safety-Critical Systems (SCSs). In particular, it is motivated by means of examples
of the automotive domain as part of SCSs. Appearing problems that have been
identified in the motivation are broken down in Section 1.2. The objectives of
this dissertation are specified in this section as well. Subsequently, approaches
including contributions for the problems and objectives are provided. Section 1.4
gives an overview over the whole thesis. Finally, a list of publications is given that
has been published during the doctoral study.
1.1. Motivation
The invention of the automobile goes back to 1886. In that year, Carl Benz applies
a patent for a vehicle with a combustion engine on January 29. [Fer86] The vehicle
with the name Benz Patent Motor Car, that has been constructed by Carl Benz, was
an innovative invention at that time since there was no construction composed
of combustion engine, chassis and motor-drive mechanism at any time before
[MB17]. Since the invention of the automobile in 1886 the development has been
continuously moving forward. At the beginning the development of comfort
equipments were at the focus. In the 1960s safety played an important role for the
first time. [AE15] Today, it is mandatory to take safety requirements preventatively
into consideration to guarantee a maximum degree of safety. This is an experience
which the Ford Motor Company had to undergo. Thereby, in the late sixties the
manufacturer had to recognise that it is essential to define mature safety goals.
The former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Lee Iacocca decided at that time to
produce a fuel-efficient and inexpensive car. The car should weigh 2.000 pounds
and the price should not exceed 2.000 $. The market launch of that car, named
Ford Pinto, was in 1970, i.e. the schedule for the development was quite tight.
Due to lack of time the CEO decided to neglect some safety checks. There was a
hazard identified late in the design process that the fuel tank being damaged and
catching fire after a rear-end crash. Notwithstanding the fact that the hazard is
extremely life-threatening, the management decided not to make any changes on
the tank position due to the time and cost factor. As a result there were 53 lethal
accidents and many injuries. [Ord+09] This example shows that it is essential to
define major safety goals which have to be accomplished in any circumstances.
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In the last few years the trend is moving towards autonomous driving or comfort-
able driving. To provide these features it is necessary to supply the cars with a lot
of assistance systems. These include, e.g. an Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), a
Lane Assist (LA) or a Lane Departure Prevention (LDP). [Ger+10] Each of them are
cross-linked, both inside and outside the car, to communicate with other interfaces
and Electronic Control Units (ECUs) or to detect other cars in the local area, i.e. in
front or in the blind spot. For this purpose, numerous wired and wireless inter-
faces and ECUs are deployed to process data. In general, the term wired interfaces
refers to bus systems like FlexRay, Controller Area Network (CAN) or Local Inter-
connect Network (LIN) that are plugged inside the car [KH10]. The term wireless
interfaces concerns Bluetooth connections as well as radio waves that are sent and
received by sensors. These Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADASs) and
wireless interfaces unfortunately provide vulnerabilities. There is a distinction
between active and passive hacking attacks. Passive hacking attacks are made
in the consciousness of the driver or the vehicle owner. These typically include
changing the mileage or increasing of the top speed. Active hacking attacks are
made from third parties maliciously to cause damage in any way. In that way
it is done without the driver’s knowledge, i.e. the driver notices the damage at
a late stage or at the moment of the damage. In 2015 there was a fatal hacking
attack which has been called Fiat Chrysler Hack. Security researchers were able to
take over control of some vehicles of the brands Jeep and Dodge. The researches
could operate air-conditioning, braking and power transmission. The hack was
performed by means of a notebook which was located 15 kilometres away from
the car. They could send commands and access the CAN bus which is responsible
for the cross-linking of ECUs in automotive vehicles. [Rin15] In another case
Chinese security researchers could hack a driving Tesla Model S. They were able
to open the tail gate and to trigger a braking operation from remote. For that
purpose the driver must use an internet connection inside the car, e.g. if the driver
is searching for a charging station. [Kli16] Both, active and passive hacking attacks,
can endanger human life without consideration of safety aspects. Therefore, it is
necessary to define safety goals to guarantee a maximum degree of safety.
Besides that, cars are developed further and thus the corresponding goals and
systems of cars may change and can have some impacts on the resulting safety.
Therefore, these impacts of the individual sub-systems are taken into account to
provide high safety. The customised configuration of cars goes back to 1903 when
Henry Ford presents the Model A. In those days, the customer could order an
optional row of seats. Furthermore, the customer could decide whether the car roof
consisted of rubber or leather. [Rei04] Moreover, it is usual nowadays to configure
its own customised car with respect to equipment, motorisation and so on, i.e.
each configuration has different Safety, Security and Timing (SST) requirements
and implications. From an economic point of view, it is not possible to check each
configuration with regard to SST since it would exceed cost limits.
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1.2. Problems and Objectives
The first section of this chapter presented some serious problems in case that safety
and security requirements are omitted. It is the aim of this thesis to circumvent
these problems. However, to reach the goals of this thesis different challenges
have to be accomplished. Therefore, this section identifies problems and objectives
that have to be solved in this thesis.
Multi-Concerns and Trade-Offs
Problem 1. Safety problems are major problems that can endanger human life. For
instance, rear-end collisions may endanger human life. Therefore, it is mandatory
to guarantee a maximum degree of safety. To achieve this, further concerns must
be considered. Security and timing has to be taken into account as well. Let us
assume the ACC system of an automotive vehicle has to be as secure as possible.
For that purpose an encryption algorithm with highest security requirements is
implemented that encrypts the data to be processed as well as data communi-
cation. The data communication includes commands that are sent via the bus
system. On the one hand, data that has been read via the sensor are sent via the
bus communication. These data include, e.g. the distance to the vehicle driving
ahead. On the other hand, a command is sent to the actuator based on these
data, i.e. it contains commands to enable braking or accelerating. If the data are
tapped, wrong commands may be executed. This situation presents a security
property. Furthermore, it is possible to execute commands at a wrong time. This
way, delayed braking could be the result. In this context, we talk about the timing
concern. As a consequence, a crash could be unavoidable. Moreover, it is also
possible to cause a crash due to highest encryption standards. If the data or data
communication is encrypted with a strong encryption algorithm it also needs more
time to decrypt data. As a consequence, commands will be processed when the
braking already should have initiated. In that case an optimal trade-off must be
found between secure en-/decryption and their execution in time. If this can be
accomplished, the ACC system is acceptably safe. It is not enough to prevent an
individual safety goal but a combination of Safety, Security and Timing goals. It is
necessary to check whether these goals are contradictory to each other. Therefore,
often a trade-off between the different goals has to be calculated that solves the
problem with an appropriate compromise.
Objective 1. It has to be possible to define necessary Safety, Security and Timing (SST)
requirements, i.e. Multi-Concerns (MC) have to be modelled. Furthermore, risks of the
individual SST requirements and thus MC need to be taken into account. In this context,
it has to be possible to develop and model Counter Measures (CMs) to avoid or mitigate
risks. Moreover, a set of alternative solutions is needed for which an optimal trade-off can
be calculated. The analysis procedure which calculates trade-offs is called Multi-Criteria
Decision Making (MCDM).
5
1. INTRODUCTION
Change Impacts
Problem 2. Already the ancient Greeks or more precisely Heraklit said “piάντα ῤεῖ”
[Sei99], i.e. everything is always in motion. This applies to software and system
development and in particular to SCSs. The system or software development is
constantly progressed, e.g. by introducing new features. As a result changes of the
whole architecture or software product are needed. In this context the risk and rel-
ative importance of SCSs is on change since amendments regarding safety, security
or timing issues entail to update the risk assessment and relative importance. In
practice, it is too laborious to perform a MCDM once again. Normally, just a small
part differentiates from the original MCDM. Therefore, it is essential to find out
which parts of the MCDM are concerned of the individual change modifications.
Objective 2. A change impact analysis has to be developed to detect which parts of
the MCDM process the individual amendments affect. Thereby, horizontal and vertical
traceability has to be enabled to retrace the effect chain. In this context, it has to be
differentiated between Best Case (BC) and Worst Case (WC) change impact analysis, i.e.
there is a minimum or maximum number of concerned impacts. For each of them, BC and
WC as well as for all dependencies within the entire process chain well-defined impact
rules have to be established. In this way, a maximum degree of safety can be enabled with a
minimum of effort.
Software Product Lines
Problem 3. Nowadays, software based products are configured via a modular
system, i.e. the customer can, e.g. build his or her own customised car from a
series of possible configuration options to allow variability. For modern mid-range
cars there are several millions of configuration options. However, each configu-
ration, i.e. product, which can be ordered by the customer, has to fulfil certain
SST requirements. In practice, it is not possible to take every Software Product
Line (SPL) configuration into account to calculate an optimal trade-off which is
acceptably safe and secure. Let us assume we can configure assistance systems for
a car consisting of three items where it is possible to choose only one component,
two components or the maximum configuration of all three items. Depending on
the selection made regarding the three assistance systems different measuring de-
vices (radar-, ultrasonic- and camera based sensors) with different SST standards
will be deployed can be derived from an underlying system model. In this way,
it has to be ascertained which system components are coherent and which are
incoherent. Otherwise, this could lead to neglecting important SST requirements.
In summary, it is not possible to perform a MCDM with all configuration items
to get a maximum degree of safety. Therefore, an automated approach is needed
to guarantee a maximum degree of safety and to reduce complexity and to save
working time.
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Objective 3. It is the aim of this objective to model SPLs taken SST issues into account.
These models have to be standardised, easy to understand and cover all variabilities of
SPLs. Furthermore, these models need to linked to allow calculation of MC trade-offs,
impacts and SPL based trade-offs. Moreover, it is an essential goal to cluster issues with
similar SST requirements to reduce overhead and to enable reusability. As a result the
MCDM of Objective 1 should be performed for individual selected SPLs.
1.3. Approaches
Section 1.2 described problems and objectives of this thesis. The following para-
graphs will give an abstract understanding of the MCDM, change impact analysis
and complexity reduction of SPLs.
Multi-Concerns and Multi-Criteria Decision Making
Since SCSs may cause serious problems, it is first of all essential to identify poten-
tial failure modes, i.e. to identify the manner in which the failures of a SCS occur.
These potential failure modes may arise when realising SST requirements. The
starting point is a top-level safety goal to achieve a maximum degree of safety, i.e.
the structure is hierarchically to break down goals as good as possible. This central
safety goal is refined to smaller safety-, security- or timing goals which represent
the SST requirements. If the safety-, security or timing goals are represented by
axioms we speak about Point of Vulnerability (POV). Parallel a system is specified
in a System Model (SM) regarding hardware and software specifications derived
from the requirements. In the next step, alternative solutions, i.e. a set of safety-
critical hardware and software configurations, are designed in accordance with the
SM. Based on these alternative solutions a MCDM is performed, i.e. the algorithm
of the MCDM decides which alternative solution best fulfils the SST requirements.
All collected goals and POVs are transferred into an hierarchical model, the Safety-,
Security-, and Timing Model (SSTM). The SSTM consists of two or more alter-
native solutions to calculate a significant trade-off. Furthermore, the Attack and
Defence Tree (ADT) is suitable to specify Counter Measures (CMs) for security-
critical issues of the SSTM. To assess risk of the SST goals and POVs the Failure
Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Attack and Defence Tree Analysis (ADTA)
are applied, whereas the ADTA is based on the ADT. If there are any risky goals
or POVs the preceding steps are repeated until the risk assessment reaches a safe,
secure or timing optimised level. To determine which of the SST goals within the
SSTM are most important a pairwise comparison is performed. For this purpose
the MCDM algorithm Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is applied. The reason
for applying the AHP is that the SSTM with its goals is built up hierarchically and
the decision making of the AHP is based on an hierarchical approach, too. I.e., the
necessary calculations do not require any scalings which might falsify the result of
the MCDM since the AHP and Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) work always on
the same hierarchical level. Data which are submitted by domain experts influence
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the result of the MCDM. It is decided which alternative solution is applicable with
highest accuracy. However, if the trade-off is not solvable, the AHP assessments
are repeated until it is feasible. The whole abstract procedure is summarised in
Figure 1.1. [LFB18]
Requirements
Failure modes and goals
System model Alternative solutions
GSN 
goal hierarchy
Risk assessment
FMEA
ADTA
AHP 
relative importance
Run MCDM
Trade-off not solvable
Risk mitigation required
Risk mitigation required
Figure 1.1.: Abstract procedure of the Multi-Criteria Decision Making [LFB18]
Change Impact Analysis
In general, the change impact analysis is initiated by stakeholders, e.g. safety
experts or developers which make change requests. In this way, corresponding
domain experts are involved. Subsequently, it is necessary to define change re-
quests affecting the SM, SSTM and ADT. These change requests include, amongst
other things, corresponding requirement changes and a triggering operation by
which the change impact analysis is started. Afterwards, the change requests are
linked with corresponding nodes of the above mentioned model types, namely
SM, SSTM and ADT. Subsequently, it is distinguished between two dimensions:
The first one is based on structural impact rules which concerns dependencies
between the individual model nodes. Thereby, dependencies between SM and
SSTM as well as dependencies between SSTM and ADT are considered. Moreover,
dependencies between the individual model types (SM, SSTM and ADT) itself
have to be taken into account. For instance, changing a goal within the SSTM may
have effects on another goals within the SSTM. The second one determines the
impact by means of calculation of attribute values for model elements. By selecting
an impact operation, e.g. modifying, deleting or extending and dimensioning the
impact analysis will be performed. The abstract procedure of the change impact
analysis is summarised in Figure 1.2.
Multi-Concerns in Software Product Lines
Variability is an important aspect to realise SPLs and individualised products. In
the context of MC we start with a Feature Model (FM) which considers functional-
ity of a SCS. Furthermore, a SM, e.g. a component diagram is needed which covers
all system components. Features of the FM and system components of the SM
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Stakeholder Initiate change request
Link model node ↔ 
change request
Change 
impact 
analysis
Impact rules
Attribution
Select trigger 
operation
Run change 
impact analysis
Figure 1.2.: Abstract procedure of the change impact analysis [LRB19]
are linked to detect indirect shared dependencies. For instance, the feature LDP
may depend on ACC although LDP is not contained in the ACC SPL. Moreover,
it is necessary to link the features of the FM with the goals or POV of SSTM to
perform MCDM at the end. Afterwards, it is essential to annotate features of the
FM with SST tags, i.e. the types of concerns (at least one concern) is assigned to the
corresponding features. Subsequently, an attribution for each feature of the FM
is defined to cluster semantically similar features and thus to reduce complexity.
This step is essential, since it is not possible to analyse each SPL for reasons of
time and costs. Therefore, we must find configurations with identical SST require-
ments. Since SPL approaches aim to customise products it is also necessary of this
approach to select an individual configuration, i.e. one or more branches within
the FM have to be chosen. Therefore, trade-offs can be calculated in consideration
of individual SPLs. In summary, the SPL approach reduces the complexity of the
SPLs and the MCDM based on reduced models is calculated. The procedure as
described above is depicted in Figure 1.3.
Feature model Link FM ↔ SM Link FM ↔ SSTM
Annotate features 
with SST tags
KPI based attribution 
for each feature
Select SPL 
configuration
Run MCDM
Figure 1.3.: Abstract procedure of the SPL based MCDM [LB19]
Methodology at a Glance
The last sections described the single approaches of this thesis which can be merged
to a coherent approach (cf. Figure 1.4). In general, there is a differentiation between
functional and qualitative requirements. Functional requirements like Keyless go
describe functionality of a software system whereas qualitative requirements
like Keyless go acceptably secure against manipulation define criteria for quality of
a software system [Poh10] [Som11]. The functional requirements are modelled
by FM and SM to realise SPLs and technical systems in this thesis. To consider
qualitative and safety-critical requirements a SSTM is needed to calculate optimal
trade-offs afterwards. The methodical procedure and prerequisites of this thesis
consists of seven essential steps:
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1. Requirements are defined in a consistent and standardised format, e.g. in
form of goals.
2. Functional requirements are implemented by creating or using an existing
FM and SM.
3. Qualitative requirements are fulfil properties, e.g. maintainability or modu-
larity and are restricted to SST are applied SSTM. The SSTM can be extended
by an ADT to perform security analyses for individual security aspects.
4. There is a linking between the SSTM and an underlying SM to derive suitable
alternative solutions.
5. The FM is linked with the underlying SM to get shared dependencies of
SPLs.
6. FM and SSTM are linked to calculate the optimal trade-off for an individual
SPL at the end.
7. Finally, the individual SPL configuration is transferred into the SSTM to
determine the resulting trade-off.
When performing a change impact analysis, it is, analogous to requirements, dif-
ferentiated between functional and qualitative change requests. The effects of the
individual source models on the target models yield from the corresponding link-
ings or dependencies which can be taken from the description of the methodical
procedure or Figure 1.4.
Functional 
requirements
Qualitative 
requirements
SST model
... ...
... ...
Feature model
... ...
Attack and defence 
tree
... ...
System model
...
SST requirements
Requirements Change requests
Figure 1.4.: Methodical procedure of the thesis
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1.4. Outline
This section describes the logical structure of this thesis which is depicted in
Figure 1.5. In general, the thesis consists of three parts: Basics, main part and
evaluation. Each of them is subdivided into two or more separate chapters. All
objectives and solutions are covered by the main part.
Chapter 1 Introduction exposes the topic of this thesis. First, a short motivation
is presented to set the context. Subsequently, the problems and objectives
are extracted and it is shown how they can be solved. These problems and
objectives are solved by the corresponding approaches which are presented
in an abstract manner. Finally, an outline of this thesis as well as a list of
publications is given. These publications has been published during the
doctoral study of this author.
Chapter 2 Foundations provides an introduction to Multi-Concerns. Moreover,
techniques are described which are required for safety- and security analyses.
Furthermore, the necessary modelling notations are introduced which are
used in later parts of the thesis. Finally, MCDM algorithms are presented to
calculate a trade-off.
Chapter 3 Multi-Concerns and Multi-Criteria Decision Making covers the first
main chapter. In general, an approach is presented to model failure modes
and goals in context of SCSs to calculate the best possible solutions. Thereby,
risk assessment using the FMEA and ADTA play an important role. Further-
more, it is described how to use a MCDM by applying the AHP. In this con-
text, two algorithms are presented, the Pairwise Comparison Mode (PCM)
as well as the RPN Comparison Mode (RCM).
Chapter 4 Change Impact Analysis describes the second main chapter of the
thesis. It is described how some changes, e.g. installation of new safety-
critical components affect the calculation of optimal trade-offs. In this context,
modifications of individual models in consideration of the SST properties
are necessary and are described in detail.
Chapter 5 Multi-Concerns in Software Product Lines is the last chapter of the
main part and covers the application of SPL taken MC into account. An
approach is presented how to model SPLs by means of FMs which consider
the SST concern. The complexity of safety-critical SPLs is reduced by means
of semantic clustering. Subsequently, it is described how the reduced SPLs
is applied for subsequent MCDM. Finally, the change impact analysis of
Chapter 4 is extended.
Chapter 6 Realisation and Evaluation gives an overview of the implementation
of the three main chapters which has been realised by an Eclipse EMF1 and
Sirius2 plugin. Subsequently, it carries out an extensive scenario-based
1https://www.eclipse.org/modeling/emf/
2https://www.eclipse.org/sirius/overview.html
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evaluation considering the three main chapters of this thesis, namely the
Multi-Concerns and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, the Change Impact
Analysis as well as the Multi-Concerns in Software Product Lines. Finally,
two case studies show the applicability of the approach.
Chapter 7 Conclusion and Outlook summarises the thesis by recapitulating the
problems, objectives and the approach. Furthermore, an outlook for future
research works is given.
2. Foundations
1. Introduction
Part I: Basics
3. Multi-Concerns and 
Multi-Criteria Decision Making
4. Change Impact Analysis
5. Multi-Concerns in Software Product Lines
Part II: Main Part
7. Conclusion and Outlook
6. Realisation and Evaluation
Part III: Evaluation
Figure 1.5.: Outline of the thesis
The three grey boxes of Figure 1.5 show the general reading order of this thesis.
However, if the reader is familiar with the basics, which are presented in Chapter 2,
he or she can continue reading with the main part of this thesis. As indicated by
numbering of the main chapters it is highly recommended to start reading with
Chapter 3 followed by Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 since it is the logical procedure of
the approach and the thesis. The implementation details of Chapter 3 to Chapter 5
are realised by Chapter 6. Furthermore, the evaluation is described in Chapter 6 as
well. It is strongly recommended to read Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 as a last resort.
1.5. Publications
During the PhD study of the author of this thesis some scientific publications
have been published. Applied concepts and results of the author, which have
already been published or to which the author has been contributed, are cited
at the beginning of the corresponding chapters. These also include supervised
master theses. The following list gives an overview of all that publications with a
brief description of contents.
1. Philipp Lohmüller, Andrea Fendt, and Bernhard Bauer: “Multi-Concerns En-
gineering for Safety-Critical Systems”. In: Proceedings of the 6th International
Conference on Model-Driven Engineering and Software Development Volume 1:
MODELSWARD. Funchal (Portugal), 2018, pp. 504-510 [LFB18]
The author of this thesis, together with an associate researcher, presents
a concept which is essential for calculating trade-offs by considering MC.
The concepts and ideas have been developed in cooperation with a master
student within the scope of a master thesis [Fen16]. The master student has
been supervised by the author of this thesis. The publication itself has been
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written down by the author of this thesis. This work is primary essential for
Chapter 3.
2. Philipp Lohmüller, Julia Rauscher, and Bernhard Bauer: “Failure and Change
Impact Analysis for Safety-Critical Systems”. In: Business Modeling and
Software Design. Lisbon (Portugal), 2019, pp. 47-63 [LRB19]
The author of this thesis, together with an associate researcher, presents
a concept which is essential for calculating failure and change impacts by
considering SST concerns. The concepts and ideas have been developed in
equal shares by the authors. Furthermore, this paper “has been partially
supported by the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology
(BMWi) in the framework of the Central Innovation Program SME (Zentrales
Innovationsprogramm Mittelstand) within the project CBMD3 [LRB19]”.
This work is a central part of the second chapter.
3. Philipp Lohmüller, and Bernhard Bauer: “Software Product Line Engineering
for Safety-critical Systems”. In: Proceedings of the 7th International Conference
on Model-Driven Engineering and Software Development Volume 1: MODEL-
SWARD. Prague (Czech Republic), 2019, pp. 211-218 [LB19]
In general, the authors describe in their paper how the complexity of SPLs
in context of SCSs can be reduced to analyse manageable trade-offs. The
content of this paper is a basic for the third main chapter. In this paper, the
first author developed the concept and main ideas of the research questions.
3https://www.informatik.uni-augsburg.de/en/chairs/swt/ds/projects/mde/cbmd/
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Foundations
The current chapter covers the basics which are necessary to understand the
following chapters in detail. First, an introduction to MC is given. Subsequently,
Section 2.2 describes the foundations for risk management in the area of safety and
security. Furthermore, necessary model notations are introduced in Section 2.3
which are applied in the main part of this thesis. These include the Goal Structuring
Notation (GSN), Feature Models (FMs) and System Models (SMs). Moreover, the
thesis covers Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM). Therefore, the necessary
basics are explained within this chapter. These include, inter alia, the AHP which
is essential for calculating trade-offs in later course of this thesis.
2.1. Multi-Concerns
This chapter aims to introduce the most common concerns which are taken into
account. These include safety, security as well as the timing concern. There is
still no widely accepted definition for concerns. Even though there is an intuitive
understanding of concerns:
Definition 2.1 (Concern). A concern defines one or more properties and require-
ments for a system which need to be fulfilled to comply with quality attributes as
good as possible [RBC05].
In this dissertation it is the primary goal to achieve safety. However, to accomplish
a maximum degree of safety, the security and timing concern must be considered
as well. The term MC defines the correlations between the individual concerns.
Figure 2.1 gives a first overview of the relationships. Hereinafter, for each depen-
dency between the individual concerns an obvious example is given:
• Safety → Security: Sensor data of individual ADTAs are transmitted in
encrypted form. Otherwise wrong actions could be done.
• Security→ Safety: If an insecure encryption algorithm has been chosen for
encrypting data traffic of an ACC cyber attacks are possible. In the worst
case, the braking process could be prevented.
• Safety→ Timing: Each automotive vehicle, which has been equipped with
an Emergency Brake Assist (EBA), has to be able to react within fractions of
a second.
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Safety
Multi-Concerns
Figure 2.1.: Multi-Concerns: Dependencies between Safety, Security and Timing
• Timing→ Safety: It is a legal requirement that every registered car has to
be equipped with an airbag. However, if the airbag does not trigger in time
it poses a hazardous risk for all occupants.
• Security→ Timing: Let us assume our car is equipped with an ACC. It is
mandatory to encrypt data traffic to protect against cyber attacks. However,
if the encryption algorithm is more secure than required it takes too much
time to decrypt corresponding commands.
• Timing → Security: Under the assumption that the ACC is working cor-
rectly, an upper time limit needs be met for individual commands, e.g.
accelerating or decelerating. Therefore, a suitable encryption algorithm must
be elected with respect to upper time limit in order to protect data (traffic) as
secure as possible.
2.1.1. Safety
The concern safety has been used in context of launching safety belts to guarantee
safety for road users [Eva86]. For the term safety there is a large number of
definitions. In conclusion, the term safety is defined as follows:
Definition 2.2 (Safety). Safety as defined in the IEC 61508 standard [IEC97] “is
the detection of a potentially dangerous condition resulting in the activation
of a protective or corrective device or mechanism to prevent hazardous events
arising or providing mitigation to reduce the consequence of the hazardous event
[IEC97].” Furthermore, it describes a state that a person or a human being is
protected against any harms or unwanted side effects [RM90].
Hence, the safety property is violated if the driver is in danger due to lack of safety
protection. Once, if the driver or other occupants neglect the obligatory wearing
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of seat belts the safety of all the human beings inside the car are endangered since
a traffic accident could occur at any time whether the driver is inattentive or other
road users may bear the guilt. In general, safety not only depends on behaviour of
drivers or occupants.
Definition 2.3 (Safety-Critical System). “A Safety-Critical System is a system
where human safety is dependent upon the correct operation of the system.”
[ST16] According to [Som18], malfunction of the system may entail death, personal
injury, environmental damage or (partial-)damage to the system.
In the context of safety there is a widely used norm for the development of Electric,
Elctronic and Programmable Electronic Systems (E/E/PE) that consider safety
functions. This norm is called IEC 61508. In general, the norm describes how safety-
critical products have to be developed to mitigate potential risks. It is the aim of
this norm that no hazards endanger operators and environment. Independent
certification authorities like the German Technischer Überwachungsverein (TÜV)
require a certification due to product liability law. In Germany, according to para-
graph §4 ProdHaftG manufacturers are liable for failures and risks of suppliers. In
the product liability litigation manufacturers demonstrate that proven techniques
has been applied for risk assessment and safe product development. The IEC 61508
norm also provides a life-cycle model, development cycles, a product architecture,
an organisation structure as well as well defined documentations for third parties.
[IEC97]
There are also safety aspects which concern the ADASs or the technique which
is plugged inside and outside the car. Let us assume the driver is cruising along
the highway with activated ACC, i.e. the driver anticipates that accelerating and
decelerating are taken by the car itself without operating any pedals. However, if
electronics of the ACC refuses suddenly, it also constitutes a significant safety risk,
since a necessary brake process could be initiated not at all or too late. This process
may endanger human life in a bad way. [Nil96] To prevent such accidents it is
mandatory to perform hazard and risk analyses during the design and develop-
ment process. Some of the commonly used hazard and risk assessment procedures
are captured in Section 2.2.1 with a detailed explanation.
2.1.2. Security
Since automotive vehicles are provided with diverse ADASs and computer-aided
information systems it is possible to manipulate the electronics of such vehicles.
As already mentioned in Section 1.1 there is a distinction between active and
passive points of attacks. Both, active and passive points of attacks, may endanger
safety of road users and thus it is mandatory to counteract them. The term security
has to be separated from safety and is defined as follows:
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Definition 2.4 (Security). Security defines to which extent a computer-based sys-
tem is protected against data manipulation, data theft and unauthorised access
[McG06] [IEC05].
There is a widespread norm for security, the IEC 27001 which concerns in large
parts to keep information assets secure and to avoid hacking attacks. Usually, such
hacking attacks can be mitigated by applying a secure encryption algorithm which
is used in a synchronous or asynchronous manner. Let us quote the ACC example
from the previous section 2.1.1. The driver is assuming that the ACC works with-
out any lacks. In the background hackers got access to the corresponding ECUs
of the car, e.g. via wireless interfaces like Bluetooth. After getting access to the
corresponding ECU the hackers can manipulate the system in an arbitrary manner.
One possible scenario is to disable the braking function of the ACC system. A
life-threatening rear-end collision is almost unavoidable. You can counteract this
scenario by applying security procedures, e.g. suitable encryption modes. Besides
the classical hacking attack there are more dangerous security issues. In this con-
text a Denial of Service (DOS) attack poses a risk to the environment. Thereby, it
may occur that some services or functions, e.g. measurement of the distance to
the vehicle driving ahead are deactivated. [FGS05] A further important security
aspect is the protection of privacy and data manipulation. As a result it may
be possible to spy out confidential data, e.g. home address or phone number.
Moreover, technical data of the car may be spied out. For the reason of distortion
of competition it would be unacceptable. [FIM10]
As stated in the introduction of this chapter or in Figure 2.1 better security boosts
the safety as well. Analogous to safety there are some preventative methods to
promote security. These methods will be explained in Section 2.2.2 in an extensive
manner.
2.1.3. Timing
The last two concerns covered the safety and security concerns. However, there is
also a further factor that influence safety in a considerable manner. In that context,
the observance of upper and lower time limits is of considerable importance.
Therefore, we can define timing as follows:
Definition 2.5 (Timing). The term timing defines that certain tasks have to be
performed within a given time interval [Per+12].
In practice, timing is the response times or Worst Case Execution Time (WCET)
analyses, i.e. the upper time limit for executing a task is pre-determined. In some
cases the lower time limit must be considered as well. This is the case if some
steps could be performed only then if other calculations or processes have been
done. [BCP02]
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Let us recall the ACC example from the previous two concerns. We already made
it more safe and secure by applying a secure encryption algorithm. However, this
may constitute a serious safety risk if commands, that contain essential actions, e.g.
accelerating or decelerating, are received not in time. This may cause an accident
and thus it endangers safety of inmates and other road users.
In summary, there has to be an optimal trade-off between the three three concerns
Safety, Security and Timing with the primary goal to achieve a maximum degree
of safety. The techniques and approaches, that we need therefore, are explained in
detail hereinafter. [Ans+11]
2.1.4. Influences of Security and Timing on Safety
In Section 2.1 it has been shown that all three concerns, i.e. SST influence each
other. In this section, we will go into detail on how security and timing influence
safety and why safety is our primary goal. In general, safety is responsible for
maintaining human life, therefore safety plays an important role in MC engineer-
ing.
For the sake of completeness, besides security and timing there are further in-
fluences, e.g. economic influences, political and personal interests. However,
these influences are no main part of this thesis and will be therefore not further
explained. In practice, some concerns may contradict to each other because the
individual concerns only make sure that safety is guaranteed by applying its
own appropriate measures. For instance, in the near future automotive vehicles
will drive autonomously. In this context, it will be necessary to enable car-2-x
communication, i.e. communication with traffic lights needs to be accessible as
well. [Sta+11] However, to ensure that no third parties manipulate the commands
of acceleration process and decelerating process a secure encryption is required.
By applying an encryption algorithm of highest security level it may happen that
the commands are not be executed in real-time. In that way, it would be possible
that the car gets the command for accelerating although the traffic light shows
already the red light. This example shows that security influences timing and
thereby safety.
The last example showed that security influence timing and thereby endanger
safety. It may also be possible that security violates safety aspects. The following
example from the past demonstrates this scenario in more detail. Due to the
terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York
City it has been decided to perform stricter security measures. Given the fact that
the air-planes from the terrorist attacks had been hijacked a security measure has
been introduced that the access to the cockpit is denied during the flight. This
security precaution became an obstacle for the Germanwings flight 4U9525 on
March 24th, 2015 that crashed in the French Alps. The captain within the cockpit
has full control over the door and can even inhibit emergency access. Based
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on voice records, the co-pilot is suspected of deliberately destroying the plane
while preventing the captain from re-entering the cockpit. I.e., increasing security
against hijackers intensified reliance on the pilot being left on his one and carrying
full responsibility for flying the air-plane [Yu15] In this case, the stricter security
measure influenced safety in a negative way. In most cases, timing influences
safety in a direct manner. This is due to the fact that timing issues often depend on
security aspects as the car-2-x example has been shown. The negative influences of
MC in direct manner or indirect manner, that has been reflected in this sub-section,
should be solved by means of the approach that are presented in further chapters
of this thesis.
2.2. Risk Management
In Section 2.1.4 a series of hazards and risks have been presented which should
be circumvented by applying correct system engineering process. In general, the
concept of system architecture is made by a systematic approach which considers
design of the entire system. In this way, it is ensured to avoid unusable measures
and to apply measures which fulfil safety or security requirements of the system.
In this context, costs will be saved in long-term vision. As depicted in Figure 2.2
the systematic approach consists of four sequential phases which are explained in
more detail hereinafter:
Hazard/Threat modelling
Risk management
Safety/Security 
requirements engineering
Develop 
counter measures
Figure 2.2.: System engineering process [MLY05]
• Threat modelling: According to [Sho14] a system is modelled methodically
from perspective of hazard or threat source. In this context, the following
three steps are performed:
1. Description and specification of the system, e.g. by means of a SM.
2. Vulnerabilities and access points to the system.
3. Identification and analysis of the hazards or threats. In this way, safety-
critical system components will be revealed.
• Risk management: For the individual threats or hazards risk management
is mandatory. According to [MLY05] it is subdivided into two steps:
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1. Risk assessment, i.e. a risk analysis is performed either qualitatively or
quantitatively.
2. Classification of the threats or hazards, i.e. it is decided whether the
risk is acceptably safe or secure.
• Safety/Security requirements engineering: It is the aim of the requirements
engineering process to define safety or security requirements. This process
consists of four steps which are explained in more detail in Section 3.3:
Identifying, analysing, specifying and validating requirements. [Som11]
• Develop Counter Measures: CMs are necessary to fulfil safety or security
requirements and to mitigate risks of threats or hazards. Applying a CM
requires the usual phases of software development cycle: design, implemen-
tation, testing and maintainability. [MLY05]
2.2.1. Safety Risk Management
As indicated in Section 2.2 violation of safety aspects can endanger human life
primarily. To circumvent this, some preventative risk management methods are
necessary. It has to be pointed out that negligence of safety can cause financial
and economic losses. In this way, by means of preventative risk assessment direct
follow-up costs of personal injuries for, e.g. medical care, salaries or compensation
payments. Furthermore, indirect follow-up costs of injuries can be avoided. These
include financial penalties due to non-compliance of regulations or repair costs.
Moreover, productivity can be boosted. If there is a recall campaign based on
safety lacks it causes unnecessary costs. Such image loss can also influence global
competitive ability and the associated export potential. [SAG18] Therefore, this
section introduces three techniques to assess and mitigate potential safety risks.
2.2.1.1. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
As already indicated in Section 1.1 there were several deadly accidents due to lack
of risk assessment. Therefore, it is content and purpose of the FMEA to mitigate
those risks in context of SCSs as much as possible by applying the FMEA. The
FMEA was originally developed in 1949 as a military instruction titled "MIL-
P-1629 - Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis"
[DOD49]. In the 1960ies the FMEA has been used for planning nuclear power
plants. Furthermore, it has been used in avionics. Between 1970 and 1980 the
FMEA has been used in automotive industry for the first time, namely from the
Ford Motor Company in USA. The FMEA has been developed over the time
and is now in use for development of electronics and software. In 2006 the
standardisation to DIN EN 60812 has been specified. [Ber+09] It is the aim of the
FMEA to prevent failures and to detect failures. For the failure prevention it is
essential to indicate and to prevent failures in early stages of product cycle. The
later a failure is indicated the more expensive the development costs are. The costs
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will increase about 10 times for each later stage [Ber+09]. The failure detection has
four essential goals:
1. Detection of possible fault sources that can cause (subsequent) failures. The
detection is, e.g. possible by applying the Fault Tree Analysiss (FTAs) (cf.
Section 2.2.1.2).
2. All causes and consequences need to be correctly identified, mitigated or
avoided.
3. Faultless organisation of processes during the development cycle.
4. Vulnerabilities of the system, products or processes have to be identified so
that a constructive revision can be performed.
To prevent and detect failures it is necessary to assess potential risk by means of
the Risk Priority Number (RPN). It is useful to answer the following questions
beforehand to calculate the RPN afterwards:
Definition 2.6 (List of Questions for Determining the RPN). To determine the
exact values of the RPNs a list of questions serves as an indication:
1. What can go wrong?
a) What failures did occur in the past?
b) What can go wrong within the sub-processes or the system’s parts?
2. Why did this failure occur?
a) What are potential causes of the failure?
b) Are there any similar failures in the past?
3. What would be the impact of the identified failure?
a) What would be the consequences?
b) What could happen in a worst-case scenario?
The following four paragraphs provide insight into determining the individual
partial calculations of the RPN. Furthermore, it is explained how to interpret and
analyse the individual partial values.
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Risk Priority Number
Definition 2.7 (Risk Priority Number). According to [BMI17] the Risk Priority
Number (RPN) is defined as follows:
RPN = Occurrence(O)× Severity(S)× Detection(D)
where
• O complies with the probability that a hazard occurs,
• S corresponds to the severity of a hazard and
• D complies with the probability that a hazard will be detected.
As already mentioned in Definition 2.7 the RPN = O × S × D. Thereby, each
factor can range between 1 and 10. Conversely, this entails that the RPN can range
between 1 and 1000. In general: The lower the RPN the better the potential risk.
Depending on the value of the RPN the degree of risk can be identified. [Ber+09]
Table 2.1 gives an overview whether CMs are required regarding the values of the
RPN. If the RPN is lower than 125, the risk is acceptable or low that no substantial
CMs are required. However, if the RPN is greater or equal 125 expansive CMs are
needed. Moreover, it should be considered that applying CMs due to potential
risk may yield new risk. Let us assume an automotive group has been researched
by means of the RPN that an encryption algorithm of 128 bit is not strong enough
for an innovative ADAS to protect against third parties. Therefore, they decided to
use an encryption algorithm of 256 bit instead. As a consequence, the RPN is lower
than 125 and thus acceptable. It has not been considered that the calculations of the
functionality need much more time and thus poses a new risk for the occupants of
the car.
RPN Risk of error Counter Measures
RPN = 1 None No CMs required
2 ≤ RPN ≤ 50 Acceptable Additional warning required
50 ≤ RPN ≤ 250 Medium Additional protective CMs required
250 ≤ RPN ≤ 1000 High Constructive CMs absolutely required
Table 2.1.: Interpretation of RPN [BMI17]
Hereinafter, the individual factors for calculating the RPN will be clarified in detail.
These include occurrence, severity and detection. For this purpose Definition 2.8 to
Definition 2.10 explain the factors of the individual formulas. The accompanying
value ranges are specified in Table 2.3 to Table 2.7. As already mentioned in the
preceding paragraph each of the three factors can take a value range between 1
and 10. Therefore, it can be concluded that the better the occurrence, severity or
detection the better the resulting RPN.
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Occurrence
Definition 2.8 (Occurrence). [GJ15] defines occurrence as follows:
O = ( f · r) + v
where
• f complies with the probability of failure,
• r corresponds to the stay in area of risk and
• v corresponds to the vulnerability of risk.
f Probability of failure
1 Misbehaviour is rarely expected
2 Misbehaviour is expected with a moderate frequency
3 Misbehaviour is expected very frequently
r Stay in area of risk
1 Stay in area of risk rarely
2 Stay in area of risk only sometimes
3 Permanent stay in area of risk
v Vulnerability of risk
0 Not vulnerable
1 (Very) vulnerable
Table 2.2.: RPN: Calculation of occurrence [GJ15]
General assessment criteria Frequency Ratingvalues
High
It is almost certain that failures occur on a large scale
1/10
1/20
10
9
Moderate
Comparable to earlier production processes that leads to
failures often
1/50
1/100
8
7
Low
Comparable to earlier production processes that leads to
failures occasionally
1/200
1/500
1/1000
6
5
4
Very low
The process is controlled statically
1/2000
1/20.000
3
2
Unlikely
The process capability is ensured ≈ 0 1
Table 2.3.: RPN: Assessment criteria of occurrence [GJ15]
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Severity
Definition 2.9 (Severity). [GJ15] defines severity as follows:
S = (i · d) + r
where
• i complies with the degree of injury,
• d corresponds to the duration of damage and
• r complies with the chances of rescue and damage limitation.
i Degree of injury
1 Minor injury
2 Moderate injury
3 Very serious injury
d Duration of damage
1 No long-term damages
2 Tolerable long-term damages
3 Serious long-term damages
r Chances of rescue and damage limitation
0 Good chances of rescue
1 Unfavourable conditions for rescue and damage limitation
Table 2.4.: RPN: Calculation of severity [GJ15]
General assessment criteria Ratingvalues
A very grave failure occurs that affects and/or regulatory compliance. 109
A grave failure occurs that causes discontentment with the customer.
Safety aspects or regulatory compliance are not considered.
8
7
A moderate failure occurs that causes discontent with the customer.
The customers will notice the impairment.
6
5
4
The failure is insignificant and the customer is interfered slightly.
The customer just notices marginal impairments .
3
2
It is unlikely that the failure has noticeable impacts on the
investigation object. The customer probably does not notice the failure. 1
Table 2.5.: RPN: Assessment criteria of severity [GJ15]
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Detection
Definition 2.10 (Detection). [GJ15] defines detection as follows:
D = (q · c) + r
where
• q corresponds to the qualification of the endangered person,
• c complies with the complexity of the hazard and
• r corresponds to the changes of reaction
q Qualification of the endangered person
1 Expert
2 Instructed person
3 Amateur, no instructed person
c Complexity of the hazard
1 Low complexity, situation is transparent
2 Average value of complexity, situation is still transparent
3 High complexity, situation is hardly transparent
r Chances of reaction
0 Good chances of reaction
1 Poor chances of reaction
Table 2.6.: RPN: Calculation of detection [GJ15]
General assessment criteria Frequency Rating values
Unlikely
Hidden failure that is not discovered in the
production or assembly
< 90 % 10
Very low
Defect is more difficult detectable > 90 % 9
Low
Defect is easily detectable > 98 % 6-8
Moderate
There is a obvious defect. Handling of the defect
by very precise (100 %) check possible.
> 99,7 % 2-5
High
Functional defect that is discovered in the
following work stages
> 99,99 % 1
Table 2.7.: RPN: Assessment criteria of detection [GJ15]
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There are some further FMEA extensions that are explained in a short way:
• Failure Mode, Effects and Critically Analysis (FMECA): The necessity of
the additional term criticality is due to the fact that the US army developed its
own FMEA standard in which the RPN has been replaced by criticality levels.
Instead of probability of occurrence, a failure rate is used. The likelihood of
detection is omitted as well. [Ber+09]
• Failure Mode, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis (FMEDA): The FMEDA
extends the FMEA with the property to analyse and determine diagnostics
options for detection of dangerous failures [LPP11].
• Design Review Based on Failure Mode (DRBFM): The car manufacturer
Toyota sets high quality standards with respect to new development and
applies the FMEA. Unfortunately, the quality standards are violated if
modifications to products, product requirements or production processes are
made. Toyota determined that such modifications were the cause for risks
and failures. Therefore, it is the aim of DRBFM to find failures that result
from intentional modifications as well as unintentional modifications on the
product or the process. [SIN03]
• X-FMEA: X stands either for System, Hardware, Software or Process. It
is purpose to analyse risks of the corresponding areas by means of FMEA.
[Ber+09]
2.2.1.2. Fault Tree Analysis
Besides the FMEA there are further risk assessment techniques which are pre-
sented in this and the following section: The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and
the Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP). Analogous to the FMEA these
approaches are used for preventative risk and failure mitigation in context of
safety-critical systems.
Similar to the FMEA some accidents happened due to lack of risk assessment
but up to now it was not possible to detect potential causes of failure to avoid
them in future. The FTA was developed in the 1960ies by H. A. Watson in New
Jersey. Originally, it has been used in the avionics for air-planes from Boeing. In
the 1970ies and 1980ies nuclear power stations were planned by means of the FTA.
Furthermore, in this period evaluation algorithms of the FTA has been developed.
In the 1990ies it was used in the automotive industry for the first time. Moreover,
software tools for developing and evaluating FTAs were developed in the 1990ies.
Nowadays, the FTA is used in all industry sectors. Such as the FMEA the FTA is
already specified to the DIN standard. It is the aim of the FTA for safety-critical
systems to model a system most realistic and to evaluate it. In this context the fail-
ure types and failure causes are detected. By means of the FTA functional relations
between the individual failures are established. Moreover, it is the purpose of the
FTA to describe the impacts of the failures on the system. In general, the FTA is an
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approach guarantee quality preventively and to analyse the system. [Ber+09]
A fault tree is created top-down, i.e. it starts with the failure cause, e.g. that a
car does not start (see Figure 2.3). Subsequently, this top-event is connected with
boolean operators like AND, OR, XOR. We call these elements gates. This gate is
now connected with sub-events, i.e. failures that can occur and may lead to the
top-event. I.e., the car does not start. In Figure 2.3 the sub-events are Controls
status OR Electronic fault. If the controls are not in proper position, the problem
is that the car is in park position AND the foot is on the brake. For case of an
electronic fault there are two options: The starter is faulty OR the wire is broken.
[Sch15] The complete syntax of FTAs is illustrated in [MB87].
Car does 
not start
Electrical 
fault
Controls 
status
In
park
Foot on 
brake
Broken 
wire
Starter 
faulty
Figure 2.3.: Exemplary FTA: Car does not start [Sch15]
The evaluation is performed by means of stochastic probability calculations. All
the (sub-)events are assigned probabilities that the failure occurs without any rela-
tionships between other events. The boolean operators are assigned mathematical
operators like + (OR) or * (AND). In this way, the so called critical path can be
calculated. This path symbolises the path from the leaf or leaves to the top event
that leads to failure of the top event with highest probability. [Ber+09] Since the
critical path is based on stochastic probabilities, it can be used for calculating the
severity of the RPN in context of the FMEA [But07].
2.2.1.3. HAZOP
The HAZOP is a procedure for analysing hazards which is described in the IEC
61882 norm [IEC16]. It is the aim of the HAZOP to identify hazards systematically.
In general, it addresses hazards which are triggered by systems and parts of them
that do not work as expected or specified. The term systems include products,
processes or software applications whereas parts include components or processing
steps. [IEC16] normalises the HAZOP and describes the principles, application
scope, procedure as well as audits. In general, HAZOP consists of four steps:
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1. Planning: In the first step, the project manager defines the system which
needs to be checked and the objective of the analysis. Furthermore, it is task
of the project manager to put a team together including a head of HAZOP
examination, system architect and a system operator.
2. Preparation: During the preparation phase the head of HAZOP examination
collects some information about the system and prepares these data in terms
of flow charts. Furthermore, he or she organises necessary meetings and
modifies the list of guide words (cf. next step).
3. Examination: First, the objectives and the system are presented. Subse-
quently, the system is decomposed in its parts. For each part, its purpose is
identified. It is mandatory to define all necessary elements, e.g. character-
istics of materials or parameter. For each element it is essential to use each
guide word to check whether a deviation is possible and may cause a hazard.
An exemplary usage of the guide words is listed in Table 2.8.
4. Evaluation of the results: By means of a table consisting of the columns:
• (sub-)systems
• parts
• parameter
• guide word
• possible causes
• possible consequences
• possible CMs
The results are documented and analysed. The significant findings should
be documented separately in a second risk table that consists all essential
risks additionally. [IEC16]
The HAZOP analyses causes AND consequences of hazards whereas the FMEA
only analyses the effects (by means of the RPN) based on causes and the FTA
vice versa. However, the FMEA and FTA has been established as standard risk
analysis method. Nonetheless, the HAZOP is used as an optional additional
risk assessment to the FMEA and FTA. Furthermore, the HAZOP is a systematic
approach which cannot prove that all hazards have been considered. Moreover,
the HAZOP requires an experienced head of examination and a concrete and
complete documentation of the system.
2.2.2. Security Risk Management
As already mentioned in Section 2.1.4 security may influence safety. For this reason
it is mandatory to consider security risk management as well. In the same way
as safety risk management neglecting security risk management may also cause
long-term financial expenses and costs. Hereinafter, some graphical and structural
approaches are presented to mitigate security risk.
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Deviation type Guide word Example interpretation for a E/E/PE
Negative NO No data or control sign passed
Quantitative
modification
MORE
LESS
Data passed at higher rate than intended
Data passed at lower rate than intended
Qualitative
modification
AS WELL AS
PART OF
Some additional or spurious signal present
Data or control signals are incomplete
Substitution REVERSEOTHER THAN
Normally not relevant
Data or control signals are incorrect
Time EARLYLATE
Signals too early with ref. to clock time
Signals too late with ref. to clock time
Order or
sequence
BEFORE
AFTER
Sig. earlier than intended within sequence
Sig. later than intended within sequence
Table 2.8.: HAZOP: Examples of guide words [IEC16]
2.2.2.1. Attack and Defence Tree
In general, an ADT consists of two parts, the attack tree and defence tree. The attack
tree is an acyclic directed graph, by which from attacker’s perspective it is anal-
ysed, which vulnerabilities can be exploited if a threat is realised. In this context,
all related attacks are modelled. Each of them represents an alternative way to
realise the threat. The latter is represented by means of the root node and describes
the main goal of an attacker. This goal is refined conjunctively or disjunctively
by means of sub-goals using AND or OR nodes. The refinement is performed
recursively as long as the refined sub-goal represents an elementary action of
the attacker. To apply an attack the realisation of several elementary actions are
necessary. The super-ordinated goals decide the kinds of actions. To realise an
AND node it is mandatory to apply all sub-goals refined by them whereas for the
realisation of an OR node just one of them has to be fulfilled. Attack trees can be
transformed into Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF). By applying the DNF calcula-
tions of the analysis can be more easier and analysis results are more manageable.
If an attack tree takes on large dimensions it will be more easier to find individual
attacks by means of the DNF structure. Attack trees enable the basic form of statis-
tical threat analysis and can be extended by different ways. For instance, leaf nodes
may be attached with attributes for further calculations. These attributes will be
passed up to the root node. In this way, each node is annotated with this attribute.
Examples for boolean attributes may be like possible/impossible, easy/difficult,
cheap/expensive, legal/illegal or special equipment mandatory/not mandatory.
Besides of boolean expressions it is possible to assign continuous values, e.g. costs,
success probability of the attack or the probability that an attacker performs an
attack. [MO06]
Applying attack trees only enables an analysis of threats from attacker’s perspec-
tive. Thereby, it is not taken into account which CMs mitigate risk for realising
a threat efficiently and economically. To enable this scenario attack trees are ex-
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tended by defence trees while adding defender’s perspective. We call the extended
attack tree ADT. For this purpose, each leaf node in the attack tree is extended
by a set of nodes which corresponds to CMs and mitigate the risk of the threat.
Similar to the attack tree, the extended ADT also enables analyses. [BFP06]
Steal money 
from account
Via ATM Via online banking
Learn PIN via 
brute force
Steal credit 
card
Guess 
password
Login and 
execute 
transfer
Max. 3 
attempts
Fingerprint 
scanner
Strong 
password
SMS 
authentication
Attacker (sub-)goals
Actions
Counter 
measures
Figure 2.4.: Exemplary ADT: Steal money from account [KW18]
Figure 2.4 shows an exemplary ADT which covers the threat Steal money from
account. In general, the orange bordered nodes show the attacker (sub-)goals,
the blue bordered nodes the actions and the green bordered nodes the CMs.
The root node Steal money from account is refined into two sub-goals Via ATM
and Via online banking. In this case, the attack can be performed by only one of
them. If the attacker makes a withdrawal via the ATM, he or she has to learn the
Personal Identity Number (PIN) AND steal the credit card. Both actions have to be
successful for the attacker to get money. It can be counteracted with a maximum
number of three attempts or a fingerprint scanner. Otherwise, if the attacker
catches the money via online banking the password has to be guessed AND the
money transfer must be executed. Allocating a strong password or using a SMS
authentication counteracts the threat. [KW18]
2.2.2.2. Extended Influence Diagram
Besides the ADT there is another technique for security system engineering: The
Extended Influence Diagram (EID). Such as the ADT the EID provides a graphical
representation for modelling uncertain variables and decision problems and en-
hances the Bayesian networks. [SEJ08]. The necessary foundations of Bayesian
networks has been described in [Nea03] in detail. In general, the EID consists of
three node types: Utility node, decision node and chance node. The decision nodes,
which are depicted as rectangle, represents possible decision alternatives. The
utility node is represented as rhombus and provides the outcome of a decision
node which is quantitatively assessed. The chance nodes, which are depicted as
ovals, consist of states from a finite domain. The relationships represent causal
dependencies and interplay between the utility node, chance nodes and chance
nodes. Finally, the EID provide calculations of quality attributes by means of
probability values. [ES09]
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Steal money 
from account
Manipulate 
ATM
Manipulate 
online banking
Learn PIN via 
brute force 
Steal credit 
card
Guess 
password
Login and 
execute 
transfer
Max. 3 
attempts 
Fingerprint 
scanner
Strong 
password
SMS 
authentication
ATM Online banking Decision node
Chance node
Threat
Attacks
Figure 2.5.: Exemplary EID: Steal money from account [KW18] [ES09]
Let us recall the example of Figure 2.4 which we want to transfer into an semanti-
cally well-defined EID. In contrast to the ADT the EID is build bottom-up. First,
there are two decision nodes ATM and Online banking. In case of ATM there are
two chance nodes, i.e. CMs: Max. 3 attempts and Fingerprint scanner. By means
of these chance nodes the threats Learn PIN via brute force or Steal credit card are
mitigated. In this way the superordinated attack, i.e. chance node Manipulate ATM
is mitigated. This chance node as well as the chance node Manipulate online banking
leads to the root threat Steal money from account and is represented by means of a
utility node. The scenario described above including accomplishment of attack
Manipulate online banking is depicted in Figure 2.5. [KW18]
2.3. Modelling Notations
In computer science, it is often essential to express knowledge in modelling nota-
tion. This section brings the GSN as well as the FM more closer.
2.3.1. Goal Structuring Notation
Nowadays, in safety-critical environment it is task of developers to document
for certification authority that a system accomplishes some degree of safety. The
arguments, which are used to describe that, are called Safety Case (SC). Tim Kelly
and Rob Weaver defined a SC as follows:
Definition 2.11 (Safety Case). “A Safety Case should communicate a clear, com-
prehensive and defensible argument that a system is acceptably safe to operate in
a particular context.” [KW04]
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Thereby, it is purpose of the SCs which are usually used from authorities to phrase
it in a clear way. Arguments are used for describing how to get safety based on
the safety evidences. The system to describe must acceptably be safe since 100 %
of safety is practically impossible. Moreover, it is important that the SC is used
in the right context. Otherwise the system may be unsafe. [KW04] Tim Kelly
and Rob Weaver described in their paper [KW04] that it is not sufficient to list
all requirements including their context and evidence, e.g. using FMEA or FTA.
Therefore, it is essential to evince relationships between those elements and to
provide convincing argumentation on how claims and requirements are supported
by evidence and in which context they apply. Figure 2.6 visualises the situation
in a graphical manner. It is therefore purpose of the GSN to communicate SCs
in a standardised argumentation notation that can be used and understood from
everyone to describe safety of safety-critical systems. [Spr12] In that way it is
ensured that all stakeholders have the same understanding of the safety arguments
presented in [KW04].
Safety requirements & objectives
Safety evidence
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Figure 2.6.: Safety argumentation [KW04]
It is the aim of the GSN to describe SCs in a well-defined, standardised, precise
and structured way. Therefore, Tim Kelly and Rob Weaver [KW04] defined several
graphical object nodes as well as two kinds of associated relationships. A listing
of all object types including their functionality is given in Table 2.9 and Table 2.10.
Claims, requirements and arguments are represented by goals whereas evidence
is realised in terms of solutions. By using strategies it is specified which approach
has been taken to apply an argument. Moreover, it is possible to specify the
context for which the claims are applicable. Furthermore, accepted assumptions
are also considered by means of the GSN. Additionally, justifications are realised
to take evidence or regulations into account. Finally, the GSN objects have to be
interconnected to each other to get a well-defined goal structure.
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GSN element Example Semantics
<Goal ID>
<Goal Statement>
G1
System can tolerate single 
component failures
A Goal in GSN is a claim as a part of
an argument.
    <Strategy ID>
<Strategy Statement>
    S1
  Argument by elemina-  
  tion of all hazards
A Strategy in GSN describes how an
argument is being presented.
<Solution ID>
<Solution 
Statement>
Sn1
Fault tree for 
hazard H1
A Solution in GSN provides evidence
to support a claim.
  <Context ID>
  <Context Statement>
     C1
     All identified system  
     hazards
A Context in GSN describes the cir-
cumstances for which the argumenta-
tion holds.
<Assumption ID>
<Assumption 
Statement> A
 A1
 All credible hazards  
 have been identified
A
An Assumption in GSN is a fact the
argumentation relies on.
<Justification ID>
<Justification 
Statement> J
J
      J1
     Domain standard  
     123 permits SIL   
     apportionment J
A Justification in GSN explains why
the argument should be accepted.
<G1>
System can tolerate single 
component failures
Represents an undeveloped claim.
Can be attached to goals or strategies
to indicate that this claim hasn’t been
developed further intentionally.
Table 2.9.: Graphical objects in GSN [KW04]
GSN relation Semantics
The in-context-of relation in GSN references the context or
requirements of goals or strategies. It allows the following
relationships:
• Goal to {context, assumption, justification}
• Strategy to {context, assumption, justification}
The supported-by relation in GSN defines inferential and
evidential correlation. The following GSN elements can be
connected:
• Goal to {goal, strategy}
• Strategy to goal
Table 2.10.: Relations in GSN [KW04]
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Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8 show an introducing example using Brake-by-Wire (BbW)
system, inspired by the TIMMO-2-USE project [Per+12]. A BbW is performed
by a electronically controlled brake-system of an automotive vehicle where the
brakes are operated by sensors and actuators which are monitored by ECUs. BbW
systems have no hydraulic or mechanic coupling between brake pedal and the
actual brakes. Their connection and functionality rather depends on an electronic
bus-system. For this purpose, the individual components of the brake are cross-
linked by ECUs.
     Context C#1
     Brake-by-Wire system  
     design
     Strategy S#1
   Argument by addressing 
   all identified operation  
   hazards
Goal G#1
Brake-by-Wire system is 
acceptably safe     Context C#2
     Brake-by-Wire  
     implementation
     Context C#3
     Integration of Brake- 
     by-wire into car system
     Strategy S#2
   Argument by compliance  
   with all applicable safety  
   standards and regulations
        Context C#5
        All applicable safety  
        standards and regu-
        lations
     Context C#4
     All identified operation  
     hazards
Figure 2.7.: GSN Example: BbW part 1
     Strategy S#1
   Argument by addressing 
   all identified operation  
   hazards
Goal G#2
Hazard of actuator or ECU 
at one of the wheels 
doesn’t react correctly is 
sufficiently mitigated
     Context C#4
     All identified operation  
     hazards
Goal G#3
Hazard of the ECU at the 
brake pedal returns no or 
faulty values is 
sufficiently mitigated
Goal G#4
Hazard of failure of the 
bus system connecting 
the five ECU is sufficiently 
mitigated
Goal G#5
Hazard of failure of the 
ABS task is sufficiently 
mitigated
Goal G#7
Hazard of actuator at one 
of the wheels fails is 
sufficiently mitigated
Goal G#6
Hazard of ECU at one of 
the wheels fails is 
sufficiently mitigated
... ... ...
Solution AS#1
FMEA of the 
wheel’s ECU’s 
with RPN ≤ 50
Solution AS#2
FMEA of the 
wheel’s actuators 
with RPN ≤ 50
Figure 2.8.: GSN Example: BbW part 2
Goal G#1 in Figure 2.7 defines the root goal, i.e. main goal of the BbW SC. In
this context, it claims that the BbW system is acceptably safe taking system design,
implementation and system environment (cf. context C#1 to C#3) into account.
Furthermore, there are two strategies (strategy S#1 and S#2) how to fulfil goal G#1
in this context. The first strategy is illustrated in Figure 2.8 and clarifies how to
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identify operation hazards and how they are mitigated. For this purpose, goals
G#2 to G#7 are responsible for this and address the actuator, ECU, bus system
and Anti-lock Braking System (ABS). To prove that goals G#6 and G#7 are being
achieved, the solutions AS#1 and AS#2 are applied which both depend on FMEA
to consider risk assessment. The example showed that the GSN notation uses a
simple and clear description which is easy to understand and realise.
2.3.2. Feature Modelling
Nowadays, systems are getting more complex and thus it is quite difficult to make
them controllable. For this purpose, clearness regarding structure of a system
has to be enabled. In this context, SPL orientated design and development has
been established to allow variability. The necessity of SPLs is covered later on
in Section 5.1. By means of proper structuring reusability and variation of sub-
structures are possible. [Böc+04] Figure 2.9 illustrates an exemplary basic FM with
all possible core elements, relationships and an extension in the context of this
thesis. The core element of FMs are features. They constitute sub-components of
the whole system and are structured hierarchically. Therefore, the FM is structured
like a tree diagram and can be splitted in easy understandable and still detailed
sub-systems. Hereinafter, the functionality of FMs is explained in more detail.
Feature F#1
Feature F#1.1 Feature F#1.2 Feature F#1.3 Feature F#1.4
Feature F#1.1.1 Feature F#1.1.2 Feature F#1.2.1 Feature F#1.4.1 Feature F#1.4.2
SST relevant feature
Mandatory feature
„XOR“ relationship
„Require“ relationship
„Exclude“ relationship
Abstract feature
„OR“ relationship
Optional feature
Concrete feature
Figure 2.9.: Elements of a FM
In general, FMs consists of features, relationships and additional characteristics.
The purpose of features has already been explained in previous paragraph. Fur-
thermore, there are two types of relationships: Hierarchical relationships and
cross relationships between features of different hierarchical layers. Within the
hierarchical relationships there are two types: OR and ALT relationship. The first
one indicates that at least one feature needs to be selected. The ALT relationship,
which is also called XOR relationship, specifies that exactly one feature is part
of the parent feature. The second kind of relationship is differentiated in two
types: requires and exclude relationship. As the name suggests, these relationships
require the existence of another feature or exclude other features. By using these
relationships it is possible to connect features between several layers, i.e. the
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features do not necessarily have to be connected hierarchically. The semantics
of a parent-child relationship is interpreted as feature a can be part of feature b and
not as feature a is part of feature b. In this way, reusability and variation is enabled.
Furthermore, there are two characteristics that describe the dependency of a fea-
ture of its sub-features: Optional and mandatory. Optional is the default value and
mandatory specifies that this feature must be selected. [CHE04] Moreover, the
classic FM has been extended for safety-critical functionality. It is now possible, to
annotate features with a safety, security or timing flag. In this context, structuring
of safety-critical features can be performed more precisely. For this purpose, three
different coloured dots mark the features (cf. note of Feature 1 in Figure 2.9). The
graphical notation of FMs are standardised uniformly but the SST flags. This
notation can be taken from Figure 2.9.
Assistance systems
Emergency Brake 
Assist
Cruise Control
Adaptive Cruise 
Control
Lane Assist
Lane Departure 
Prevention
Max. 210 km/hMax. 160 km/h Acoustic warning Visual warning
Figure 2.10.: Exemplary FM: ADASs
Figure 2.10 shows a real example of the automotive industry. In focus here is the
configuration of ADASs. The customer can select between five different ADASs:
EBA, Cruise Control (CC), ACC, LA and LDP. It has to be noted that the EBA is
mandatory whereas the other ADASs are optional features. The ACC excludes
the CC feature since the ACC includes CC functionality. If the customer orders an
ACC he or she must decide between a system that allows a maximum permissible
speed of 160 km/h or 210 km/h. Furthermore, the potential customer is forced to
choose LDP if LA has been selected. For the LDP system there are two available
options of which at least one has to be enabled: Acoustic and visual warning. As
one sees by means of FMs you can create product architectures that represent a
product to be manufactured.
2.3.3. System Modelling
Nowadays, hardware and software systems are becoming increasingly complex
and extensive by using a large number of components. Let us recall an exam-
ple from the automotive industry. As mentioned in Section 1.1 modern cars are
equipped with a variety of (semi-)autonomous ADASs. Therefore, many ECUs
and sensors are installed. For this reason, it is essential to model involved system
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components in a manageable manner. First, the term system is defined. Subse-
quently, it will be explained how system modelling is specified.
Definition 2.12 (System). According to [Sch99] a system is characterised by avail-
ability of certain features and by the following four axioms:
1. Structural principle: The system consists of several parts which are related
mutually by each other and the system environment.
2. Decomposition principle: The system consists of several parts which can
be decomposed in related sub-parts. Each sub-system has different system
characteristics.
3. Principle of causality: The system consists of several parts whose relation-
ships and amendments between them are determined clearly.
4. Temporal principle: The system consists of several parts whose structure
and state is determined by temporal procedures and amendments.
According to [Jan10] it is the main task of system modelling to organise all the
different system components of complex systems. Furthermore, a system is clas-
sified as a complex system if there is a variety of system components. Moreover,
human beings are just able to keep the overview of a limited number of elements,
i.e. graphical symbols and their semantics. This is reflected by system modelling
Therefore, there are four design principles to keep also the overview of very
complex systems which has been presented by [Jan10]:
• Structuring: The system is decomposed as far as possible according to
specific criteria. In this way, relationships are identifiable.
• Decomposition: The system is decomposed into basic components and sub-
systems. Hence, there are more details available in the current model and
the structure is finely granulated.
• Aggregation: Sub-systems are aggregated into an entire system by merging
single elements. Aggregation is consequently the opposite of decomposition.
• Hierarchy: In general, system definitions are hierarchical, i.e. sub-systems
can be considered as new systems. The first hierarchical level presents a
global view on the system whereas the bottom layer enables a detailed view
on the system.
Figure 2.11 represents hierarchical levels of a SM. There is a decomposition from
layer 0→ layer 1 and an aggregation from layer 1→ layer 0 [Jan10]. There are
several graphical modelling notations for system modelling The corresponding
notation used in this thesis is presented in Section 3.3.2.
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Layer 0
Layer 1
Layer 2
Figure 2.11.: Hierarchical layers of a SM [Jan10]
2.4. Multi-Criteria Decision Making
Frequently, we were facing the problem that we have to take a decision between
more given alternatives. However, the decisions are not always easy to make. This
is due to the fact that we often prefer attribute 1 from alternative 1, attribute 2
from alternative 2 and so on. Therefore, an intelligent algorithm is needed which
allows decision making by taking individual preferences into account. In this
chapter three common techniques are presented: The AHP, Technique for Order
Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) and Utility Analysis (UA).
For a better understanding of the three MCDM algorithms a simple example is
introduced. Let us assume we need to decide between three cars Car a, Car b
or Car c. There are the attributes power, number of installed safety features (in the
course of Section 2.4.1 to Section 2.4.3 abbreviated as: safety) and price that have to
be assessed. The Car a has the best price whereas the Car c has the highest num-
ber of safety features and best power. In turn, the Car b has the best average values.
The following three sections give an answer how to calculate the optimal solution
by applying the AHP, TOPSIS or UA.
Power Safety Price
Car a 190 HP 19 37.250 e
Car b 231 HP 43 62.850 e
Car c 286 HP 74 90.600 e
Table 2.11.: MCDM example: Alternatives and attributes
2.4.1. Analytic Hierarchy Process
As indicated in the preceding section, decisions often have to be made on the
basis of several criteria. However, these criteria depend on further other criteria.
Therefore, the AHP is used for complex and nested criteria and structures the
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attributes in a hierarchical way, i.e. there is a top-level attribute with a lot of sub-
attributes in different levels. For the case study we need just one layer, because
there are just the attributes power, safety and price that have to be compared. For
that purpose the corresponding attributes are compared pairwise. Thereby, values
between 1 and 9 are assigned. 1 means that attribute x is just as important as
attribute y, whereas 9 means that attribute x is much more important than attribute
y. [Tri00] A detailed description is gathered in Table 2.12. If attribute x compared
to attribute y is assigned value z, it is obvious that attribute y compared to attribute
x is assigned the reciprocal value 1z . [Saa04] The pairwise comparison in general as
well as of the running example can be taken from Table 2.13. The notation of using
matrices with the extension of rows and columns has been taken from [Saa04]. In
this example the following applies: Safety (A2)  price (A3)  power (A1).
Intensity of Definition Description
importance
1 Equally important/liked Both criteria contribute equally
to the objective
3 Moderately more import- One criterion is favoured over the
ant/preferred other
5 Strongly more import- One criterion is largely favoured
ant/preferred over the other
7 Very strongly more im- One criterion has been proved to
portant/preferred dominate the other
9 Extremely more import- One criterion is favoured over an-
ant/preferred other based on evidence of the
highest possible order of affirm-
ation
2, 4, 6, 8 Intermediate values Compromise between the two
adjacent judgements
Table 2.12.: AHP: Scale of relative importance [SK90]
First, we need a square matrix to perform a pairwise comparison. The matrix is
square since the attributes A1, A2, ..., An are compared row by column respectively.
When making judgements in form of pairwise ratios we have to ensure that we do
not use inconsistent ratios, i.e. transitivity must be ensured. [Saa04] Concretely,
the following applies:
Definition 2.13 (Transitivity). There is a relation R ⊆ A × A with set A of
attributes . Then, the following applies for observing transitivity [GV17]:
∀x, y, z ∈ A : xRy ∧ yRz ⇒T xRz
According to [Saa04] it is necessary to check that the matrix is not inconsistent, i.e.
the consistency ratio CR has to be calculated and may not exceed 10 %. For that
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purpose, the consistency index CI is determined that depends on the maximum
eigenvalue λmax and the dimension n of the matrix. Furthermore, CR depends
on an average consistency index CIR of 500 random generated matrices that has
been performed by [Saa04]. In summary, the consistency ratio can be calculated as
follows:
Definition 2.14 (AHP Consistency Ratio). The consistency ratio CR of a matrix A
with the dimension n is defined as follows [Saa04]:
CR = CICIR =
λmax−n
n−1
CIR
≤ 0, 1
A =

A1 A2 . . . An
A1
w1
w1
w1
w2
. . . w1wn
A2 w2w1
w2
w2
. . . w2wn
... . . . . . . . . . . . .
An wnw1
wn
w2
. . . wnwn
 A =

A1 A2 A3
A1 1 16
1
3
A2 6 1 4
A3 3 14 1

Table 2.13.: AHP matrices with weights [Saa04]
According to Definition 2.14 the consistency ratio of the example is:
CR =
3,05−3
3−1
0,58 ≈ 0, 043
Consequently, it has been shown that the matrix is consistent. Subsequently, it is
continued with calculating of the weights wi. It first requires that the matrix of
Table 2.13 is normalised. Based on the normalised matrix the weight wi of attribute
Ai can be calculated:
Definition 2.15 (AHP Weight). The weight wi of attribute i within a matrix A with
dimension n and a row total ri is defined as follows [Saa04]:
wi =
ri
n
By applying Definition 2.15 to the example there are the local priorities that are
listed in Table 2.14. The results reflect our prerequisite that safety  price  power.
To determine our best alternative for our example with respect to the information
already made it is still required to calculate the local priorities of the individual
attributes for all alternatives.
Power Safety Price ri wi
Power 0,1 0,12 0,06 0,28 0,09
Safety 0,6 0,7 0,75 2,05 0,68
Price 0,3 0,18 0,19 0,67 0,22
Σ 1 1 1 3 1
Table 2.14.: AHP example: Normalised matrix and weights wi
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To calculate the local priority vij of alternative i and attribute j the percentage
distribution is determined depending of the real measurable values, e.g. in the
running example the HP [Saa04]. The formal definition of the local priority
therefore is:
Definition 2.16 (AHP Local Priority). The local priority vij of alternative i and
attribute j with real measurable value uij is defined as follows [Saa04]:
vij =
uij
∑nj=1 uij
By applying Definition 2.16 to determine local priority of alternative Car a and
attribute power one gets:
v = 190190+231+286 ≈ 0, 269
The complete list of all local priorities can be taken from Table 2.15. Finally, the
last step of the analysis is performed, in particular calculating the global priorities
of the individual alternatives i. For this purpose, the already calculated weights
according to Definition 2.15 or Table 2.14 as well as the local priorities according
to Definition 2.16 or Table 2.15 are used (see Definition 2.17).
Power Safety Price Global priority
Car a 0,269 0,140 0,403 0,208
Car b 0,327 0,316 0,335 0,318
Car c 0,405 0,544 0,262 0,464
Σ 1 1 1 1
Table 2.15.: AHP example: Local and global priorities
Definition 2.17 (AHP Global Priority). The global priority pii of alternative i and
attribute j with weight wj and local priority vij is defined as follows [Saa04]:
pii = ∑nj=1 wj · vij
The global priorities of the running example can be also taken from Table 2.15.
By means of the attached table it can be concluded: Car c  Car b  Car a. This
can be explained by the fact that the number of installed safety features has been
weighted the highest in this example. The alternative Car b is the second best
option since it has the best average values for all three attributes. As it can be seen
the AHP algorithm is based on likelihood calculations and easy to understand.
One major advantage is that the algorithm is built up hierarchically, i.e. it is
possible to nest the attributes to refine them. However, there is a disadvantage:
If there are matrices with more than five attributes it is quite difficult to keep
consistency ratio under control since the matrices are created manually by experts
in most cases.
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2.4.2. TOPSIS
The TOPSIS has been developed by Hwang and Yoon in 1981 with the objective of
an easy understandable technique for efficiency analysis. Furthermore, TOPSIS
is applied in various domains, e.g. assessment of transport systems, selection
of robots for industrial use or operational location selection. [PZ07] First, the
TOPSIS defines the criteria that has to be taken into account. In this context, it is,
similar to the AHP differentiated between cost criteria and benefit criteria. For
cost criteria the lowest value is the best one whereas for benefit criteria it applies
vice versa. TOPSIS does not define how to assess relative criteria importance.
Therefore, established methods, e.g. the AHP has to be applied. [PZ07] Let us
assume there is an assessment of criteria importance performed with the AHP
that is listed in Table 2.14. On the basis of these data it should be determined by
means of TOPSIS which alternative of the example is the optimal solution. The
first step is calculating local priorities of the individual alternatives. This is done
by applying Definition 2.16. The results are identical to the AHP and are listed in
Table 2.15.
Definition 2.18 (TOPSIS Best and Worst Case Alternative). According to [PZ07]
the best case alternative A+ and worst case alternative A− of alternative i and
attribute j is defined as follows :
A+ = {(maxi = {vij | j ∈ J}), (mini = {vij | j ∈ J′}) | i = 1, ..., n} =
{v+1 , v+2 , ..., v+j , ..., v+m}
A− = {(mini = {vij | j ∈ J}), (maxi = {vij | j ∈ J′}) | i = 1, ..., n} =
{v−1 , v−2 , ..., v−j , ..., v−m}
where
J = {j = 1, ..., m | criterion j belongs to benefit criteria}
J’ = {j = 1, ..., m | criterion j belongs to cost criteria}
and
J ∩ J′ = ∅ ∧ J ∪ J′ = {1, ..., m}.
Subsequently, it is necessary to determine the best case and worst case alternative
A+ and A− of each attribute. The calculation is laid down in Definition 2.18.
Hereinafter, the values are summarised in Table 2.16.
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Power Safety Price
A+ 0,405 0,544 0,403
A− 0,269 0,140 0,262
Table 2.16.: TOPSIS example: Best/Worst case alternative of each attribute
Based on the ascertained best case and worst case values the clearances Si+ or Si−
depending on A+ or A− must be defined for each alternative Ai. The clearances
are so-called Euclidean distances. [PZ07] The subsequent definition summarises
calculation of Si+ and Si− .
Definition 2.19 (TOPSIS Clearances). The clearances Si+ and Si− of alternative i is
defined as follows [PZ07]:
Si+ =
√
∑mj=1 (vij − v+j )2 ∀i = 1, ..., n
Si− =
√
∑mj=1 (vij − v−j )2 ∀i = 1, ..., n
where
vij refers to the local priority of alternative i and attribute j and
v+/−j refers to the corresponding BC or WC value of A
+ or A−).
By applying Definition 2.19 to the example the clearances of Table 2.17 are given.
This is not the final result which is analysable. For this purpose, we need the
distance index C+i for relative proximity to the best case alternative A
+. C+i only
depends on S+i and S
−
i and is defined in Definition 2.20 [PZ07]. Finally, the optimal
alternative can be determined by applying them. Analogous to the AHP algorithm
the result is the same: Car c  Car b  Car a. This can be justified by the fact that
the alternative Car c has the best case attribute twice. Alternative Car a has one
best case attribute, but it has two worst case attributes. Therefore, Car b is the
second best choice.
S+i S
−
i C
+
i
Car a 0,426 0,141 0,249
Car b 0,250 0,200 0,440
Car c 0,141 0,426 0,751
Table 2.17.: TOPSIS example: Results
In summary, the TOPSIS is a suitable MCDM algorithm and requires little prior
knowledge. However, it requires priorities of assessment criteria are already be
present. [PZ07] recommend to use AHP for that. Therefore, it is more practicable
to apply AHP instead.
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Definition 2.20 (TOPSIS Best Case Distance Index). The distance index C+i of
alternative i for relative proximity to best case alternative A+ is defined as follows
[PZ07]:
C+i =
S−i
S+i +S
i
i
where 0 ≤ C+i ≤ 1 ∀i = 1, ..., n
2.4.3. Utility Analysis
The UA is a scoring model that helps to make decisions more easier, especially in
macroeconomics, project management or controlling. However, it is applicable
in various domains including embedded and SCSs. Analogous to the AHP and
TOPSIS it is essential for the UA to determine which attributes are most important.
In contrast to the two MCDM methods that have already been presented, the UA
is kept simple to save time and to perform it in an easy manner. For that purpose,
we create a table consisting of the individual alternatives, criteria and (weighted)
scorings. In this context we want to find out which type of cars is the optimal
decision regarding the preferences that have already been listed in Table 2.14. The
scoring vij of alternative i and attribute j in the example consists of values between
the interval 1 ≤ vij ≤ 5. [EWL10] Conversely, this means that an alternative i has
a score of 5 points in best case and 1 in worst case. The best scoring of alternative
Car a is price (4) whereas safety is the worst attribute (2). Alternative Car b has
average to above-average scorings (3-4). The third alternative Car c scores with the
attributes power and safety (5 respectively) whereas price is below the average (2).
The complete list of all (weighted) scorings is listed in Table 2.18. The calculation of
the overall result of the alternatives can be performed by applying Definition 2.21
and has been listed in Table 2.18.
Car a Car b Car c
Criterion Weight Score Weighted Score Weighted Score Weighted
power 0,09 3 0,27 4 0,36 5 0,45
safety 0,68 2 1,36 3 2,04 5 3,40
price 0,22 4 0,88 3 0,66 2 0,44
Σ 1 2,51 3,06 4,29
Table 2.18.: UA example: Results
As it can be taken from Table 2.18 the UA concludes that Car c  Car b  Car a.
This can be justified by the fact that alternative Car c has the best scorings in safety
and price whereas price has highest priority. Alternative Car b has (above) average
scorings for all attributes, therefore it is the second best alternative.
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Definition 2.21 (UA Overall Scorings). The overall scoring σi of alternative i and
attribute j is defined as follows [EWL10]:
σi = ∑nj=1 wij · vij
where
wij represents the weighting and
vij reflects the corresponding scoring.
Car a only has a good price, power and safety is better for the competitive alternatives.
In summary, the UA can be applied with little prior knowledge and for less
extensive decision makings. Furthermore, the UA should be used for decisions
with a small level of detail. Therefore, it is recommended to use AHP or TOPSIS
for complex MCDMs since the level of detail is more exactly.
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Multi-Concerns Engineering for
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3
Multi-Concerns and Multi-Criteria
Decision Making
The current chapter describes one of the three main parts, the MCDM in more
detail. First, the term trade-off serves as a basis and is specified in Section 3.1.
Subsequently, the underlying concept of this chapter including a concept picture is
explained in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 specifies necessary prerequisites of the MCDM.
Modelling of goal hierarchy is specified in Section 3.4 and covers creating a SSTM
and the necessary modelling for further security analysis which is also part of the
MCDM. Section 3.5 gives a detailed description how to define relative importance
of the SSTM components. In this context, the consistency ratio, i.e. transitivity
property plays an important role and needs to be improved in some cases. It is part
of Section 3.6 to describe how the consistency ratio can be improved. The essential
risk assessment of the MCDM is described in Section 3.7. In this context, it is
differentiated between safety and security risk assessment. The proper analysis
algorithm is presented in Section 3.8. There are two algorithms available, the PCM
and RCM. For a better understanding the MCDM is explained by means of a
selected example which is described in Section 3.9. Finally, an overview of related
work is given. The content of this chapter is mainly based on [LFB18] and [Fen16]
which has been written by the author of this thesis and fellow researchers and is
not cited any more
3.1. Trade-Offs
The development and modelling of safety-critical embedded systems demands
some considerations, dependencies and objectives including safety, security and
real-time requirements. As already indicated in Section 2.1.4, these demands
are usually of different importance and are partially conflicting. Consequently,
aspects which have been realised in consideration of safety or security issues
possibly cause another safety-critical risks. Thus, solving a safety or security
vulnerability might induce severe safety problems. Nowadays modern cars are
equipped with a large number of wired and wireless interfaces. According to the
trend in the automotive domain wireless communication increases immensely by
supporting car2X communication. By transmitting most current and very impor-
tant information, e.g. warnings, weather conditions or traffic news to vehicles
driving within close proximity road safety is influenced significantly. Wireless
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communication offers high risk of hacking attacks. Therefore, the functionality of
modern automotive vehicles are highly safety-critical. Even minor interferences
can impact functionalities tragically. Although car2x communications provide
safety improvements nowadays, it still offers hacking attacks regarding safety
and security issues. These potential problems seem to be solved by applying a
secure data encryption. However, such an encryption causes at this point new
timing problems, since more time is needed to execute the tasks. Let us remind
the example which has been introduced in Section 1.1. The Ford Motor Company
decided in the late 1960ies to develop a car which is cost-effective as well as fuel-
efficient. Thereby, safety aspects and goals have been neglected due to lack of time.
This decision has proved as wrong decision afterwards since the consequential
costs (procedural costs, compensations costs and so on) were much higher than
the costs that would have been incurred for safety-critical development of the
car. [Ord+09] In principle, a car manufacturer operates on the principle of profit
maximisation. To develop a fuel-efficient, cost-efficient as well as a safe car, it is
necessary to evaluate these three criteria each other for determining an optimal
result, i.e. maximisation of all three criteria. In this particular case the Ford Motor
Company would have needed an optimal trade-off between safety, fuel efficiency
and cost efficiency whereas safety should have highest priority. As can be seen,
it is not trivial to find an appropriate solution to fulfil SST requirements to the
highest degree. For this purpose, a suitable trade-off has to be found which covers
all the functional and qualitative requirements to the best possible level.
Definition 3.1 (Trade-Off). A trade-off reflects an optimal decision based on crite-
ria. If each criterion would be assigned the best possible value, it might be feasible
that the criteria are excluding each other.
In this thesis, trade-offs are the result of MCDMs and require modelling and
specifying of safety-critical aspects and concerns including their dependencies be-
forehand (cf. subsequent section). SCSs are used in different application domains
or industries such as automotive, avionics or railway. Nowadays, the trend is
shifting towards autonomous driving. To enable autonomous driving a variety of
ADASs and thus some hardware components are required and must be installed.
Usually, the individual components have different SST requirements. The reason
is that each hardware component has its own purpose. For instance, the reali-
sation of an ACC may require a radar sensor and a camera-based sensor. The
requirement of a radar sensor would be that the range is sufficient to determine the
distance to the vehicle driving ahead. One of the main challenges of camera-based
sensors is the recognition of objects despite back-lighting of the sun. In this case, a
trade-off has to be determined corning safety requirements. In practice, security
and timing issues must be considered as well and complicate decision making
process. Hereinafter, some examples of SST requirements are introduced which
need to be fulfilled by safety-critical components:
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• Safety: Range of sensor is sufficient, object recognition works fine despite
back light of the sun.
• Security: Data traffic is protected against third parties, ECUs are protected
against external manipulation.
• Timing: Brake command is performed in time, airbag is triggered in time.
3.2. Concept
This section presents the concept of the approach, i.e. the MCDM in detail. Thereby,
a concept picture, which is illustrated in Figure 3.1, is used initially to describe the
overall approach of the MCDM in an abstract manner. Furthermore, the necessary
steps, which are used in the concept, are explained in more detail.
Step 1: Requirements and systems  
              engineering
Failure modes and goals
System modelling
Functional and qualitative 
requirements
Step 2: Modelling
ADT
SSTM
Alternative solutions
Step 4: Risk assessment
ADTA
FMEA
Step 3: Multi-Criteria Decision Making
Consistency checks and improvements
Relative importance
Step 5: Calculation 
              algorithms
Figure 3.1.: Logical concept of the MCDM
When developing SCSs the design phase of the MC engineering process is neces-
sary with respect to contradicting SST issues which have already been explained
in Section 3.1. A MCDM is developed to avoid SST conflicts:
1. Devise potential alternative system designs
2. Identify and structure SST objectives
3. Perform risk analysis
4. Apply MCDM to find the safest solution
In general, all steps of the concept picture are covered within the current chapter.
The individual steps or order can be taken from the boxes of the concept picture
and are described hereinafter. A detailed explanation of the individual steps is
done in further course of this chapter.
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Step 1. As usual in each software development process it is first essential to define
requirements and to apply systems engineering. Otherwise it is not possible to
calculate an optimal trade-off. For this purpose, it is necessary to define proper
SST requirements. The requirements are available in GSN notation and define
occurring failure modes of the SCSs taken SST aspects into account. Failure modes
and goals have to be determined for all MC, i.e. SST issues. Furthermore, it is
essential to collect all system specifications within a SM which contains primarily
software and hardware components and dependencies between them. Moreover,
it is mandatory to specify alternative solutions for the MCDM, i.e. possible deci-
sion options between which the MCDM process have to be ruled. Defining failure
modes, goals and SM depends on requirements, whereas specifying alternative
solutions result from the underlying SM.
Step 2. In general, this step covers modelling and processes collected data of step
1 to perform the approach of the MCDM. This step includes modelling of SSTM
and ADT. The SSTM contains the individual failure modes, goals and alternative
solutions in an hierarchical structure whereas the ADT concerns modelling of
security attacks and relating thereto suitable CMs.
Step 3. In this step the AHP algorithm is performed including determining the
relative importance of the goals and POVs within the SSTM. In this way, the
SSTM is used as input for the AHP and is refined by step 4 and 5 to get the output.
For this purpose, it is necessary to compare the individual goals or POVs of the
SSTM by each other to determine local and global priorities. In this context it
is also necessary to check consistency ratio and, if applicable, to update relative
importance to get an acceptable consistency.
Step 4. The second step deals with performing risk assessment using FMEA and
ADTA technique. These methods cover SST issues whereas the ADTA is only
responsible for security concern. Economic aspects are also covered by the ADT
based ADTA. By means of the FMEA technique probability of occurrence, severity
and detection are taken into account for the interrelations between individual
POVs and alternative solutions.
Step 5. This step describes the calculation of the optimal trade-off based on
information of step 1-4. In this context, two algorithms are available, the PCM and
the RCM. The first one is mainly based on AHP calculations whereas the second
one is mainly based on risk assessment calculations.
3.3. Requirements and Systems Engineering
As usual for every software development process, it is necessary before the design
phase to perform requirements engineering. Besides requirements engineering
there is a change request process. The requirements engineering process is covered
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in this chapter whereas the change request process is part of Chapter 4. The
requirements engineering process is defined in the following order:
1. The necessary requirements are identified.
2. The requirements are analysed and reviewed and if necessary identified once
again.
3. The requirements will be specified until they are validated. However, if the
validating process fails a repeated specifying process is necessary.
This procedure has to be repeated for all requirements. [Som11] A detailed de-
scription of this process is given in Section 3.3.1. In general, there are two types of
requirements namely functional requirements and quality requirements:
• Functional requirements define functionality and variability of a software
system. Typically, these requirements are defined from function view (in-
put/output of a system, failure situations), data view (data structures, in-
tegrity conditions) and behaviour view. [Poh10]
• Qualitative requirements on the other hand define criteria for goodness of a
software system or individual system components. These include require-
ments, e.g. SST requirements, reliability, usability, performance, changeabil-
ity, portability or scalability. [Som11]
Requirements Engineering
Identifying Analysing Specifying Validating
Change Request
Requirement change
Document management
Planning, organisation, controlling
Figure 3.2.: Requirements engineering and management process [Som11]
The requirements engineering process is mandatory and prerequisite for the
change request process. It is the purpose of the change request process to track
amendments of requirements and to manage requirement documents during the
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whole life cycle. Moreover, core activities of the requirements have to be organised
and controlled. [Som11] A graphical overview of the requirements engineering
and requirements management process is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
3.3.1. Requirements Definition
As already mentioned in the previous section, it is mandatory to define require-
ments correctly. It is the purpose of the MCDM to achieve a maximum degree of
safety for a SCS. Therefore, we consider SST requirements:
• Safety: It must be taken into account that the target system must prevent
hazards and may not endanger human life at any time (cf. Definition 2.2).
• Security: It is covered that the final system has to be protected against data
manipulation, data theft and unauthorised access (cf. Definition 2.4).
• Timing: It is considered that timing intervals and thresholds are reached (cf.
Definition 2.5).
Thereby, for each requirement certain conditions need to be fulfilled:
• Technological: The system and the technical IT infrastructure within which
the software system should be executed and developed.
• Organisational: Structure and procedure organisation of stakeholders which
use or develop the software.
• Legal: Compliance with laws, standards and norms.
• Ethical: Morals and wordings of the individual cultural circle, e.g. forms of
address in which the system is applied. [Poh10]
In the previous section a rough roadmap for defining requirements has been
presented. This process is explained in more detail by the following:
1. Identifying: It is essential to find existing as well as potential requirements to
the SCS. Existing requirements can be determined by surveys or analyses
whereas potential requirements are identified by creativity techniques, e.g.
brainstorming or mind mapping. [Poh10]
2. Analysing: After identifying requirements they are usually unstructured.
Therefore, it is necessary to classify and prioritise them. The classification
of requirements entails clusters of coherent requirements. Furthermore,
redundant and conflicting requirements are emphasised. Subsequently, the
relevant requirements are prioritised upon consultation with the different
stakeholders. [Poh10]
3. Specifying: This step transforms the analysed requirements in a default
notation. For instance, requirements can be transformed into a graphical
model notation. [Poh10]
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4. Validating: This process is responsible for synchronising specified require-
ments with the identified requirements. In this way it is ensured that on
basis of the resulting requirements the correct SCSs are developed by means
of the MCDM. [Som11]
For the MCDM requirements are specified in textual form since they are trans-
ferred into a hierarchical goal structure by means of the requirements engineering
process. The requirements are formulated by the different participated stakehold-
ers. These include persons or organisations which are interested in the software
system, e.g. software- and hardware specialists or regulatory authorities. [Poh10]
The requirements for the MCDM have to be formalised with a high quality stan-
dard and consider all MC in order to get a significant result by the MCDM. For this
purpose, it is mandatory to take SST into account by means of requirements. In
context of the MCDM a security analysis is performed which analyses vulnerabili-
ties of the SCS and analyses whether appropriate CMs are profitable or not. I.e., in
this context the requirements have to be formalised in a way that quality attributes
are fulfilled. Hereinafter, there are some examples of resulting SST requirements
including their concerned stakeholders and the corresponding quality attributes
in context of developing a safety-critical ACC system:
Stakeholders Requirements Quality attribute
Safety specialist,
software developer
Distance to the obstacle
is acceptably accurate Safety
Data protection authority,
software developer
Communication is acceptably
secured against data theft Security
Cyber security specialist,
software developer
Messages arrive in time
with acceptable reliability Timing
Table 3.1.: Exemplary SST requirements for developing an ACC system
3.3.2. System Model
Section 2.3.3 described the necessary foundations of system modelling In this
section, the SM, which is part of the systems engineering process, is used for the
MCDM and is explained in more detail. For this purpose, a component diagram,
which is used for system modelling of the MCDM, provides necessary information.
In this context, the SM is used to derive necessary information for the MCDM.
These information derive alternative solutions which are part of the following
section.
Component diagrams are specified in the Unified Modeling Language (UML)
which help to understand the structure of existing systems or to build new ones.
Components are the major elements of the component diagram and are related with
other system components of the component diagram. Thus, structural principle
(cf. Definition 2.12) is fulfilled. Furthermore, components can be nested arbitrary
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to specify the system on different abstraction levels as illustrated in Figure 2.11
of Section 2.3.3. Therefore, the component diagram also meets decomposition
principle. Components are characterised by interfaces and ports. An interface is a
collection of methods and attributes which describes the behaviour of a system
component. There are two types of interfaces: Required and provided interfaces. A
required interface requires an external interface from another interface, whereas a
provided interface can be implemented by other interfaces for their use. A port
usually clusters interfaces and defines an interaction point between the component
and its environment. Since the port and interface connections are subject of causal
relationship, the principle of causality is fulfilled. Moreover, creating a compo-
nent diagram is governed by some temporal processes, e.g. specifying functional
requirements. Therefore, the temporal principle as defined in Definition 2.12 is
covered. [RQS12]
For the system modelling of the MCDM and for further steps of this thesis, the
component diagram is reduced to merely provide relevant information for the
analyses. For this purpose, we only model components and ports and link them
with each other. This is due, among other reasons, to the fact that only components
and ports are pertinent for the approach of this thesis since we need no implemen-
tation details, e.g. required or provided interfaces. In context of this thesis, the
individual system components as well as how they are connected between them.
Later in the course of this thesis, if we speak about SM it refers to the reduced SM
which is described in this paragraph.
Radar sensor
Wide-angle camera 
Ultrasonic sensor
Adaptive Cruise 
Control
Lane Departure 
Prevention
Figure 3.3.: Exemplary SM: Excerpt from ADASs
Figure 3.3 shows an exemplary and rudimentary excerpt from a SM which models
relationships between two ADASs. There are two components representing the
ADASs, namely Adaptive Cruise Control and Lane Departure Prevention. Further-
more there are three system components which represents the individual sensor
types. These include Radar sensor, Wide-angle Camera and Ultrasonic sensor. By
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means of the individual port connections, which are represented by small squares
dependencies, can be determined. In this way, the system component Wide-angle
camera is used from both, the Adaptive Cruise Control and Lane Departure Prevention.
3.3.3. Failure Modes, Goals and Solutions
In general, it is the purpose in each safety-critical domain, e.g. in the automotive,
avionics or railway environment to develop a system which is as safe as possible.
To enable this, some compromises, i.e. trade-offs have to be made since the
individual aspects don’t correspond with each other. For instance, if an airbag
doesn’t trigger in time it may endanger human life. To guarantee a maximum
degree of safety the requirements engineering process (cf. Figure 3.1) is first
mandatory to solve the problem. After specifying the requirements and modelling
of system relationships by means of a SM it is mandatory to derive alternative
solutions, failure modes and goals therefrom. These elements are described in
more detail in the following paragraphs.
Failure Modes
The fundamental functionality of the MCDM is to define an hierarchical goal
structure and to refine them step by step to consider SST aspects and how they are
connected among each other. In this way, it can be ensured that the correspond-
ing system is acceptably safe. It is the first step to define failure modes before
specifying the corresponding goals. Without specifying any failure modes, i.e.
identifying the manner in which the failures of a SCS occur, goals could not be
defined correctly since necessary context information would be missing. Under
certain circumstances, these context information could not be taken into account
otherwise.
Goals
As already mentioned in Section 1.1, if it is neglected to define goals it may lead to
economic, financial or personal damage. The Ford Pinto example showed that it
can lead to serious consequences if there are no sufficient
a) defined goals
b) preventative risk assessments
The more precise the goals are defined the lower the probability of any damages
or failures which can occur at a later time. Goals must be defined via different
abstraction layers. The lower the degree of abstraction the more precise are the
goals. [DLM13] There is one goal starting from root node, i.e. abstraction layer
0 which needs to be a safety goal since safety has highest priority. Proceeding
from this goal, goals can be refined by further goals. Goals with an abstraction
layer grater than 0 consider different concerns such as safety, security or timing,
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i.e. security and timing influence safety in an indirect manner as mentioned in
Section 2.1.4. Furthermore, non safety-critical aspects, e.g. economic aspects can
be considered as well. These include, e.g. costs or profitability. However, in this
thesis we only consider the three concerns SST unless they will mitigate safety
risk. The first aspect is an essential part of the MCDM and has to be taken into
account in the next paragraph. By means of preventative risk assessment it has
to be clarified beforehand which kind of risks can occur and to which degree it
may lead. For this purpose, the POVs need to be estimated with respect to the
individual decision points of the MCDM, i.e. the alternative solutions (cf. next
paragraph). Thereby, the probability of occurrence, severity and detection are of
high importance. If the risk is not acceptable, the corresponding goals, POVs or
alternative solutions have to be replaced or adapted.
Alternative Solutions
In automotive vehicles, air-planes or railways there are a number of installed hard-
ware and software configurations whose interactions behave differently. Therefore,
it is essential to apply the MCDM for each configuration set individually to get
the best result. We call such configuration set (alternative) solution. Reversely,
this means that the MCDM should analyse by means of a percentage distribution
which solution is the most optimal taken SST requirements into account. To get
a significant result there must be at least two solutions. Table 3.2 shows a set of
possible solutions:
Solution Sensor(s) Encryption Bus system
Solution AS#1 radar 64 bit CAN
Solution AS#2 camera 128 bit LIN
Solution AS#3 radar & camera 128 bit FlexRay
Table 3.2.: Exemplary solution set for MCDM
In case of solution AS#3 the individual solution is interpreted as follows: The
corresponding automotive vehicle (or something else) is equipped with a radar
and camera based sensor. The corresponding data is en-/decrypted by means
of a 128 bit encryption algorithm. Moreover, the data is sent via a FlexRay bus.
Combining these three properties is the result of solution AS#3. Let us assume
the MCDM is performed with the solution set of Table 3.2 the final result is a
percentage distribution of solution AS#1, AS#2 and AS#3, i.e. summing up all
solutions result 100%. The solution with the highest percentage distribution
is that solution which best accomplish SST requirements. When selecting the
corresponding solution system’s safety properties are fulfilled optimally, i.e. if
another solution with worse percentage value is applied the system is no longer
as safe as possible.
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3.4. Modelling of Goal Hierarchy
When developing contradicting SST issues of a SCS it is first necessary to define
some initial fundamentals as proposed in Section 3.3.3 to perform MCDM. The
approach which has been developed in the context of this thesis analyses the
alternative solutions in regards to potentially conflicting SST aspects to calculate
the optimal trade-off. For instance, if you analyse the ACC of an automotive
vehicle, you might consider different sensor types, data encryption algorithms
or data bus systems (see Table 3.2). Hereinafter, it is described how to create the
necessary SSTM which is essential for the MCDM. Moreover, it is specified how
to create an ADT, an optional extension of the SSTM. Figure 3.4 gives an overview
of the used components which are essential for the MCDM.
SSTM 
goal 
hierarchy
ADT 
 hierarchy
FMEA GSN
Failure
modes
Alternative
solutions
Goals
Attack
nodes
CM
nodes
Figure 3.4.: Overview of components of MCDM
3.4.1. SST Model
In the requirements engineering process, it is the aim to define well-defined
requirements and to derive solutions from the underlying SM. This knowledge is
transferred into a standardised Safety Goal Hierarchy (SGH) which shapes a solid
basis for the actual FMEA risk assessment. In this context, the term safety of SGH
may be misleading since security and timing is taken into account as well. This is
explained by the fact that safety is our primary goal which can also be achieved
by any security and timing goals, not only by safety goals. The SGH applies the
graphical argumentation notation GSN by Tim Kelly and Rob Weaver [KW04] for
a comprehensible representation. Therefore, we define a SGH as follows:
Definition 3.2 (Safety Goal Hierarchy). A SGH combines structure of GSN for
modelling SST concerns (MC) and FMEA for documenting failure modes.
The GSN presents the goals with various possible features in a standardised,
hierarchical and understandable manner. To resolve conflicts of SCSs the concern
safety is rated as primary goal whereas security and timing are ranked as sub-
ordered goals which might affect safety in an indirect manner. On this account, a
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SGH is always initiated with a top-level goal, e.g. Assuring that the (sub-)system is
acceptably safe. The term acceptably means that the system is as safe as possible and
ensures to enable almost 100 % of safety. Based on empirical values, exactly 100 %
of safety is not reachable. The top-level goal is decomposed into more concrete
sub-goals which cover the System under Development (SuD), usually including
security requirements and real-time constraints. Figure 3.5 shows a slimmed SGH
example of an ACC use case which is extended in Section 3.9. The node ACC is
acceptably safe represents the primary safety goal which should be achieved. There
are four sub-goals in order to fulfil the root goal:
1. ACC Sensors are working correctly
2. ACC Actuators are working correctly
3. ACC Software is working correctly
4. ACC Communication is acceptably reliable
Each of them has to be considered for the solutions for which the MCDM should
be applied. Goals which are not being refined any more are called Point of
Vulnerability (POV). In this example, the solutions refer to the solution set which
has been proposed in Table 3.2.
ACC is 
acceptably safe
ACC sensors are 
working 
correctly
ACC actuators 
are working 
correctly
ACC software is 
working 
correctly
ACC 
communication 
is acceptably 
reliable
Solution 
AS#1
Solution 
AS#2
Solution 
AS#3
Figure 3.5.: SGH: ACC is acceptably safe
3.4.2. Attack and Defence Tree
As already described in Section 2.2 or rather in Figure 2.2 it is the aim to model
threats and to develop CMs. The ADT is an extension of the SSTM and provides
an additional security analysis considering these aspects. For this purpose, a valid
SSTM has to be exist with at least one security goal within the SGH of the SSTM.
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Reversely, i.e. there is separate ADT for a specific security goal within the SGH.
As already described in Section 2.2.2.1, an ADT provides one or more CMs to
mitigate or avoid a security attack. Creating the ADT including its components,
i.e. specifying the attacks and developing the corresponding CMs is part of the
requirements engineering process. This process is performed in parallel with
identifying the failure modes which have been explained in Section 3.3.3. First, it is
necessary to identify the individual security attacks which can arise. Subsequently,
the corresponding CMs can be developed. Figure 3.6 shows a minimalistic ex-
ample of an ADT hierarchy which is extended in Section 3.9. There is the root
attack Manipulation of the car software which can be achieved either by the attack
Gain violent access to the car or by Gain non-violent access to the car. In this short
example only the first one is explained. The attacks are emphasised by orange
nodes. For each attack, possible actions (blue nodes) of the attacker are identified
before necessary CMs (green nodes) are developed:
1. Action: Break down the door with the CMs
• Install alarm system and
• Install security lock
2. Action: Exploit vulnerability with the CM
• Install strong authentication mechanism
3. Action: Go out unobserved with the CM
• Install a video surveillance equipment
Manipulation of the 
car software
Gain violent access 
to the car
Gain non-violent 
access to the car
Break 
down the 
door
Exploit 
vulnerability
...
Install 
alarm 
system
Install strong 
authentication 
mechanism
...
Go out 
unobserved
Install a video 
surveillance 
equipment
Install 
security 
lock
Figure 3.6.: ADT hierarchy: Manipulation of the car software
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3.5. Applying the AHP on SGHs
It is purpose to develop a well-defined goal structure to avoid or mitigate risks.
For this reason, the SGH is introduced. A valid SGH is a suitable model to apply
the AHP and thus to perform a MCDM by means of the identified solutions. Some
definitions, closely related to graph theory, are introduced. They are necessary for
describing the characteristics of a valid SGH precisely.
Definition 3.3 (Validity of SGHs). A SGH is defined as SGH = (N, E) whereas
E ⊆ N × N := tuple of set of nodes N and edges E. A SGH is valid if and only if it
fulfils the following criteria:
1. The number of nodes is finite, i.e. ∃n ∈N : |N| = n
2. It defines exactly one root node, i.e. ∃!r ∈ N : P(r) = ∅
whereas P : N → N and n 7→ P(n) := set of all predecessors of n
3. The only root node is of the type GSN Goal, i.e. ∃!r ∈ N : P(r) = ∅
∧ Type(r) ∈ GSNGoal whereas Type : P(N)→ N and x 7→ Type(x)
4. The only root node has at least two children, i.e. ∃!r ∈ N : P(r) = ∅
∧ |P(r)| ≥ 2
5. Either all children of the root node are of the type GSN Goal or GSN Strategy,
i.e. ∃!r ∈ N : P(r) = ∅ ∧ (Type(r) ∈ GSNGoal ∨ Type(r) ∈ GSNStrategy)
6. A child node of the type GSN Goal or GSN Strategy has at most one parent
node, i.e. ∀n ∈ N : Type(n) ∈ GSNGoal ∨ Type(n) ∈ GSNStrategy ⇒
P(n) 6= ∅
7. Each node of the type GSN Strategy defines at least two children of the
type GSN Goal, i.e. ∀n ∈ N : Type(n) ∈ GSNStrategy ⇒ ∃s1, s2 ∈ S(n) :
s1 6= s2 ∧ s1 ∈ GSNGoal ∧ s2 ∈ GSNGoal whereas S : N → P(N) and
n 7→ S(n) := set of all successors of n
8. Each node of the type GSN Goal has at least two children of the same type,
i.e. ∀n ∈ N : Type(n) ∈ GSNGoal ⇒ ∃s1, s2 ∈ S(n) : s1 6= s2 ∧ s1 ∈
GSNGoal ∧ s2 ∈ GSNGoal
9. Each node of the type GSN Goal has only children of the type GSN Goal,
GSN Strategy or GSN Solution, i.e. ∀n ∈ N : Type(n) ∈ GSNGoal ⇒ S(n) ⊆
GSNGoal ∪ GSNStrategy ∪ GSNSolution
10. If a GSN Goal G has children of the type GSN Solution, then all nodes of
the type GSN Solution have to be children of G, i.e. ∃n, m ∈ N ∀s ∈
GSNSolution : Type(n) ∈ GSNGoal ∧ Type(m) ∈ GSNSolution ∧ m ⊆
S(n) ∧ n ∈ P(s)
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Elements of the type GSN Context, Assumption and Justification annotate the SGH
with useful information which are not mandatory to calculate the optimal trade-off
by means of the AHP by ranking the alternative solutions. Therefore, these ele-
ment types as well as the in-context-of relationships can be ignored when checking
the validity of SGHs with the aim of determining the best trade-off. For the sake of
completeness, the in-context-of relationship R within a SGH is defined as follows:
R ⊆ A × B whereas A × B = {(a, b) | a ∈ A, b ∈ B} and A := GSNGoal ∪
GSNStrategy and B := GSNContext ∪ GSNAssumption ∪ GSNJusti f ication.
First, the number of nodes has to be finite such that a SGH is valid. This is neces-
sary because violating this requirement would for instance allow endless refining
of goals. The SGH is a tree-based structure, i.e. there is exactly one root goal on the
top-level. The GSN and thus also the SGH does not provide multiple inheritance,
i.e. no Goal or Strategy node has more than one parent node. In this way, all the
GSN Goal and GSN Strategy nodes forms an hierarchical tree structure by means
of the supported-by relationships. Furthermore, each GSN Strategy node within the
SGH needs to be refined by at least two GSN Goal nodes. A GSN Goal node has
to be supported by at least two nodes of the type GSN Goal, Strategy or Solution.
The supported-by relation R is described formally as follows: R ⊆ A× B ∪ C× A
whereas A × B = {(a, b) | a ∈ A, b ∈ B}, C × A = {(c, a) | c ∈ C, a ∈ A},
A := GSNGoal, B := A ∪ GSNStrategy ∪ GSNSolution and C := GSNStrategy.
Since there are only the relationships are available which have been presented in
Table 2.10, the only way to terminate refinement process of the goals is to support
them by at least two GSN Solution nodes. According to Definition 3.3, sub-item
10., each sub-goal must be supported by all solutions which are defined within the
hierarchy.
According to rule 3 of Definition 3.3 a GSN Goal root node functions as goal with
highest abstraction level, i.e. it serves as top-level goal for the SGH. The AHP
decision attributes and criteria of this root goal are covered by direct successors
of the root node (cf. rule 4 of Definition 3.3). According to rule 5 of Definition 3.3
either a GSN Goal or Strategy is allowed. These goals or strategies are decomposed
further, just like a regular AHP hierarchy. The GSN Solution nodes, which are on
the lowest level within the hierarchy, match the alternative solutions of the AHP.
Applying the AHP algorithm, competing nodes have to be compared pairwise
step by step. In the simple example of Figure 3.5 this would mean to judge the
relative importance of the goals ACC sensors are working correctly, ACC actuators
are working correctly, ACC software is working correctly and ACC communication is
acceptably reliable for accomplishing the top-level goal ACC is acceptably safe. Each
rating within the AHP should be argued carefully since it may have decisive
impacts on the result of the MCDM.
Furthermore, the solutions AS#1−3 have to be compared pairwise to determine how
well they fulfil the goals ACC sensors are working correctly, ACC actuators are working
correctly, ACC software is working correctly and ACC communication is acceptably
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reliable. Since these goals have not been further refined, we speak about Points
of Vulnerabilitiy (POVs) and have to be judged according to the FMEA. This
means to estimate the probability of occurrence, severity and detection for each
of the three solutions individually. This procedure is explained in Section 3.7.1 in
more detail. Furthermore, we have to compare how well the solutions AS#1, AS#2
and AS#3 fulfil the objective of the corresponding POVs relatively to each other.
Therefore, a pairwise comparison between the individual solutions based on the
individual POVs is performed. Finally, the regular AHP algorithm can be applied.
3.6. Improving Consistency of Comparison Matrices
Applying the AHP requires that the matrices of pairwise comparison judgements
are consistent (cf. Definition 2.14). In summary this means: If the consistency ratio
is above 0.1, the consistency index is more than 10% of the average consistency
index of random generated matrices with the same number of columns and rows.
Reversely, this means that decision makers have to revise and update their matri-
ces until the ratings achieve a more consistent judgement, i.e. transitivity has to
be fulfilled within the whole matrix (cf. Definition 2.13) The bigger the size of the
matrices the more difficult it is to achieve a more consistent judgement. If the size
of the matrix is greater than 5 it is nearly impossible to create a consistent matrix
intuitively. For this reason, an algorithm is proposed how to solve the difficulty of
improving inconsistent as well as consistent matrices. The consistency of matrices
which have a consistency ratio ≤ 10 can be improved optionally as well.
It is prerequisite that there is a matrix of pairwise ratios A with in/consistent ratios
to calculate the completely consistent matrix of pairwise ratios X by means of the
maximum right eigenvector v of A, with
xij :=
vi
vj
The deviation between them derives a completely consistent matrix X and the
matrix of pairwise ratios A can be calculated element by element:
A− X := (aij − vivj )
[Saa02] proposed the entry of A with the highest deviation for revision.
Thus, the algorithm for improving the consistency of in/consistent matrices is
defined as follows:
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Definition 3.4 (Improve Consistency of In/Consistent Matrices). There are four
steps necessary to improve consistence of a matrix A consisting of pairwise ratios:
1. Compute the right Perron eigenvector v [LT69] of the matrix of pairwise
ratios A.
2. Calculate the fully consistent matrix X with xij :=
vi
vj
.
3. Determine the deviations between A and X element-wise: A− X.
4. Find the maximum absolute value in the matrix A− X.
The algorithm which has been defined in Definition 3.4 is demonstrated by means
of a simple example. In this context, there is a matrix A of pairwise comparisons
considering three criteria A1, A2 and A3:
A =

A1 A2 A3
A1 1 2 4
A2 12 1
1
5
A3 14 5 1

In this example, A1 is twice important as A2 whereas A1 is four times important
as A3. Consequently, one would imply that A2 should be twice as important as A3.
However, A2 has been weighted to be five times less important than A3 wrongly.
In this context we define the following notation (as already used in Section 2.4.1):
Ai  Aj as Ai is more important than Aj for i 6= j. Consequently, we should
have A1  A2  A3 but also A3  A2. As can be seen, these are conflicting and
inconsistent constraints. According to Definition 3.5, the maximum eigenvalue
λmax of A is approximately
λmax ≈ 3, 6186
65
3. MULTI-CONCERNS AND MULTI-CRITERIA DECISION MAKING
Definition 3.5 (Calculation of Maximum Eigenvalue). There has to be a square
matrix, e.g. a 3 × 3 matrix with the following scheme:
A =
a11 a12 a13a21 a22 a23
a31 a32 a33

Subsequently, the matrix A− λE results by subtracting with λ multiplied unit
matrix E [Coh94]:
A− λE =
a11 − λ a12 a13a21 a22 − λ a23
a31 a32 a33 − λ

By applying Sarrus’ rule [Coh94] the determinant det(A − λ) is calculated as
follows:
det(A− λ) = (a11 − λ) · (a22 − λ) · (a33 − λ) + a12 · a23 · a31 + a31 · (a22 − λ) ·
a31 − (a11 − λ) · a23 · a32 − a12 · a21 · (a33 − λ)
The eigenvalues λ1, ...,λn result from the zeros of the polynomial. The resulting
maximum eigenvalue λmax is defined as follows: [Coh94]
λmax = max({λ1, ...,λn})
According to Definition 2.14 we get a consistency ratio of about
CR ≈ 0, 5869 > 0, 1
In accordance with Definition 3.4, we first need to determine the right Perron
eigenvector of A. It results the following Perron eigenvector:
v =
1.85660.4309
1.0000

Step 2 of Definition 3.4 requires to calculate the fully consistent matrix X with
xij :=
vi
vj
. According to step 3 and 4 of Definition 3.4 we need to define the
maximum absolute value in the matrix A−X. In this way, we receive the following
completely consistent matrix X and deviations A− X:
X ≈

A1 A2 A3
A1 1 4, 3087 1, 8566
A2 0, 2321 1 0, 4309
A3 0, 5386 2, 3207 1

A− X ≈

A1 A2 A3
A1 0 −2, 3087 2, 1434
A2 0, 2679 0 −0, 2309
A3 −0, 2886 2, 6793 1

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If we take a look at the results of the deviation matrix A− X one will realise that
there is a maximum absolute deviation value of 2,6793. I.e. the importance of
criterion A3 compared to A2 as well as the rating of A2 compared to A3 should
be revised. Changing the proposed rating seems to be reasonable for the ex-
ample. However, changing the value with the highest inconsistency does not
automatically imply that there is an improvement of the consistency index and
thus consistency ratio. Appropriately, the algorithm which has been presented in
this section has to be repeated until the consistency ratio is acceptable, i.e. less or
equal 10%.
3.7. Risk Assessment
The previous sections presented how to model a SGH, applying the AHP on
them and how to improve consistency to avoid and mitigate in/consistency. The
current section covers step 4 of the concept (cf. Figure 3.1), i.e. the risk assessment
is explained in more detail. The MCDM uses the FMEA and ADTA for risk
assessment. The second one can be seen as an extension within the SGH and does
not affect the result of the MCDM in a direct manner.
3.7.1. FMEA for POVs
In Section 3.4.1 the principle of SGHs has been explained. In this context, the
purpose of POVs has been defined. In our approach it is necessary to identify the
potential risk of failure for each of the alternative solutions by means of the FMEA.
It is shown how rating risks with the FMEA influence the ranking proposed by
the adapted AHP. The FMEA is a widely used method to identify and reduce
potential risks of failure which are coupled to corresponding systems, processes
or hardware, preventatively. [LYL16] First of all, it is recommended to answer the
following questions to identify the potential failure modes:
1. What can go wrong?
2. Why did this failure occur?
3. What would be the impact of the identified failure?
If all the potential failure modes including their causes have been identified, they
are integrated into the SGH which has been prepared in Section 3.4.1. It may
happen that the SGH needs to be refined after identifying the potential failure
modes and the causes. Conversely, this entails that the SGH has to be refined until
each potential failure mode is described by at least one POV (cf. Figure 3.7).
It is noted that the SGH can be arbitrarily nested and complex, but it is always
ending at the POVs, i.e. the leaves of the hierarchical tree structure. If all the
mentioned steps have been considered, the potential risks associated with each
POV have to be evaluated. When performing a MCDM and respecting SST aspects,
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Goal
Sub-goal #2 Sub-goal #3Sub-goal #1
Sub-goal #2.1 Sub-goal #2.2
Prevent
POV #1.1
Prevent 
POV #1.2
Prevent POV 
#2.1.1
Prevent POV 
#2.1.2
Prevent POV 
#2.2.1
Prevent POV 
#2.2.2
Prevent 
POV #3.1
Prevent 
POV #3.2
Prevent 
POV #3.3
Figure 3.7.: Abstract and exemplary SGH
it is necessary to take the FMEA ratings or the respective RPN of the alternative
solutions into account. For this purpose, the FMEA determines the risk based
on three parameters which is subsequently referred to as Occurrence, Severity and
Detection (OSD):
1. Occurrence: The probability that a failure occurs.
2. Severity: The impact that a failure can have it is not detected.
3. Detection: The likelihood that a failure will be detected.
Each of these three criteria is assigned an integer value between 1 and 10 whereas
1 means that there is very low probability that a failure occurs. There are also
little effects which a failure can have if it is not detected. Moreover, the likelihood
that a failure is detected is very high (vice versa for 10, cf. Section 2.2.1.1). The
corresponding ratings and how to interpret them can be taken from Section 2.2.1.1.
As described in Section 2.2.1.1, to evaluate the risk of the POV, the OSD is in-
tegrated in the RPN by multiplying the individual factors: RPN = O× S× D.
Therefore, it can be necessary to consider the RPN of the alternative solutions
when performing a MCDM on the SGH. As stated in Section 2.2.1.1, the RPN is
clustered into four risk levels. If the RPN does exceed a risk value of 50 or more,
retaliatory actions in consideration of risk mitigation or risk reduction are needed.
I.e., amendments on the system design have to be done and potentially hazards
have to be ruled out, i.e. step 1 to 3 of the concept picture (cf. Figure 3.1) and thus
SGH has to be repeated and adapted until an acceptable risk is reached. These
changes might cause new threats or existing threats must be updated. In short,
this means that this process needs to be repeated until an acceptable risk level and
safe state is reached. [BMI17] It is important to note that this approach can not
guarantee that the best alternative regarding safety is chosen, because optimising
the RPN does not necessarily imply reducing the overall risks. In Section 3.9 a
more sophisticated aggregation is presented.
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3.7.2. Attack and Defence Tree Analysis
In Section 3.4.2 it has been explained how to create hierarchies based on ADTs. In
this context, it has been shown how to develop CMs to mitigate or avoid threats.
However, the efficiency of such CMs has not been considered so far. For this
purpose, the economic indices Return on Invest (ROI) and Return on Attack (ROA)
are introduced to evaluate the efficiency of developed CMs. Furthermore, it is
described how to combine the indices to make decisions for CMs.
Return on Invest
It is purpose of the ROI index to measure whether a developed CM is economically
profitable with respect to a certain attack from point of the defender. This applies
if the ROI value is greater than zero. Otherwise, an investment is not profitable.
According to [BFP06] there are some terms which should be understood before
proceeding with the calculation of the actual ROI calculation. Hereinafter, these
terms are clarified:
• AV: The Asset Value reflects costs of manufacturing, development, support,
renewal and ownership of an asset.
• EF: The Exposure Factor measures loss or impact on the value of an asset if a
threat is realised. Thereby, the EF is specified in percent with regard to the
value of the asset.
• SLE: The Single Loss Exposure measures losses of a company if a threat is
realised. Since all the threats are not realised with the same probability, this
value can be refined by means of an additional calculation of the frequency
of the corresponding threat.
• ALE: The Annualised Loss Expectancy corresponds to the estimated annual
loss which suffers a company in case of realising a threat.
• ARO: The Annualised Rate of Occurrence is a numeric estimation and indicates
how often a threat is realised per year.
• RM: The Risk Mitigated measures how effectively a CM mitigates the risk of
a threat. The value is between the interval [0;1].
• CSI: The Cost of Security Investment is the value for costs which incurs for
implementing a corresponding CM.
Based on the given knowledge the algorithm for calculating the ROI index for all
CMs of a threat is specified in Definition 3.6.
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Definition 3.6 (Return on Invest). If there is an arbitrary ADT in DNF then the
ROI index is calculated as follows:
1. Define EF, ARO for all attacks and the AV for the threat.
2. Calculate SLE and ALE for all attacks and assign the results to the corre-
sponding leaves:
SLE = AV · EF
ALE = SLE · ARO
3. Define CSI, RM for all CMs.
4. Calculate ROI for all CMs:
ROI = (ALE·RM)−CSICSI
Let us apply a simple example of the automotive domain. We want to calculate
the ROI for CM Install alarm system which is part of Figure 3.6. According to
Definition 3.6 there are four steps which have to be performed. For this purpose,
values have to be assigned to some variables which are partly based on experience
values.
1. We assign the AV to 70.000e. This corresponds to the prise of the automotive
vehicle. In this case, the EF is set to 90% since the loss has bad impacts.
Furthermore, the ARO is set to 0,1. This is due to the fact that this threat is
not realised very often.
2. Subsequently, we can continue with calculating SLE and ALE:
SLE = 70.000 e · 0, 9 = 63.000 e
ALE = 63.000 e · 0, 1 = 6.300 e
3. The RM of the CM is set to 70%, since a minimal residual risk is present. The
CM amount to 1.500 e.
4. Finally, the ROI can be calculated:
ROI = (6.300 e·0,7)−1.500 e1.500 e = 1, 94
In this way, it has been shown that the CM is profitable since the value is
greater than zero.
Return on Attack
The ROA index describes the benefit which results from a successful attack over
the losses which he or she invests due to the realisation of a CM. According to
[BFP06], the calculation of the ROA index uses three parameters which should be
described beforehand:
• GI: This factor quantifies the expected gain which applies in case of a suc-
cessful attack for an attacker.
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• Cost: Estimates the costs for an attack if no CMs are realised.
• Loss: Estimates the costs for an attack if the corresponding CM is imple-
mented.
Based on the given parameters the algorithm for calculating the ROA index is
specified in Definition 3.7.
Definition 3.7 (Return on Attack). If there is an arbitrary ADT in DNF then the
ROA index is calculated as follows:
1. Define GI for the attack.
2. Define Cost and Loss for all attacks.
3. Calculate ROA for all CMs:
ROA = GICost+Loss
Let us apply the same simple example as used for the ROI but this time from an
attacker’s perspective. According to Definition 3.7 there are three essential steps
necessary:
1. The GI for the attack Break down the door is set to 50.000 e. This would be the
profit for an attacker in case of reselling the automotive vehicle.
2. The costs, which occur if no CM is implemented, would be 2.000 e whereas
loss would be 500 e in case of applied CMs.
3. Finally, the ROA for the CM Install alarm system can be calculated:
ROA = 50.000 e1.500 e = 20
Since this value is greater than zero, it is profitable for an attacker.
Analysis with ROI and ROA
It is mandatory to realise at least one CM to mitigate an attack. It is necessary to
analyse the indices of each CM together to apply a preferably cost-effective and
secure solution which is deterrent for attackers. It is useful to maximise the ROI
index whereas the ROA index should be minimised in ideal case. If there is no
CM with maximum ROI and minimum ROA index the selection is done either by
maximum ROI or by minimum ROA. Alternatively, a pareto-optimal solution can
be applied by which the selection is done by means of a customised function. The
combined use of ROI and ROA indices enables a more convincing evaluation of
CMs. Thereby, not only the benefit but also the deterrent impact on the attacker is
considered. [BFP06]
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3.8. MCDM Modes
Let us assume we want to find the best ACC system which can be installed
within an automotive vehicle. For this purpose, different sensor types, data
encryption algorithms as well as the used bus system for data transmission have
to be considered. (cf. Table 3.2). However, some of these SST aspects may be
conflicting to each other. Therefore, it is necessary to define priorities regarding
the individual aspects. The following subsections give an overview in theory how
to solve the problem to calculate the optimal trade-off. Therefore, two algorithms,
the PCM and RCM, are presented. Thereby, the PCM uses the AHP, whereas the
RCM uses the FMEA calculation primarily. In both cases, the result is a percentage
distribution of the alternative solutions identifying the one which best fulfils the
SST objectives.
3.8.1. Pairwise Comparison Mode
To calculate the trade-off, which is the safest and realisable implementation, Saaty’s
AHP [Saa04], is applied in a modified version to the SGH, which has already been
presented. As already mentioned in Section 2.4.1 the AHP is a MCDM technique
which calculates the best compromise on the basis of a hierarchical goal structure
and comparison matrices. These matrices contain the relative importances of the
individual goals in relation to the corresponding super-ordinated objective. If
such a ratio matrix is created, the relative importance has to be ranked for every
cohered pair of sub-goals to each other. As proposed by [Saa04] for the AHP, the
PCM uses ratings between 1 and 9. Thereby, 1 means that two compared goals are
of equal importance, whereas 9 means that goal x is extremely more important
than goal y. We have to ensure that the matrix is not inconsistent because of
non-transitive comparison ratings. As indicated by [Saa04] the consistency ratio
may not exceed 10%. This is due to the fact that comparison matrices with a
dimension of 5 × 5 or more are usually not completely consistent if the matrix is
generated by human operators. In Section 3.6 an algorithm has been presented
how to improve inconsistency. Besides this algorithm, there are some more similar
algorithms in literature which identify inconsistent comparison matrices of the
AHP, e.g. [Har87].
By means of the eigenvector and the AHP comparison matrix, local priorities,
i.e. the importance of the super-ordinated goal in relation to the sub-goals are
calculated. The local priorities are mandatory for the calculation of the final global
priority of the POVs, i.e. the absolute importance of the objectives on the leaves
for reaching the top-level safety goal is determined. Subsequently, it has to be
checked whether the individual alternative solutions are in accordance with the
objectives of preventing POVs. This has already been evaluated in context with
the FMEA, but with ratings 1 and 10 for failure OSD, therefore FMEA judgements
only have to be transferred into suitable AHP comparison matrices which can be
done with minimum effort automatically. Since the PCM does not only depend
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on the RPN values itself, but rather it depends on the OSD ratings, the PCM
allows a more accurate and more flexible way to include FMEA judgements. To
avoid the criticism of [Bow03] the OSD of the potential failure modes are rated
are individually with respect to the relative importance for the vulnerability of a
failure. Otherwise, a RPN value with low risk is possible although one of the OSD
values has a high criticality of a failure. For this purpose, a so-called OSD matrix
is created which is valid for all concerned POVs. This OSD matrix compares the
importance of OSD on behalf of safety. In a standard way, the matrix considers
OSD equally important, i.e. all the parameters are assigned to 1. Subsequently,
it is necessary to transform the FMEA ratings for the alternative solutions into
judgement matrices. The individual values of OSD are multiplied with each other,
therefore higher ratings result in exponentially higher RPNs.
To consider that characteristic in the matrices of pairwise ratios, a cubic function is
needed to transform OSD ratings: Let X be one of the ratings X ∈ {O, S, D} and
xi ∈ {oi, si, di} for i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, then each rating is transformed by x′i = x3i for all
xi. The reason for raising the rating to the third potency is that it approximates the
multiplication which would have been yielded when calculating the RPN. Again
the inverse ratios of the transformed judgements have to be used, since higher
OSD ratings represent a higher risk of failure and though a worse, i.e. a lower,
AHP judgement. The three pairwise ratio matrices are calculated as follows:

S1 S2 · · · Sn
S1 1
x′2
x′1
· · · x′nx′1
S2
x′1
x′2
1 · · · x′nx′2
...
...
... . . .
...
Sn
x′1
x′n
x′2
x′n
· · · 1

As it can be seen, this is a consistent reciprocal matrix. To calculate the local
and global priorities with the AHP, the SGH has been extended for each POV, as
depicted in Figure 3.8. The regular AHP algorithm can be applied on this extended
SGH to find the safest trade-off between evaluated alternative solutions.
Prevent POV
SeverityOccurrence Detection
Solution 
AS#1
Solution 
AS#2
Solution 
AS#n
Figure 3.8.: PCM: SGH extension
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The following example demonstrates how the local priorities of three alternative
solutions S1, S2 and S3 regarding one POV are calculated.

O S D
S1 1 2 8
S2 5 8 10
S3 10 3 1

After applying the transformation from the formula x
′
i = x
3
i for all xi we get the
following matrix:

O S D
S1 1 8 512
S2 125 512 1000
S3 1000 27 1

Subsequently, the matrices of pairwise ratios, for the three criteria OSD and the
corresponding priorities are:

O S1 S2 S3 Prio.
S1 1 125 1000 0, 3487
S2 1125 1 8 0, 5789
S3 11000
1
8 1 0, 0724


S S1 S2 S3 Prio.
S1 1 64 278 0, 9898
S2 164 1
27
512 0, 0005
S3 827
512
27 1 0, 0097


D S1 S2 S3 Prio.
S1 1 12564
1
512 0, 113
S2 64125 1
1
1000 0, 0010
S3 512 1000 1 0, 9878

Finally, the priorities for the three solutions can be calculated as follows :
• S1 : 13 · (0, 3487 + 0, 9898 + 0, 0113) ≈ 0, 4499⇒ 44,99 %
• S2 : 13 · (0, 5789 + 0, 0005 + 0, 0010) ≈ 0, 1935⇒ 19,35 %
• S3 : 13 · (0, 0724 + 0, 0097 + 0, 9878) ≈ 0, 3566⇒ 35,66 %
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3.8.2. RPN Comparison Mode
The RCM needs a vector a = (r1, r2, ..., rn) of RPNs which can be derived from the
following matrix:

O S D RPN
S1 o1 s1 d1 r1
S2 o2 s2 d2 r2
...
...
...
...
...
Sn on sn dn rn

Based on vector a, an inverse vector a−1 = (r−11 , r
−1
2 , ..., r
−1
n ) is needed. Subse-
quently, a−1 has to be normalised by applying the following formula: α = 1
∑i=ni=1 r
−1
i
.
The local priority pi(Si) for every alternative solution Si is calculated as follows:
pi(Si) = r−1i · α. The main difference between the RCM and the PCM is that the
RCM directly reflects the RPN values in the MCDM whereas the PCM is much
more related to the AHP algorithm by Thomas L. Saaty [SK90].
The following example demonstrates how the local priorities of three alternative
solutions S1, S2 and S3 for a POV are calculated, when setting the FMEA ratings
for a failure and the three solutions as follows:

O S D RPN
S1 1 2 8 16
S2 5 8 10 400
Sn 10 3 1 30

This means a = (16, 400, 30) and thus a−1 = ( 116 ,
1
400 ,
1
30) with a normalisation
factor of α = 11
16+
1
400+
1
30
≈ 10, 1695. The following local priorities for the three
alternative solutions result:
• S1 : 116 · 10, 1695 ≈ 0, 6356⇒ 63,56 %
• S2 : 1400 · 10, 1695 ≈ 0, 0254⇒ 2,54 %
• S3 : 130 · 10, 1695 ≈ 0, 3390⇒ 33,90 %
When facilitating further reduction and extension of the impact, the rating of the
relative importance of the FMEA attributes OSD is enabled. Therefore, the PCM
is more adaptable. Since the FMEA supposes an unweighted multiplication of the
factors of the rating set for OSD, the assumption has been made that all criteria are
equally important. This can easily be adjusted by modifying the OSD comparison
matrix ARPN. For instance, one might assess that the probability of occurrence is
more important than the worst case severity which is moderately more important
than the probability of detecting a failure, i.e. the following applies: O  S  D.
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ARPN =

O S D
O 1 2 5
S 12 1 3
D 15
1
3 1

The consistency ratio of ARPN of about 0,35 % is close enough to consistency. The
resulting local priorities of the FMEA attributes are:
• Occurrence: 58,2 %
• Severity: 30,9 %
• Detection: 10,9 %
The local priorities of the three solutions would change significantly:
• S1 : 0, 582 · (0, 3487 + 0, 9898 + 0, 113) ≈ 0, 786⇒ 78,60 %
• S2 : 0, 309 · (0, 5789 + 0, 0005 + 0, 0010) ≈ 0, 179⇒ 17,90 %
• S3 : 0, 109 · (0, 0724 + 0, 0097 + 0, 9878) ≈ 0, 117⇒ 11,70 %
3.8.3. Comparison between PCM and RCM
The RCM method and the two versions of the PCM method differ significantly.
However, each of them has its own scope. The RCM directly includes the RPN
which is an essential part of the FMEA process and can be a compulsory certifica-
tion requirement. As shown by [Bow03], comparing RPN values is not an easy
task. The PCM circumvents this problem by applying the established AHP algo-
rithm while rating alternative solutions relatively to each other in consideration of
the three relevant criteria OSD. In particular, this method is useful if the compared
alternative solutions have identical RPN which arise from different ratings. The
RCM would assess those alternative solutions equally, whereas the PCM prefers
the alternative solutions with evenly distributed ratings. Let us demonstrate it
with a simple example by means of two solutions with the same RPNs.
O S D RPN RCM PCM
Solution AS#1 10 7 2 140 50,0 % 41,5 %
Solution AS#2 5 4 7 140 50,0 % 58,5 %
Table 3.3.: FMEA rating: Solutions with equal RPNs
As can be seen in Table 3.3 both solutions have a RPN of 140. Solution AS#1 has
a very bad rating for the probability of occurrence of the failure. I.e., there is an
increased probability of a very high impact the failure could cause. However, the
failure is considered to be inevitably detected. In contrast to that, there is only a
medium rating for the probability of occurrence and impact for solution AS#2 but
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can not be detected without making contact to the customer. Obviously, the rank-
ing of both solutions is equal when applying the RCM. The PCM ranks the second
alternative solutions – with the more equally distributed ratings – slightly better
on the assumption that the FMEA attributes OSD have equal importance. Usually,
human decision makers prefer equally rated alternative solutions. Therefore, in
such cases the PCM would be the better one. The second version of the PCM
introduced an even more advanced and customised judgement of the relative
importance of the FMEA criteria OSD. However, it has to be indicated that the
PCM does not directly improve the RPN. In summary, unless the RPN should be
optimised, in most cases it is recommended to use the PCM with a customised
OSD rating.
3.9. Example
The example of this chapter analyses two ACC systems which fulfil the necessary
safety requirements and enables a cruising speed of at least 160 km/h. The first
step is to define and recapitulate the requirements. In this thesis, the functional
requirements are available in structural form: ACC sensors must work correctly, ACC
software must work correctly, ACC actuators must work correctly and ACC communi-
cation must be reliable. Based on these requirements, a systematic failure analysis
which is based on the FMEA as well as the corresponding SST goals have to be
developed. For this purpose, the failure modes and goals are clustered into four
categories: ACC sensors, ACC software, ACC actuators and ACC communication.
These failure modes are described hereinafter:
1. ACC sensors
a) Missing an obstacle
b) Detecting an obstacle not in time
c) Detecting a non existing obstacle
d) Distance to the obstacle is not accurate (too short)
2. ACC software
a) Results are not correct
b) Results are calculated not in time
c) Software not secure against manipulation and hacking attacks
3. ACC actuator
a) Brake fails
b) Engine fails
4. ACC communication
a) Communication is not secure against data theft
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b) Communication is not secure against manipulation
c) Messages don’t arrive in time
d) Messages are transferred incorrectly
Failure 2c) could also be applied for the ACC sensors, actuators and communica-
tion. Due to similar properties it is considered only once. Based on these failure
modes, it is mandatory to define goals to avoid or mitigate the failure modes. The
corresponding goals can be taken from Figure 3.11. Furthermore, it is required to
design a SM according to the requirements.
Adaptive Cruise 
Control
Encryption
(128 bit and 256 bit)
Sensor technology
(Radar and video camera)
Engine controlBrake control
Cruise switch
(160 km/h and 
210 km/h)
Actuator technology
Figure 3.9.: SM of the example
Figure 3.9 represents the corresponding SM. Following the green forks starting
from the individual ACC component, the alternative solutions can be retraced:
1. ACC 160 km/h: Radar sensor and 128 bit encryption
2. ACC 210 km/h: Radar sensor + video camera and 256 bit encryption
The next step covers creating the SGH including goals, POVs and alternative
solutions which is depicted in Figure 3.11. The relation of how to use the afore-
mentioned SM within the SGH is illustrated in Figure 3.10.
All sub-goals are split in at least two POVs. For instance, in case of sub-goal
ACC actuators are working correctly there are two POVs: Brake failure is sufficiently
mitigated as well as Engine failure is sufficiently mitigated. The entire goals as well
as all associated POVs (marked with the individual concerns) are represented by
means of a SGH where each of the POVs is connected with the two aforemen-
tioned alternative solutions. For each POV, it is mandatory to perform FMEA
risk assessments as described in Section 3.7.1, i.e. RPN values must be calculated
based on OSD probabilities. The exemplary POV Missing an obstacle can be ruled
out with sufficient certainty with the resulting RPNs is assessed in Table 3.4.
All detailed RPN values can be found in Figure 3.11 assigned to the respective
POV. Since there are POVs with associated RPN values, which endanger safety
risk significantly, improvements according RPN calculations have to be performed
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A
D
T 
h
ie
ra
rc
h
y 
fo
r 
A
D
TA
ACC is acceptably safe
ACC sensors are working 
correctly
ACC software is working 
correctly
ACC actuators are 
working correctly
ACC communication is 
acceptably reliable
Brake failure is sufficiently 
mitigated (SA)
Engine failure is sufficiently 
mitigated (SA)
Results are correct. Errors 
are sufficiently mitigated. 
(SA)
Results are calculated in 
time. Delays are sufficiently 
mitigated. (TI)
Software acceptably secure 
against manipulation and 
hacking attacks (SE)
Missing an obstacle can be 
ruled out with sufficient 
certainty (SA)
Distance to the obstacle is 
acceptably accurate (not too 
short) (SA)
The probability of detecting 
an obstacle in time is 
acceptable. (TI)
Detecting a non existing 
obstacle can be ruled out 
with sufficient certainty (SA)
Communication is 
acceptably secured against 
data theft (SE)
Communication is 
acceptably secured against 
manipulation (SE)
Messages arrive in time 
with acceptable reliability 
(TI)
Messages are transferred 
correctly with acceptable 
reliability (SA)
ACC sensors must work correctly
ACC software must work correctly
ACC actuators must work correctly
ACC communication must be reliable
Functional requirements
SST model
Manipulation of the 
car software
Gain violent access to 
the car
Gain non-violent 
access to the car
Break down 
the door
Exploit 
vulnerability
Exploit 
vulnerability
Go out unobserved
CM #1: Install 
alarm system
CM #3: Install 
strong 
authentication 
mechanism
CM #8: Install 
strong 
authentication 
mechanism
CM #9: Install a 
video surveillance 
equipment
Gain wireless access
Go out 
unobserved
CM #4: Install a 
video surveillance 
equipment
CM #2: Install 
security lock
Spy the key
Open the car with 
the key
Bribe a person
CM #5: Change key 
at regular intervals
CM #6: Install 
signal activation 
button on key
CM #7: Install 
multi-factor 
authentication
Attack and 
defence tree
Alternative solutions in accordance with SM
ACC (160 km/h) 
with Radar, 128 
Bit Encryption
ACC (210 km/h) 
with Radar + 
Camera, 256 Bit 
Encryption
System model
Adaptive Cruise Control
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Figure 3.10.: Relations between SGH, SM and ADT
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ACC is acceptably safe
ACC sensors are working 
correctly
ACC software is working 
correctly
ACC actuators are 
working correctly
ACC communication is 
acceptably reliable
Brake failure is sufficiently 
mitigated (SA)
27 27 88,9%
Engine failure is sufficiently 
mitigated (SA)
21 21 11,1%
Results are correct. Errors 
are sufficiently mitigated. 
(SA)
90 90 40,0%
Results are calculated in 
time. Delays are sufficiently 
mitigated. (TI)
100 100 40,0%
Software acceptably secure 
against manipulation and 
hacking attacks (SE)
162 81 20,0%
Missing an obstacle can be 
ruled out with sufficient 
certainty (SA)
54 96 38,8%
Distance to the obstacle is 
acceptably accurate (not too 
short) (SA)
48 90 8,0%
The probability of detecting 
an obstacle in time is 
acceptable (TI)
80 70 38,5%
Detecting a non existing 
obstacle can be ruled out 
with sufficient certainty (SA)
45 45 14,7%
Communication is 
acceptably secured against 
data theft (SE)
180 90 10,0%
Communication is 
acceptably secured against 
manipulation (SE)
72 144 30,0%
Messages arrive in time with 
acceptable reliability (TI)
48 48 30,0%
Messages are transferred 
correctly with acceptable 
reliability (SA)
48 48 30,0%
ACC (210 km/h) 
with radar + 
video camera, 
256 bit 
encryption
ACC (160 km/h) 
with radar, 128 
bit encryption
any Goal
any POV
RPN ACC 160 km/h
RPN ACC 210 km/h
Local Priority
Legend
Note: Solutions relate to 
all POVs
any 
Solution 
any 
Solution 
2 
(SA) Safety
(SE) Security
(TI) Timing
Figure 3.11.: SGH of the example ACC is acceptably safe
O S D RPN
ACC 210 km/h 1 9 6 54
ACC 160 km/h 2 8 6 96
Table 3.4.: FMEA risk assessment of an exemplary POV
but are not further considered in this example. As already mentioned in Sec-
tion 3.5, it is necessary to rate (sub-)goals and POVs by their importance with the
completion of the risk assessments. The AHP rating of the top-level goal can be
seen in Table 3.5.
Actuator Software Sensor Communication
Actuator 1 1 1 12
Software 1 1 1 12
Sensor 1 1 1 12
Communication 2 2 2 1
Local Priority 20 % 20 % 20 % 40 %
Consistency Ratio 0 %
Table 3.5.: AHP rating of goal ACC is acceptably safe
The MCDM can be performed comparing local priorities of the RCM and PCM
method. The corresponding results are listed in Table 3.7. For the PCM, the
judgements of OSD were changed according to Table 3.6. In this way, the following
applies: O  S  D.
The results show that ACC (210 km/h) with radar + video camera and 256 bit encryption
is safer than ACC (160 km/h) with radar and 128 bit encryption. As can be seen, there
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O S D Local Priority
O 1 2 5 58,2 %
S 12 1 3 30,9 %
D 15
1
3 1 10,9 %
Table 3.6.: OSD matrix of the PCM
is no significant difference between the two methods.
Alternative Solution RCM PCM
ACC 210 km/h 54,4 % 56,2 %
ACC 160 km/h 45,6 % 43,8 %
Table 3.7.: OSD matrix of the PCM
The SGH hierarchy of Figure 3.11 contains two security goals of which the goal
Software acceptably secure against manipulation and hacking attacks is examined care-
fully, i.e. an ADTA is performed. For this purpose, an ADT hierarchy is created
first (for the correlation between SGH and ADT, cf. Figure 3.10) which is illus-
trated in Figure 3.12. Hereinafter, a detailed calculation is performed for the CM
Manipulation of the 
car software
Gain violent access 
to the car
Gain non-violent 
access to the car
Break down 
the door
Exploit 
vulnerability
Exploit 
vulnerability
Go out 
unobserved
CM#1: Install 
alarm system
CM#3: Install 
strong 
authentication 
mechanism
CM#8: Install 
strong 
authentication 
mechanism
CM#9: Install a 
video 
surveillance 
equipment
Gain wireless access
Go out 
unobserved
CM#4: Install a 
video 
surveillance 
equipment
CM#2: Install 
security lock
Spy the key
Open the car 
with the key
Bribe a person
CM#5: Change key 
at regular 
intervals
CM#6: Install 
signal activation 
button on key
CM#7: Install 
multi-factor 
authentication
Figure 3.12.: Extended ADT hierarchy: Manipulation of the car software
Change key at regular intervals. First, we need to initialise the necessary variables
exemplary in order to proceed with the calculation of ROI and ROA:
• AV: 40.000 e. In this example, we calculate the ADTA for the manipulation
of the car software of a compact car.
• EF: The exposure factor is set to 85 %, since (compact-)cars are equipped with
a large number of security-critical features. In most cases, the malfunction of
these features may lead to almost complete loss of the car.
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• ARO: Since this kind of car is produced in large quantities, the ARO is set to
10.
• RM: This variable is assigned to 0,2 for the CM since it is less effectively.
• CSI: Changing the key at regular intervals costs 5.000 e.
• Cost: It costs 4.500 e to realise the attack.
• Loss: The attack costs 1.500 e if the CM is realised.
According to Definition 3.6, the ROI can be calculated as follows:
SLE = 40.000 e · 0, 85 = 34.000 e
ALE = 34.000 e · 10, 0 = 340.000 e
ROI = (340.000 e·0,2)−5.000 e5.000 e = 12,6
Subsequently, the according ROA for the CM can be calculated by applying Defi-
nition 3.7:
ROA = 40.000 e4.500 e+1.500 e = 6,67
In practice, it is not possible to realise all available CMs. Therefore, it is necessary
to determine the most effective CM. Table 3.8 lists the corresponding values
for ROI and ROA according to Definition 3.6 and Definition 3.7. It can thus be
concluded that there is no single CM with the best ROI and ROA. It is reminded
that the ROI has to be be maximised, whereas the ROA needs to be minimised.
Therefore, it has to be weighed up in detail which CM applies for more: Install
multi-factor authentication or Install strong authentication mechanism.
CM #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9
ROI 14,20 4,70 6,60 4,43 12,60 11,75 19,40 12,60 8,71
ROA 3,08 4,00 1,74 11,76 6,67 7,27 2,05 1,63 8,16
Table 3.8.: Results of the ADTA
3.10. Related Work
In this section, related publications and projects are presented and compared with
the approach of a MCDM on SCSs. In this context, publications and projects with
respect to safety assessment with the AHP, the FMEA, security analysis by means
of ADT as well as safety and security in general are considered.
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Safety Assessment with the AHP and the FMEA
The AHP by Thomas L. Saaty [SK90] is used for making decisions regarding
safety in various domains, e.g. in [Jia+09], [WC11] and [Che+11]. The AHP is
also used for making decisions based on security concerns, e.g. in [Ji+10] and
[Tah+14]. A MCDM in compliance with safety, considering security and timing
as well as functional demands does not seem to have been covered before. Even
though the AHP is used for decision making on security concerns, e.g. [Jia+09]
and [Tah+14] a MCDM in consideration of safety, taking security and timing
issues as well as functional demands into account does not seem to have been
researched before. Furthermore, there is the work of [FK18] which combines
FMEA, AHP and MULTIMOORA1 to optimise risk assessment. However, there is
no approach which considers MC and calculates an optimal trade-off as proposed
in this chapter. Therefore, the approach of this chapter is innovative and does not
seem to have been evaluated so far. A fairly similar approach which performs
a MCDM in consideration of safety and also combines the FMEA with the AHP,
is the work of [ZFW13]. They analyse the reliability of manufacturing processes
by means of the Process Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (PFMECA),
enhanced by the well known AHP. This method has solely been designed for
analysing safety in manufacturing processes. The method proposed in this chapter
can be applied to any SCS, product or process.
Security Assessment with the ADT
There are some publications regarding security assessment, e.g. [HMW11]. This
paper proposes an approach how to mitigate or avoid vulnerabilities of database
resources and to compare it with agile criteria of a self-defined conceptual model.
However, it is only focused on security. In this thesis, we perform security assess-
ment under observation of safety. Furthermore, there are no economic indicators
as proposed in the approach of this thesis to measure quality of developed CMs.
The approach of [BFP06] has been used in thesis for calculating the economic
indicators ROI and ROA based on ADTs. However, in our approach there is an
underlying SGH to analyse SST vulnerabilities. Without analysing SST vulnerabil-
ities or security weaknesses a security analysis would not be possible. Moreover,
it has been described in this chapter how to update the SGH by using new CMs
based on the work of [BFP06]. There are some publications regarding security
assessment. It has not been evaluated scientifically before how to integrate the
impacts of such an assessment into a MCDM concept.
Related Projects on Safety and Security
The SAFE (Safe Automotive software architecture) project which started in July
2011 and has been finished in June 2014 had the aim to “[...] speed up the efficiency
development of safety features in cars.” [SP14] The focus was to extend and adapt
1Multi-objective optimization on the basis of ratio analysis plus full multiplicative form
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AUTOSAR2 system architecture model by methods in to trace safety requirements
over the entire project life-cycle [SP14]. Besides safety the SAFE project did not
consider any other concerns such as security or timing. Furthermore, there was no
research about MCDM and thus no trade-off calculations. The SESAMO (Security
and Safety Modelling) project focuses on safety and security requirements, aiming
“to develop a component-oriented design methodology based upon model-driven
technology, jointly addressing safety and security aspects and their interrelation
for networked embedded systems in multiple domains.” [SES15] One major ob-
jective is to develop methods for integrated analysis of safety and security claims
which is focused on identifying hazards to facilitate a versed trade-off between
conflicting safety and security demands. One goal is to to provide clear evidence,
justifying “that the risks associated with the system are as low as reasonably prac-
ticable” [Pau+12]. Constituting that a system cannot be safe without considering
security demands, the SESAMO project aims to specify safety as top-level goal
which can be influenced by security issues. [Pau+12] In contrast to the approach
presented in this thesis, the SESAMO project does not provide a competitive
MCDM by a systematic method like the modified AHP combined with the FMEA.
However, the FMEA is a compulsory part of the certification requirements in the
automotive industry [Pau+12]. Moreover, there is another project called SafeCer
(Safety Certification of Software-Intensive Systems with Reusable Components).
It aims to increase “[...] efficiency and reduce(d) time-to-market by composable
safety certification of safety certification of safety-relevant embedded systems.”
[SP16a] It is the aim of the SafeCer project to provide methods and tools composing
safety arguments for a complete system by reusing already consolidated safety
arguments and proven specifications of the sub-systems. Another project called
SYNOPSIS (Safety Analysis for Predictable Software Intensive Systems) which
started in 2011 and has been finished in 2016 “is targeting increased efficiency
and reduced time-to-market by composable safety certification of safety-relevant
embedded systems.” [SP16b] The last two projects aim to provide means (ar-
chitectures, tools, processes or standardisation) and to improve efficient safety
assurance and certification. The SYNOPSIS project does not explicitly aim to
support a MCDM taking SST issues into account, as it has been proposed in this
thesis. [SP16a] [SP16b] Finally, the MERgE (Multi-Concerns Interactions System
Engineering) project has to be mentioned. It aimed “to develop and demonstrate
innovative concepts and design tools addressing in combination the Safety and
Security concerns, targeting the elaboration of effective architectural solutions.”
[MP17] However, the MERgE project did not take any MCDM algorithms into
account, i.e. calculating trade-offs in context of SCSs is not part of [MP17] and thus
there is another focus in this thesis. Moreover, there is another huge project with
55 organisations called CESAR (Cost-effective methods and processes for safety
relevant embedded systems) [CP12]. It was the aim of that project which started in
March 2009 and has been finished in June 2012 to “[...] boost cost-efficiency of em-
bedded system development and safety and certification process[...]” [CP12] in a
multi-domain approach. Thereby, the project is concentrated on cost-effective and
2Automotive open system architecture
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ultra-reliable embedded systems in automotive, aerospace, railway and automa-
tion domains since those transportation domains are competitive. This project did
not cover an approach for MCDM as proposed in this chapter of the thesis. [CP12]
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Change Impact Analysis
The preceding chapter described how a MCDM is performed in consideration of
SST concerns. In this context, FMEA risk assessment plays an important role and
suitable CMs have to be developed possibly if the risk is not acceptable. Intro-
ducing new CMs cannot be done offhand since these CMs may have awkward
consequences since new risks or hazards might arise. It is part of this chapter to
detect dependencies of concerned model components in context of the MCDM
and to analyse the extent of the impacts. First, the term change impact including
a motivation and problem description is clarified in more detail in Section 4.1.
The underlying concept is elaborated in Section 4.2 which serves as a basis for
the following sections. The impact rules for the algorithms of the change impact
analysis are defined in Section 4.3 and its subsections. In this context, the SM,
SSTM as well as the ADT are considered. The subsequent section specifies the
term change request within the software development process and which elements
are necessary to define them. To realise such a change impact analysis it is initially
essential to define a so-called Change Impact Algorithmic (ChIA) with the neces-
sary algorithms which is part of Section 4.5. For clarification, a plausible example
is presented in Section 4.6. Finally, it is conveyed which works are related to our
change impact analysis. This chapter is mainly based on the scientific publication
[LRB19] of the author and is therefore no cited any more
4.1. Change Impacts
As mentioned in the introducing paragraph of this chapter, the MCDM of Chap-
ter 3 is not a finite approach. The development is progressing steadily, i.e. require-
ments are constantly changing. For instance, the ADTA may lead to the conclusion
that CMs need to be developed and thus some goals within the SSTM have to be
changed. In most cases, it is not sufficient to only adapt the affected elements.
Rather, other model elements are affected and must therefore also be changed.
Hereinafter, the term change impact is defined.
Definition 4.1 (Change Impact). A change impact is the result, i.e. effects after
changing an existing model element which is caused by a change request. The
iterative or recursive process to identify change impacts is called change impact
analysis and is an discovery-based approach [Boh02].
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In general, a change impact analysis can be performed for single models or even
for complex software systems. In both cases, dependencies between individual
model elements have to be calculated. Thereby, a distinction is made between
• direct impacts, i.e. there is an effect to one or more neighbour nodes and
• indirect impacts, i.e. effects of direct impacts in turn affect further model
elements within the corresponding model or software system
As it can be seen, it is hard to deal with change impacts, especially with indirect
impacts since they can trigger ripple-effects. Such effects can already be activated
by simple amendments and require reachability information. [LSB15] Let us take
an introductory example from the automotive domain: A change request may
be like All data within the bus system must be transferred by means of a 256 bit AES
encryption algorithm. If the current software only supports a 128 bit encryption, a
modification of some model elements, e.g., goals within the SSTM is mandatory.
Since the change request interferes with a security goal, some further timing goals
may be affected by the change request. For instance, the goals Airbag is triggering
in time, ACC identifies obstacles in time and LDP identifies obstacles in blind spot in
time are directly affected and need be modified as well. This in turn, requires
enhancement of safety goals. In case of the goal which is responsible for triggering
the airbag in time, some essential safety goals need to be adapted as well. In this
way, many more goals may be affected. Another problem is that a target model
element can be affected by different source model elements (cf. Figure 4.1) if
structural impact rules will be applied. I.e., for a target model element two or more
different effect types may be assigned. However, for one change request there has
to be exactly one effect type. In Figure 4.1, the change impact analysis is triggered
by means of Model element 1. The node Model element 1.2 depends on Model element
1 and has two different effect types over two iterations. In iteration 1 (green path),
effect A is assigned to Model element 1.2, whereas in the second iteration (blue path)
effect B is assigned to it. It is also the aim of this chapter, getting this problem under
control.
Model element #1.1
Model element 
#1.1.1
Model element #1.2
Model element 
#1.1.2
Model element #1
Iteration 1: effect A Iteration 1: effect A
Iteration 1: effect A
Iteration 1: effect A
Iteration 2: effect B
Iteration 2: effect B
Iteration 2: effect B
Figure 4.1.: Conflict of the change impact analysis
In this thesis, we distinguish between BC and WC change impacts, i.e. there is
minimal set of affected model elements in case of BC change impact analysis.
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The WC change impact analysis, however, considers the maximal set of affected
elements. In practice, the actual impacts lies somewhere in between and have to
be determined by domain engineers. [LSB15] In context of this thesis, we consider
four effect types:
1. No change: Changing a source element has no effects on the corresponding
target model element.
2. Extend: Enhancing a source element yields extending target model element.
This typically means adding new sub-nodes to the current model element.
3. Modify: Amending a source element means modifying target model element.
Usually, the context or further information is changed.
4. Delete: Changing a source element yields deleting target model element.
4.2. Concept
This section introduces the concept of the change impact analysis by means of a
concept picture (cf. Figure 4.2). Thereby, the necessary constituents of the change
impact analysis are described. The individual steps of the concept, which are
illustrated in Figure 4.2, are explained within this section.
SM  SM
Step 1: Impact ruling
SM  SSTM
SSTM  SSTM
SSTM  ADT
ADT  ADT
Step 3: Change impact methodology
Change request
Step 2: Change request
Requirement change
Affected model element
Trigger operation
Source model
Structural impacts Attributed impacts
Stakeholder
Figure 4.2.: Logical concept of the change impact analysis
When performing a change impact analysis, it is still mandatory to observe SST
restrictions as described in Section 2.1. Furthermore, the influences between the
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individual concerns (cf. Section 2.1.4) have to be met as well. When realising the
results of the change impact analysis, the MCDM as described in Chapter 3 can
be performed once again. However, we need to consider and to perform three
essential steps which are described hereinafter:
Step 1: To enable an impact analysis, it is necessary to define a heuristic since
we usually only know the abstract interrelations of a system but not the causal
relationships. In this context, the kind of effects to its correlated (model-)nodes
by means of well-defined impact rules will be determined. For each application,
there is a set of BC and WC rules respectively. In this chapter, we differentiate
between five model dependencies for which the structured impact rules and thus
the change impact analysis can be applied. Change requests regarding the SM
may either affect the SM itself or the hierarchical SSTM. When modifying the
SSTM, it may affect the SSTM itself as well as an ADT. If an ADT is changed it
has only impacts to the ADT itself since the ADT is an extension of the SSTM. It
is possible that the five model dependencies have to be combined over several
iterations. This is part of step 3.
Step 2: As generally described in Section 3.3, change requests consist of require-
ment change, document management and planning, organisation, controlling
which are operated by different stakeholders (e.g. a software developer or safety
expert) to get optimal transparency. The term requirement change means that
requirements are enhanced (e.g. due to new regulations) and thus a consistent and
understandable description of this amendment is needed. In this context, it needs
to be determined which model element the requirement change affects, e.g. a goal
or POV within the SSTM. Finally, it has to be specified which triggering operation
(cf. preceding section) the requirement change is associated. However, the effect
type no change is not included since the associated model element is the source
node (and not any target node). Otherwise, the change impact analysis would not
be triggered.
Step 3: The last step of the change impact analysis combines step 1 and step 2
to determine the change impacts. First, we need the change request as defined
in the previous step to initiate the change impact analysis starting from a model
node with a triggering operation. In this context, the whole source model is
used to perform one of the subsequent algorithms. On the one hand, there is a
structural algorithm which applies the impact rules of step 1. On the other hand,
there is an algorithm which calculates impacts by means of Key Performance
Indicator (KPI) based attributions. The first algorithm is applied if there are
structurally conditioned change requests whereas the second considers semantics
of the corresponding model elements.
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4.3. Impact Ruling
When performing change requests, it is distinguished between amendments for
which the semantics of qualitative change requests are considered and those for
which only the structure is relevant. The latter is part of this section, whereas
semantically based impacts are described in further course of this thesis. If the
semantics does not matter, only the structure and dependencies of the correspond-
ing models are of interest, i.e. direct and indirect dependencies are considered.
In practice, these models are very large and complex and thus structural depen-
dencies are not directly visible. Furthermore, cyclic change impacts can occur
and need to be solved accordingly. Let us assume a model element, e.g. a goal
within the SSTM, is deleted and we want to determine the structural impacts.
In this case, if the impact rules are applied a domain expert receives structural
impacts which need to be checked by the expert. As mentioned in the introductory
Section 4.1 there are four effect types which may occur: No effect, extend, modify
and delete. To apply such impact rules to detect structural dependencies, there are
five superordinate cases which are described hereinafter shortly:
1. SM→ SM: When changing system components or relationships between
within a SM it may have effects on corresponding model elements of the SM
itself.
2. SM → SSTM: Since the SSTM requires an underlying SM, amendments
regarding the SM have effects on the target SSTM.
3. SSTM → SSTM: When modifying the SSTM which is, i.a. significantly
responsible for the MCDM may affect the SSTM itself since it compromises
a hierarchical structure.
4. SSTM→ ADT: When enhancing a security goal or POV within the SSTM,
which is extended by an ADT, the corresponding ADT is affected.
5. ADT→ ADT: Similarly to the third item, the ADT is built up hierarchically
and thus influences itself.
4.3.1. SM to SM
In this thesis, the MCDM as proposed in Chapter 3 is an essential part. However,
to perform such a MCDM an underlying SM is mandatory. If there are change
requests, which affect the SM, it may change the SM itself first and foremost. When
thinking a couple of steps ahead, these changes may also affect the SSTM and thus
influence the result of the MCDM significantly. Table 4.1 lists the impact rules
differentiating between BC and WC impact rules for the individual components.
According to [LSB15] all the impact rules have the following syntax:
A.X→ B.Y
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In general, this statement expresses if source A has the characteristics X, it fol-
lows that target element B has the characteristics Y. In this concrete use case,
this implies A, B ∈ {Component, DockedPort, LinkedPort} whereas X ∈ {extend,
modify, delete} and Y ∈ X ∪ {noChange} [LSB15]. In further course of this thesis,
the elements of X will be abbreviated as {ext, mod, del}. The term component
refers to any system component within a SM. The rules SM→ SM distinguish
between docked port and connected Port. To understand the difference between
them, the usual order of applying impact rules clearly illustrates port classes. The
impact ruling is initiated by a component and the first impact concerns at least
one port which belongs to the component from which the impact rule has been
started. These part are also called docked ports. Afterwards, one of the rules
Docked Port→ Linked Port is applied. A linked port is a port which is connected
with a docked port. Finally, this linked port has impact/s on the corresponding
system component to which this port belongs to.
Source/Target element BC WC
Component→ Docked Port
A.ext→ B.mod A.ext→ B.mod
A.mod→ B.noChange A.mod→ B.ext
A.del→ B.del A.del→ B.del
Docked Port→ Linked Port
A.ext→ B.noChange A.ext→ B.ext
A.mod→ B.noChange A.mod→ B.mod
A.del→ B.noChange A.del→ B.noChange
Linked Port→ Component
A.ext→ B.noChange A.ext→ B.mod
A.mod→ B.noChange A.mod→ B.mod
A.del→ B.ext A.del→ B.del
Table 4.1.: Impact rules of dependencies SM→ SM
When extending a component, e.g. adding new ports the corresponding docked
ports need to be modified both, in BC and WC. In this case, the current docked
ports may get new functionality. Otherwise, when modifying a component there
is no impact on the corresponding docked port in BC if there are only lightweight
changes of the component. However, there are major changes the corresponding
docked ports need to be modified since the port need new connections. Further-
more, if a component is deleted the corresponding docked ports are deleted as
well in BC and WC since the ports are part of the components. If we regard the
docked port as source model element and the docked port is extended then it
follows that the corresponding linked ports have not to be changed in BC. In WC,
i.e. if the source docked port is of major interest, the corresponding linked ports
are extended since the docked port is connected with at least one new connected
port. When modifying a lightweight docked port there are no impacts on the
connected linked ports. However, in WC they have to be modified as well since
the linked port may change its behaviour When deleting a docked port there are
no effects on the target linked ports since the linked port is the target port and thus
does not have any effects. Finally, it has to be determined which kind of effect it
will have for a component if a linked port is changed. If a linked port needs to be
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extended, e.g. due to the rule classification Docked Port→ Linked Port it yields no
effect in BC. However, in WC the corresponding component needs to be modified.
Otherwise, the port could be invalid for the component. Modifying a linked port
yields the identical effects as extending them and has also to be justified on the
same reasons. If a linked port is deleted, the corresponding component is extended
in BC to fulfil same functionality. In WC, the component has to be deleted as well
since the component could otherwise no longer exist.
So far, we defined impact rules and the necessity of them. However, it has not yet
been explained how to apply the individual impact rules. As already mentioned
in Section 4.1, applying different change impact rules may cause some conflicts (cf.
Figure 4.1) since there would be different effect types over several iterations for
the same model element. To avoid this problem, we assign preferences for BC and
WC rules respectively. Hereinafter, the preferences are defined as follows:
del BC mod BC ext and
ext WC mod WC del
This is due to the fact that it is more complex to extend a model element more as to
delete it. In this way, the target model element can change three times maximally.
Finally, Algorithm 4.1 specifies how to avoid the above mentioned problems.
Algorithm 4.1 Calculation of impacts of dependencies SM→ SM
1: procedure CALCULATIONIMPACTSSM-SM(modelElement, operation)
2: if modelElement isTypeOf Component then
3: for all dp ∈ getDockedPorts(component) do
4: if checkPrefAndApplyRule(component, dp) then
5: CalculationImpactsSM-SM(dp, getOperation(dp))
6: end if
7: end for
8: else if modelElement isTypeOf DockedPort then
9: for all lp ∈ getLinkedPorts(dockedPort) do
10: if checkPrefAndApplyRule(dockedPort, lp) then
11: CalculationImpactsSM-SM(lp, getOperation(lp))
12: end if
13: end for
14: else
15: for all comp ∈ getComponents(linkedPort) do
16: if checkPrefAndApplyRule(linkedPort, comp) then
17: CalculationImpactsSM-SM(comp, getOperation(comp))
18: end if
19: end for
20: end if
21: end procedure
The method CalculatingImpactsSM-SM is called by means of two parameters. The
first one refers to the corresponding source model element whereas the second
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one matches the initial operation (ext, mod, del). First, we need to check our
source model element type which is done in line 2, 8 and 16. If the model type is
determined it is necessary to fetch all target model elements. Subsequently, for
each pair of (source, target) model element the preferences need to be reviewed
when applying the impact rule of the current iteration. If the corresponding
method checkPrefAndApplyRule returns true the effect has a higher preference and
the current impact rule is applied. Afterwards, the method is called once again.
Due to the preferences the impacts can be changed three times in spite of recursion,
i.e. it results the following complexity for all model elements |V| and connections
|E| between them:
3 · (|V|+ |E|) ∈ O(|V|+ |E|)
4.3.2. SM to SSTM
To perform a MCDM, it is mandatory to create a well-defined SSTM. The SSTM
consists of at least two alternative solutions to get reasonable result. However, if
there are change requests which affect the SM, the SSTM is affected as well. In this
context, the system components of the corresponding SM have direct effects on
the alternative solutions. Since ports of the SM influence components of the SM
there are only impact rules for the classification Component→ Alternative Solution.
In concrete terms, i.e. there are only impact rules with the syntax A.X→ B.Y where
A ∈ {Component}, B ∈ {AlternativeSolution} and X, Y ∈ {ext, mod, del} [LSB15].
Alternative solutions in turn, have no further impact rules since they are the final
analysis elements of the MCDM. Hereinafter, Table 4.2 specifies the necessary
impact rules differentiated by BC and WC.
Source/Target element BC WC
Component→ Alternative Solution
A.ext→ B.mod A.ext→ B.mod
A.mod→ B.noChange A.mod→ B.mod
A.del→ B.del A.del→ B.del
Table 4.2.: Impact rules of dependencies SM→ SSTM
When extending a system component of a SM, e.g. by adding new ports, the
corresponding alternative solutions within the SSTM need to be modified in BC
and WC. The reason is that additional system components have to be taken
into account. Obviously, they have to be included into the individual alternative
solutions. If a component is modified, it has no effects on the corresponding
alternative solutions in BC if there are lightweight changes, e.g. that a component
is replaced by another component which is identical in construction. If there are
major changes such as enhancing functionality of the component an alternative
solution needs be modified since alternative solutions depend on functionality of
the components. If there is necessity of deleting a system component the matched
alternative solution is modified in that context in WC. Only in BC the alternative
solutions is deleted as well since in this way the number of consequential impacts
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is kept slightly. As already mentioned in the section before, conflicts can arise
when applying different impact rules. Therefore, we define preferences for impact
rules of type SM→ SSTM hereinafter:
mod BC ext BC del and
ext WC mod WC del
Deleting an alternative solution has lowest priority since results of the MCDM are
more significant if there are more alternative solutions within the SSTM. Otherwise
it is more easier to modify an alternative solution than to extend it since extending
implies applying new innovations. For this reason, the BC ranks modify better
than extend and vice versa for WC. Hereinafter, the underlying algorithm which
describes how the impact rules have to be applied:
Algorithm 4.2 Calculation of impacts of dependencies SM→ SSTM
1: procedure CALCULATIONIMPACTSSM-SSTM(component, operation)
2: for all as ∈ getAssociatedAlternativeSolutions(component) do
3: if checkPref(component, as) then
4: applyRule(component, as)
5: end if
6: end for
7: end procedure
Since we want to calculate the impacts for dependencies between two different
model types it is first necessary to fetch all potential alternative solutions which
have been assigned to the component. Initially, the calculation method getAssoci-
atedAlternativeSolutions is started by means of that component. Subsequently, it is
necessary to check the above defined preferences. If the method checkPref returns
true, the corresponding impact rule can be applied. When applying impact rules
of type Component→ Alternative Solutions no cycles can occur because there is no
impact rule starting from an alternative solution. Nevertheless, preferences have
to be checked since there may be preceding impact rules which parallelly call the
described method of Algorithm 4.2. Finally, we want to analyse complexity of
Algorithm 4.2. Since this algorithm is never called recursively a linear complexity
of O(|V|) can be achieved.
4.3.3. SSTM to SSTM
The SSTM which is structured hierarchically is a central component of the MCDM.
If the SSTM is changed by external influences, e.g. introduction of new policies
it may have impacts on model elements within the SSTM itself. When applying
corresponding rules with the syntax scheme A.X→ B.Y of [LSB15], which have
been listed in Table 4.3, it must be distinguished between three rule types: Goal
→ Goal/POV, Goal/POV → Goal and POV → Alternative Solution. In summary,
there are impact rules which calculate the effects either top-down (↓) or bottom-up
(↑). However, bottom-up rules are more lightweight than the top-down rules.
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Furthermore, there are no impact rules starting with alternative solutions since
final results of the MCDM depend on alternative solutions.
Source/Target element BC WC
Goal→ Goal/POV (↓)
A.ext→ B.mod A.ext→ B.ext
A.mod→ B.noChange A.mod→ B.mod
A.del→ B.del A.del→ B.del
Goal/POV→ Goal (↑)
A.ext→ B.mod A.ext→ B.mod
A.mod→ B.noChange A.mod→ B.mod
A.del→ B.ext A.del→ B.mod
POV→ Alternative Solution
A.ext→ B.noChange A.ext→ B.mod
A.mod→ B.noChange A.mod→ B.mod
A.del→ B.noChange A.del→ B.mod
Table 4.3.: Impact rules of dependencies SSTM→ SSTM
When changing a goal within the SSTM there are effects on sub-ordinated goals or
POVs. If a source goal is extended the corresponding target goals or POVs need
either to be modified in BC or extended in WC. Extending a goal means that a
goal is refined, hence the target goal or POV must be modified, i.e. adapted. Only
in WC this goal or POV needs to be extended as well since a further hierarchical
structuring is necessary. When modifying a goal node there is no effect on the
target element in BC since the modifications are more or less negligible. If there are
more serious amendments of the source goal, the target node needs to be modified
as well. In another case, if a source goal has to be deleted due to change requests it
automatically yields deleting the corresponding target goals or POVs both, in BC
and WC. The reason for deleting the target node is that it depends on the source
goal and thus a delete operation is mandatory. Furthermore, there are impact rules
which propagandise effects bottom-up. These include Goal/POV→ Goal. When
extending a source goal or POV then it yields modifying the super-ordinated goal
since refining of a node means that the corresponding parent node needs to be
updated accordingly. Furthermore, if a goal or POV is modified there are no effects
in BC if there are only marginal enhancements. On the contrary, the target node
needs to be modified in WC if there are modifications of greater significance. In
case of deleting a source goal or POV, the corresponding target goal needs either
to be extended or modified depending on choosing BC or WC calculations. In
this use case, extending is less sophisticated than modifying. This can be justified
by the fact that it is easier to add new functionality than to update an existing
one. Finally, changing a POV may have effects on alternative solutions. In BC, i.e.
if there are only marginal amendments of the corresponding POVs there are no
effects on the target alternative solutions. In WC they need to be modified since
the primary goal of safety cannot be guaranteed otherwise by means of the MCDM.
To avoid potential conflicts by applying the impact rules listed in Table 4.3 we
define preferences for the BC and WC impact analysis:
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del BC mod BC ext and
del WC ext WC mod
In both cases, BC and WC, deleting a model node is the easiest way since the
SSTM has an hierarchical structure and thus information in most cases only is
passed along the corresponding paths. Furthermore, in BC it is easier to modify a
model element than to extend it since extending requires a few more steps within
the SSTM. For instance, if a goal is extended by an additional POV, the POV has
to be taken into account for all valid alternative solutions. This is also the reason
why extending is better ranked for WC impact analysis and yields better results
where applicable.
Algorithm 4.3 Calculation of impacts of dependencies SSTM→ SSTM
1: procedure CALCULATIONIMPACTS-SSTM-SSTM(modelElement, operation)
2: if modelElement isTypeOf Goal then
3: for all sg ∈ getSubGoalsPOVs(goal) do
4: if checkPrefAndApplyRule(goal, sg) then
5: CalculationImpactsSSTM-SSTM(sg, getOperation(sg))
6: end if
7: end for
8: Goal g← getParentGoal(goal)
9: if checkPrefAndApplyRule(goal, g) then
10: CalculationImpactsSSTM-SSTM(g, getOperation(g))
11: end if
12: else
13: Goal g← getParentGoal(pov)
14: if checkPrefAndApplyRule(pov, g) then
15: CalculationImpactsSSTM-SSTM(g, getOperation(g))
16: end if
17: for all as ∈ getAlternativeSolutions(pov) do
18: if checkPref(pov, as) then
19: applyRule(pov, as)
20: end if
21: end for
22: end if
23: end procedure
All the impact rules, which have been defined within this, section have to be
applied usefully. Therefore, Algorithm 4.3 specifies the appropriate procedure.
First, we need to request for the source model element, i.e. it is checked whether
a goal or POV performs further actions. This is done by line 2 for Goal and by
line 12 for POV. If the used model element is of type Goal, we need to determine
all sub-goals or POVs. For each of them we first need to check preferences as
defined in the paragraph above. If the preference check is positive, the corre-
sponding impact rule of type Goal→ Goal/POV is applied and the current method
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CalculationImpactsSSTM-SSTM is called recursively. Furthermore, the parent node
needs to be determined and the same procedure is repeated, i.e. impact rule of
type Goal/POV→ Goal is applied. In this way, we can avoid conflicts for cycles
over several iterations. In case of model element type POV we first need to de-
termine the parent goal bottom-up and then we check preferences. Afterwards,
the corresponding impact rule of type Goal/POV can be applied and the current
method is called once again. Finally, we need to perform impact rules for type
POV→ Alternative Solution. Therefore, all alternative solutions have to be deter-
mined for each POV. After preference checking the corresponding impact rules
can be applied. When determining complexity of this algorithm one will realise
that there are as many calculation steps are necessary as for the algorithm of SM
→ SM. The reason is that the impacts of the individual nodes (goals, POVs or
alternative solutions) can be changed three times due to assigned preferences. In
this context, the recursive algorithm is called repeatedly. This results the following
complexity for all model elements |V| and connections |E| between them:
3 · (|V|+ |E|) ∈ O(|V|+ |E|)
4.3.4. SSTM to ADT
The SGH within the SSTM considers, i.a., security goals to calculate an optimal
trade-off. As already mentioned in Section 3.4.2, the SSTM can be extended by
an ADT to perform an ADTA and thus to develop appropriate CMs for security
lacks. These security lacks are prevented by corresponding security goals within
the SGH. If there are change requests, which affect the SSTM, the ADT may be
affected as well. In this context, the security goals directly influence corresponding
root nodes of the ADTs and thus a few steps further other nodes of the ADT.
However, in this section we only consider impact rules of type Security Goal→
ADT Root Node to determine impacts between those models. Impact rules which
influence ADT elements between them are part of Section 4.3.5. This means in
particular that the impact rules with the already familiar syntax scheme A.X→
B.Y is composed of A ∈ {Goal}, B ∈ {ADTRootNode} and X, Y ∈ {ext, mod, del}
[LSB15]. Table 4.4 lists the individual impact rules which are sorted by BC and
WC.
Source/Target element BC WC
Security Goal→ ADT Root Node
A.ext→ B.noChange A.ext→ B.ext
A.mod→ B.noChange A.mod→ B.mod
A.del→ B.del A.del→ B.del
Table 4.4.: Impact rules of dependencies SSTM→ ADT
When extending, i.e. refining a security goal it has no significant effects on the
associated ADT in case of lightweight change requests. Only in WC, if there
are more pregnant amendments regarding the security goal, the corresponding
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ADT needs to be extended since the information about which the security goal is
extended has not yet been considered within the ADT. Furthermore, if a security
goal is modified it will have no effects in the corresponding ADT root node in BC.
In WC the ADT root node needs to be modified as well. Modifying a security goal
may yield that the corresponding ADT is no longer suitable since the ADT defines
appropriate CMs for the individual security goals. When deleting a security goal,
it results in deleting the ADT root node and thus the entire ADT as well. Without
an associated security goal an ADT cannot exist. Although impact rules of type
cannot cause cycles it is still possible that conflicts will arise. This is possible if
an ADT is influenced by two or more security goals. Consequently, we also need
preferences for impact type SSTM→ ADT:
mod BC ext BC del and
ext WC mod WC del
In both cases, deleting an ADT root node would be the solution with minimum
effort. Conversely, it means that a new adequate ADT needs to be created. In this
case, the effort would be greater than to extend to modify it. When extending
an ADT there are some more steps necessary as for deleting since new points of
attack have to be taken into account. For this reason modifying is rated better than
extending in BC and vice versa for WC.
Algorithm 4.4 Calculation of impacts of dependencies SSTM→ ADT
1: procedure CALCULATIONIMPACTS-SSTM-ADT(securityGoal, operation)
2: ADTRoot root← getAssociatedADTRoot(securityGoal)
3: if checkPref(securityGoal, root) then
4: applyRule(securityGoal, root)
5: end if
6: end procedure
The algorithm which specifies applying impact rules of type Security Goal→ ADT
Root node is written down in pseudo-code in Algorithm 4.4. The algorithm is called
by a security goal. First, it is necessary to determine the associated ADT and thus
the corresponding ADT root node. Afterwards, we need to check the preferences
regarding the impact rule which should be applied. If the preference is ranked
better, the corresponding impact rule can be performed to determine the effect of
the ADT root node. Finally, we want to determine complexity of Algorithm 4.4.
Since this algorithm does not contain any loops or recursive calls the complexity
is constantly, i.e. Algorithm 4.4 ∈ O(1).
4.3.5. ADT to ADT
As already mentioned in Section 3.4.2, the MCDM can be extended by a security
analysis, in more detail the ADTA which requires a well-defined ADT. For this
purpose, the preceding section, covered impact rules of type SSTM→ ADT since
these security analyses depend on security goals within the SSTM. However, in
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this case we only considered corresponding root nodes of the ADTs. We also
must take sub-nodes of the ADT into account. Therefore, top-down rules of the
type ADT→ ADT are needed. Thereby, there are two types of impact rules of the
syntactical scheme A.X→ B.Y [LSB15]: Attacker Node→ Attacker Node and Action
Node→ CM. Table 4.5 lists all the necessary impact rules in detail.
Source/Target element BC WC
Attacker Node→ Attacker Node
A.ext→ B.noChange A.ext→ B.mod
A.mod→ B.noChange A.mod→ B.mod
A.del→ B.mod A.del→ B.del
Action Node→ CM
A.ext→ B.mod A.ext→ B.mod
A.mod→ B.noChange A.mod→ B.mod
A.del→ B.del A.del→ B.del
Table 4.5.: Impact rules of dependencies ADT→ ADT
When extending an attacker node it has no effects on the corresponding target
attacker node if there are no marginal refinements. In WC, the target attacker node
needs to be modified since there may be enhancements which affects as final result
the corresponding CMs. Furthermore, if an attacker node is modified there are no
impacts on the corresponding target attacker nodes in BC. In WC, the target nodes
need to be modified since modifications, e.g. may enforce other logical operations.
For instance, an AND branch could be transformed into an OR operation branch.
If an attacker node is deleted in any step it yields deleting the corresponding target
node in BC and WC. This results from the hierarchical structure of the ADT and
thus the attacker nodes are included. When extending an action node, which is
part of an attacker node, the corresponding CM nodes need to be modified in both
cases, BC and WC. This is justified by the fact that extending an action node does
not consider the refinement regarding the corresponding CM node. Therefore, it
has to be still modified. In another case, if an action node is modified there is no
effect on the CM node in BC. However, in WC the corresponding CM node needs
to be modified as well. In BC the amendment is not marginal, however, in WC it
has serious impacts regarding SST if an inadequate CM is realised. When deleting
an action node it yields deleting the corresponding CM nodes since they depend
on the action node, i.e. without any action node there is no CM node. If the impact
rules regarding the ADT are applied it is possible that conflicts arise. For instance,
if there is one CM, which mitigates attacks of two or more action nodes, a conflict
may arise when changing all the action nodes over several paths. For this reason
we need preferences to avoid conflicts:
mod BC del BC ext and
mod WC ext WC del
In both cases, modifying has the highest priority since modifying does not entail
any structural changes. In BC, deleting is ranked better than extending since the
structure is changed in case of extending and thus requires a few more steps. In
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WC analysis deleting has the worst priority since it often requires creating a new
(sub-)tree afterwards and the effort is not really minimised by this operation. To
apply the corresponding impact rules, an procedure is necessary which is specified
in Algorithm 4.5.
Algorithm 4.5 Calculation of impacts of dependencies ADT→ ADT
1: procedure CALCULATIONIMPACTS-ADT-ADT(modelElement, operation)
2: if modelElement isTypeOf AttackerNode then
3: for all an ∈ getAttackerNodes(attackerNode) do
4: if checkPrefAndApplyRule(attackerNode, an) then
5: CalculationImpacts-ADT-ADT(an, getOperation(an))
6: end if
7: end for
8: else
9: for all cm ∈ getCMNodes(counterMeasure) do
10: if checkPref(actionNode, cm) then
11: applyRule(actionNode, cm)
12: end if
13: end for
14: end if
15: end procedure
First, we need to query the model element type, i.e. AttackerNode or ActionNode
which is done in line 2 and 8. In case of an attacker node it is subsequently
necessary to determine all target attacker nodes. Afterwards, it is checked by
means of the preferences if the needful impact rule can be applied. If this has been
done successfully, the procedure is called again recursively. In the second case the
target CM nodes have to be determined before the preferences can be checked.
Subsequently, the corresponding impact rule can be performed. The impact rule
Action Node→ CM does not require a repeated recursive call since CM nodes have
no outgoing transitions. The complexity of Algorithm 4.5 is O(|V|+ |E|) since
there are |V|model elements and |E| connections between them. Furthermore, the
algorithm does not contain any cycles and has hierarchical structure.
4.4. Change Requests
Definition 4.1 specified the term change impact by using the term change request.
Hereinafter, the term change request is defined.
Definition 4.2 (Change Request). A change request is a defined request for modi-
fication which usually receives after determining the extent of the requirements to
be realised in a project bindingly [Mäk00].
The more complex a system is, the more likely it is that there are change requests
during the project life cycle. Even long project times increase the likelihood of
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necessity of change requests. A change request is a uniform defined requirement
which usually delivers a principal to a corresponding contractor. [Mäk00] How-
ever, according to [Mäk00] there are some more use cases for the necessity of
change requests:
1. Errors and failures have been identified by means of bug reports and need
to be avoided.
2. Customers or users wish to adapt and to enhance system properties.
3. Errors and failures have been detected while developing a linked or related
system.
4. There are some changes in the underlying structure, architecture or standards.
For instance, an alternative operating system or safety standard should be
used instead.
5. Commands from a higher instance lead to change requests.
6. An individual software or hardware configuration is no longer available on
the market.
Thereby, project requirements can be extended, modified or reduced. In principle,
to realise a change request, a series of information has to be noticed. First, the
part of a product or software which should be changed is described textually. By
analogy it is also written down in which state the product or software should
be changed. It is mandatory to motivate and justify the amendment. In case
of an individual software product, the involved software license or version has
to be specified additionally. Moreover, the date of the change request as well
as corresponding date have to be indicated. The employee which initiates the
change request should mention his or her name in the proposal. Furthermore,
the change request should also contain estimations of costs separated by items,
e.g. personnel costs or license fees. Moreover, an estimated time frame should be
specified separated by useful milestones. [Kaj99] In further course of this thesis, a
change request only consists of four essential elements for the sake of simplicity
unless otherwise stated:
1. Stakeholder
2. Description of the change request
3. Affected model element
4. Trigger operation
Let us take a simple example of a change request which is illustrated in Figure 4.3.
In this example, the encryption should be made more secure. For this reason,
we need the stakeholder Security Expert. The change request description Update
encryption algorithm from 128 bit AES to 256 bit AES is assigned to the stakeholder.
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In this way, the intention of the change request has been specified in more detail.
Afterwards, the description is refined and assigned to the corresponding model
element. In this case it refers to the SSTM goal Software acceptably secure against
manipulation and hacking attacks (cf. Figure 3.11). Finally, the triggering operation
(extend, modify or delete) must be selected which can be usually derived from
change request description. In this example, the goal is modified.
Security expert
Update encryption 
algorithm from 128 bit AES 
to 256 bit AES 
Software acceptably secure 
against manipulation and 
hacking attacks
modify
Stakeholder
Description of 
the change 
request
Affected model 
element (SSTM 
Goal)
Trigger 
operation
Figure 4.3.: Example of a change request
If change requests are initiated, efficiency is increased due to less subsequent
failures or errors and thus low risk of adjustments. Furthermore, by means
of change requests costs are minimised since rethought and newly developed
systems are much more expensive. Moreover, in this way there is an efficient
maintenance since transparency is fulfilled from the change request to realisation
of the corresponding change requests. [SAP19]
4.5. Change Impact Algorithmic
So far, it has been specified how impact rules of different source and target model
types are performed. Furthermore, the necessity of change requests has been
explained in detail. It has not been considered how to combine different impact
ruling types as proposed in Section 4.3.1 to Section 4.3.5 to a consistent methodol-
ogy. This is part of Section 4.5.1. Moreover, there is another methodology which
calculates resulting change impacts based on attribution functions. This procedure
is presented subsequent in Section 4.5.2.
4.5.1. Structural Impacts
In practice, it is not sufficient to determine only resulting affected elements if a
change request is performed. In this context, traceability is of great importance, i.e,
the entire path has to be comprehensible to also perform unforeseen modifications.
As described in Section 4.3, these kinds of safety-critical aspects do not consider
semantics but ensure that structural dependencies are not violated. For instance,
if there is a road sign recognition for speed limits the structural impact analysis
could calculate that the installed video camera needs to be adapted. In retrospect
it might turn out that a change has to be made on the corresponding bus system
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which is linked with the video camera. Without a reasonable traceability it would
not be possible to detect this component. In this way, it is purpose of structural
impacts to check which model elements of all interrelated models are concerned of
a change request. This kind of change impact analysis is easier to perform than an
attributed and semantic change impact analysis since it does not require further
information, e.g. Safety Integrity Level (SIL) classification.
In Section 4.3 it has been described how to apply impact rules of the corresponding
types, e.g. SSTM → SSTM. However, in practice there are impacts which not
only affect change impacts of one type. Therefore, we need to combine them.
Thereby, it is possible that a target model element is affected by impact rules of
two different types. For instance, an alternative solution could be affected by the
impact types SSTM→ SSTM as well as SM→ SSTM. For this reason, we need to
specify preferences which are listed in Table 4.6. In case of SM as target model,
there is no alternative as source model. However, if a SSTM model element is
affected the impacts of the SSTM itself have more expressiveness than the SM
since the SSTM is more essential for the MCDM. In other words, impacts of the
type SSTM→ SSTM are ranked better than SM→ SSTM and thus have priority.
If an ADT model element should be changed by means of the impact analysis it
can either be changed by means of the ADT or the SSTM. In this case, the ADT is
ranked better since it contains necessary security analysis components.
Target model Preferences source model
SM SM
SSTM SSTM  SM
ADT ADT  SSTM
Table 4.6.: Preferences of structural impacts
Finally, all gathered information is collated to a procedure which is specified in
Algorithm 4.6. First, we need to determine the model element from which the
structural impact analysis is initiated. This is done by method getAffectedModelEle-
ment(changeReq). Subsequently, the preferences which have been listed in Table 4.6
can be applied. If the target model element is part of the SM, the change impact
rules as described in Section 4.3.1 can be performed. Otherwise, i.e. in case of
SSTM or ADT model element the preferences must be checked if there would be
conflicts. Afterwards, the corresponding impact rules of types as described in
Section 4.3.2 to Section 4.3.5 can be applied.
4.5.2. KPI Based Impacts
It is usual that some quality attributes and SST properties are met. These include,
e.g., compliance with corresponding SILs or timing restrictions. For this purpose,
we want to find those model elements within the entire models (SM, SSTM and
ADT) which have similar SST properties (e.g. identical SIL classification) than the
model element from which the change impact analysis will be triggered. This
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Algorithm 4.6 Calculation of structural impacts
1: procedure STRUCTURALIMPACTS(changeReq)
2: modelElement← getAffectedModelElement(changeReq)
3: if getTarget(modelElement) isTypeOf SM then
4: applySMImpactRule
5: else
6: if checkPreferences then
7: applyPrioritisedImpactRule
8: end if
9: end if
10: end procedure
procedure only considers KPI, i.e. attribution without any implicit structural
dependencies. In practice, there are often semantic dependencies even though the
concerned model elements do not correlate structurally. For instance, if a system
component of a SM is replaced by another system component which boasts a
different SIL it may affect goals within a SSTM. To enable attribution, i.e. KPIs
for model nodes, we need to define construction of them which is introduced in
Definition 4.3.
Definition 4.3 (Attribution). For each node there is at least one triple which con-
sists of following characteristics:
1. Attribute key: Defines attribute which is taken into account, e.g. SIL classifica-
tion for safety concern.
2. Attribute function: Defines a function with which allowed values are specified.
In this thesis there are three types of attribute functions:
a) Max: Specifies that a maximum defined threshold may not be exceeded.
This function is, e.g. usually applied for timing functions.
b) Min: Defines that a corresponding minimum may not be undercut. This
function is, e.g. applied if at least a specific SIL must be achieved for a
model element.
c) Exactly: A precisely defined value has to be maintained, i.e. there is
exactly one valid value. This function is, e.g. applied.
3. Attribute threshold: Defines a limiting value which limits the corresponding
attribute functions.
For instance, if there is a model element, e.g. a goal regarding timing concern there
may be an attribution triple with the following parameters: (transmissionTime, max,
300). In this context, transmission time is taken into account for the corresponding
model element. Thereby, transmission may not last more than 300 ms. In addition
to the attribution triple there is also a further triple
∆FMEA(O, S, D)
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which only affects POVs and is part of the SSTM. This triple is specified within the
corresponding change requests and defines the individual deltas of the probability
components for calculating RPN, i.e. occurrence, severity and detection. For in-
stance, if there is a ∆FMEA(−2, 0,+1) it means that occurrence is downgraded two
ranks whereas detection is getting better one level and severity remains unchanged
if the corresponding change request is realised. In this way, the MCDM can be
initiated once again if the change request only affects the SSTM. Furthermore, if
the KPI based change impact analysis is triggered it could be the case that there
is more than one attribution triple. For the precision of the change impacts it is
necessary to define whether all annotated KPIs should be taken into account or
whether it is sufficient to consider at least one of them. For instance, if there is
model element Airbag is acceptably safe which may have two attribution triples, e.g.
• (timeLimit, max, 150)
• (silLevel, min, 2)
In this case it has to be decided whether it is sufficient to only consider either
attribute timeLimit or silLevel. Otherwise, both of them are taken into account
for calculation of affected model elements. To realise this difficulty, a boolean
variable allAttributes is needed which is set to true if all attributes are considered
or false if not. Some of the triples or variables as proposed in this section have to
be taken into account within the change request. These include the allAttributes in
any case and ∆FMEA if necessary. Since we cannot make any logical predictions
about operations, e.g. extend, modify or delete we combine them as a modifying
operation. The adaptations of the attributed change requests are illustrated in
Figure 4.4.
Stakeholder
Change request description Affected model element
allAttributes
ΔFMEA
Figure 4.4.: Change request for KPI based impacts
In Algorithm 4.7, the procedure is defined which enables calculating of attributed
impacts in consideration of the prerequisites which have been mentioned in the
last paragraphs. First, we need to determine the affected model element which is
either part of the SM, SSTM or ADT and is specified within the change request. Af-
terwards, it needs to be checked whether all attribution triples are necessary for the
calculation of the change impacts or only one of them respectively. Subsequently,
each model, i.e. SM, SSTM and ADT is browsed for vulnerabilities of the corre-
sponding attribution triples by means of the methods ImpactsAll/OneAttributeXX.
Thereby, XX stands for the individual model types. Concretely, this means that all
the attribution triples of the model nodes are checked regarding the attribution
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triple/s of the triggering model element. In this context, it has to be taken care that
the max, min or exactly function is met. For instance, if there is a system component
scold which has to be replaced by another system component scnew. Thereby, the
following applies for the individual system components according to Figure 4.5:
• scold: (timeLimit, max, 500)
• scnew: (timeLimit, max, 300)
<<Goal>>
Airbag triggers in time
(timeLimit, max, 500)
<<SystemComponent>>
Airbag component SCold
(timeLimit, max, 500)
<<SystemComponent>>
Airbag component SCnew
(timeLimit, max, 300)
Replaced by Change Impact
Figure 4.5.: Example of an attributed change impact
In this case, it is looked for model nodes with attribution triples which currently
allow a maximum timeLimit of more than 300ms and thus violate the attribution
triple (timeLimit, max, 300) of scnew. This kind of calculations are part of the method
findVulnerabilities(XX) whereas XX stands for the model type, e.g. SM which needs
to be browsed. Furthermore, if the affected element is of type POV the new
RPN regarding the FMEA can be calculated automatically if the corresponding
alternative solutions are not affected by triggering change request. In this way,
the MCDM can be can be performed once again without any significant effort.
This is done by line 20 to 22. All the affected elements are finally stored in the list
affectedElements and has been modified during the calculations. The complexity
of this algorithm is O(|V|+ |E|) where |V| is the number of all model nodes and
|E| the relations between them. This can justified by the fact that each element is
inspected at most once.
4.6. Example
The example, which is presented in this section, clarifies the principle of structural
and attributed change impact analysis by means of two selected use cases. The
use case of the attributed change impact analysis is the already known ACC
example from Section 3.9 which is extended by necessary attribution triples. For
the structural change impact analysis a new use case is introduced which calculates
change impacts for a road sign recognition.
Structural Impacts
The first use case is demonstrated by means of a SSTM (cf. Figure 4.6) which
represents a SGH for the goal Speed limit road sign recognition is acc. safe. The root
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Algorithm 4.7 Calculation of attributed impacts
1: procedure ATTRIBUTEDIMPACTS(changeReq, allAttr)
2: modelElement← getAffectedModelElement(changeReq)
3: if allAttr then
4: for AttributionTriple at ∈ getAttributionTriples(modelElement) do
5: ImpactsAllAttrSM(at)
6: ImpactsAllAttrSSTM(at)
7: ImpactsAllAttrADT(at)
8: end for
9: else
10: for AttributionTriple at ∈ getAttributionTriples(modelElement) do
11: ImpactsOneAttrSM(at)
12: ImpactsOneAttrSSTM(at)
13: ImpactsOneAttrADT(at)
14: end for
15: end if
16: end procedure
17: procedure IMPACTSALL/ONEATTRIBUTEXX(attributeTriple)
18: affectedElements← new List
19: findVulnerabilities(XX)
20: if getAffectedElement(attributeTriple) isTypeOf POV then
21: calculateNewRPN(getDeltaFMEA(changeReq))
22: end if
23: end procedure
safety goal is refined by three further goals: Road sign recognition camera is acc. safe,
Road sign recognition software is acc. safe and Road sign recognition communication is
acc. safe. The first one is refined by further safety and timing goals which consider
malfunction due to back-lights as well as the correct and timely recognition of
road signs. The second and third goal is refined by SST goals which are already
known by Section 3.9. Finally, the SSTM contains two alternative solutions which
cover two different image sensor types. Only one of them supports uncompressed
data storage. First, we need to define a change request for this use case which
should be performed:
1. The resolution of cameras has at least 20 mega pixels.
2. It affects the POV The probability of detecting a road sign in time is acceptable.
3. This results in the triggering operation modify of the POV.
For this change request a structural change impact analysis is performed since the
correct recognition of speed limit road signs is minimum safety-critical since the
road sign recognition only supports the driver and does not perform interventions.
As already indicated, the structural change impact analysis is initiated by the
purple dashed goal of Figure 4.6 with mod. We have to apply rules of type SSTM
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→ SSTM as proposed in Section 4.3.3 to get the desired results. When performing
a BC analysis there are no further impacts. This analysis is chosen if the current
camera system approximately fulfils the new requirements with minimal devi-
ations. In WC analysis some changes are needed over several iterations. When
applying rules of type Goal/POV→ Goal (↑) the green bordered goals of Figure 4.6
are affected with mod. In the next steps and iterations we apply Goal→ Goal/POV
rules. The POVs which have some mod impacts are highlighted with a red dashed
frame. Finally, the affected solutions which needs to be modified, can be deter-
mined when applying the corresponding rule A.mod → B.mod of the type POV
→ Alternative Solution. In this way, it has been demonstrated that modifying a
single POV can have impacts on the remaining POVs within the SSTM. In this use
case it is justified by the fact that the camera shots which are primarily affected by
the change request have to be processed by further software. Furthermore, their
results need to be communicated within any bus system.
Speed limit road sign 
recognition 
is acc. safe
Road sign recognition 
camera is acc. safe
Road sign recognition 
software is acc. safe
Road sign recognation 
comm. is acc.  reliable
Results are correct. Errors 
are sufficiently mitigated. 
(SA)
Results are calculated in 
time. Delays are sufficiently 
mitigated. (TI)
Software acceptably secure 
against manipulation and 
hacking attacks (SE)
Malfunction due to back-
lights can be ruled out with 
sufficient certainty (SA)
The probability of detecting 
a road sign in time is 
acceptable. (TI)
Detecting a non existing 
road sign can be ruled out 
with sufficient certainty (SA)
Communication is 
acceptably secured against 
data theft (SE)
Communication is 
acceptably secured against 
manipulation (SE)
Messages arrive in time with 
acceptable reliability (TI)
Messages are transferred 
correctly with acceptable 
reliability (SA)
Camera with 
CMOS sensor 
and RAW 
support
Camera with 
CCD sensor 
without RAW 
support
Element to be modified
Affected elements by applying 
rule Goal  Goal/POV (↑)
Affected elements by applying 
rule Goal  Goal/POV
Affected elements by 
applying rule POV  
Alternative Solution
SST model
Figure 4.6.: Example of structural impacts
KPI Based Impacts
The use case for calculating attributed impacts is based on the example of Sec-
tion 3.9. First, we need to take some precautions to perform the attributed change
impact analysis which is illustrated graphically in Figure 4.7. The individual POVs
of the SSTM are extended by corresponding attribution triples to consider SST.
As already mentioned in Section 3.3.2, a SM is required to derive individual alter-
native solutions therefrom. Therefore, we need to annotate individual selected
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system components with attribution triples as well. The sensing must fulfil timing
constraints, i.e. there is also an attribution triple with attribution key timeLimit.
ACC is acceptably safe
ACC sensors are working 
correctly
ACC software is working 
correctly
ACC actuators are 
working correctly
ACC communication is 
acceptably reliable
Brake failure is sufficiently 
mitigated (SA)
27 27 
(sil, min, 3)
 (fmea, max, 100)
Engine failure is sufficiently 
mitigated (SA)
21 21 
(sil, min, 3)
 (fmea, max, 100)
Results are correct. Errors 
are sufficiently mitigated. 
(SA)
90 90 
(sil, min, 2) 
(fmea, max, 100)
Results are calculated in 
time. Delays are sufficiently 
mitigated. (TI)
100 100 
(timeLimit, max, 300) 
(fmea, max, 180)
Software acceptably secure 
against manipulation and 
hacking attacks (SE)
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certainty (SA)
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(fmea, max, 100)
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short) (SA)
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(sil, min, 3)
(fmea, max, 100)
The probability of detecting 
an obstacle in time is 
acceptable. (TI)
80 70 
(timeLimit, max, 300)
 (fmea, max, 100)
Detecting a non existing 
obstacle can be ruled out 
with sufficient certainty (SA)
45 45 
(sil, min, 2)
(fmea, max, 180)
Communication is 
acceptably secured against 
data theft (SE)
180 90 
(aes, min, 128) 
(fmea, max, 180)
Communication is 
acceptably secured against 
manipulation (SE)
72 144 
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(fmea, max, 180)
Messages arrive in time with 
acceptable reliability (TI)
48 48 
(timeLimit, max, 300) 
(fmea, max, 65)
Messages are transferred 
correctly with acceptable 
reliability (SA)
48 48 
(sil, min, 2) 
(fmea, max, 185)
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video sensing, 
256 bit 
encryption
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with radar, 128 
bit encryption
Any goal
Any POV
RPN ACC 160 km/h
RPN ACC 210 km/h
Attribution Triple
Legend
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any 
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2 
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Engine control
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Cruise switch for 210 km/h
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Figure 4.7.: Example of attributed impacts
Moreover, the individual encryption algorithms have specific key lengths. There-
fore, we need an attribution triple with the key aes. In accordance with the SSTM,
the system components are annotated with corresponding fmea triples as well. In
this use case we define a change request with following characteristics:
1. The system component Video sensing is replaced by another one.
2. The new video sensing have some new attribution triples
a) (timeLimit, max, 400) and
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b) (fmea, max, 70).
3. allAttributes = true
4. ∆FMEA = (0,−1, 0)
For the safety concern there is the attribution triple (sil, min, X) where X stands
for the corresponding SIL, i.e. at least SIL X has to be achieved. Furthermore,
there is an attribution (aes, min, X) where X stands for the key length of the AES
algorithm. The attribution triple (timeLimit, max, X) is assigned to the timing
concern, i.e. there is a maximum time limitation of X ms. Furthermore, each POV
and some system components are annotated with a triple (fmea, max, X), i.e. the
FMEA of the corresponding POV or system component does not exceed a RPN
of X. The attributed change impact analysis is consequently initiated by system
component Video sensing. Since we consider all attribution triples we need to check
for violations of timeLimit and fmea for corresponding model nodes. The first model
node which is affected by the change request is the system component Cruise switch
for 210 km/h which uses Video and radar sensing. Therefore, the alternative solution
ACC 210 km/h with radar + video sensing, 256 bit encryption is affected. Furthermore,
the POV Messages arrive in time with acceptable reliability is affected by the change
request since there is a maximum required time limit of 300 ms and FMEA RPN
value of 65. Both attributes could be violated by the new video sensing. Since the
change impact analysis yields an alternative solution an automated adaption of
the corresponding FMEA values and thus an iterated execution of the MCDM is
not possible. In summary, there are three affected model elements which have
been marked with a red dotted frame in Figure 4.7:
• System component 210 km/h
• Alternative solution ACC 210 km/h with radar + video sensing, 256 bit encryption
• POV Messages arrive in time with acceptable reliability
4.7. Related Work
There are some related publications which are presented and compared with
the approach of a change impact analysis on SCSs. On the one hand there are
papers which cover Enterprise-related impacts. On the other hand there are
publications dealing with change impacts regarding UML models and object-
orientated programming languages, e.g. Java.
Enterprise Based Impacts
First, the work of [Arn96] has to be mentioned. This publication introduces basic
techniques and concepts which are necessary to perform a change impact analysis.
In contrast to [Arn96] this thesis proposes an advanced ChIAs. Moreover, it is
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not part of [Arn96] taking any safety-critical concerns into account. The work of
Langermeier et al. [LSB15] provides a change impact analysis approach based on
Enterprise Architecture Models (EAMs). By means of their approach, which is
based on a data-flow analysis technique, it is analysed which model elements are
affected. Moreover, the algorithm of the authors aims to apply a change impact
analysis in context of EAMs. However, in this chapter of the thesis an approach
is proposed how to apply change impact analysis taken safety-critical concerns,
e.g. SST into account. Furthermore, there is the paper of Hanemann et al. [HSS05]
dealing with resource failures which might endanger service level agreements by
influencing services. Therefore, [HSS05] presents an approach which identifies the
effect of resource failures with respect to the corresponding services and service
level agreements. The work of [HSS05] analyses failure impacts and does not take
safety-critical issues into account. Finally, there is an impact analysis from [Ola07].
“The analysis consists of stakeholder impact index to determine the nature and
impact of stakeholder influence, the probability of stakeholders exercising their
influence and each stakeholder’s position in relation to the project [...]” [Ola07].
The focus of this work is on impacts of stakeholder influences whereas the focus
of this chapter of the thesis is on the calculation of change impacts on the basis
of models in safety-critical environment. In summary, this chapter of the thesis
proposes an approach how to apply a structural and KPI based change impact
analysis taken safety-critical concerns, e.g. safety and security into account. The
focus of the related publications is on other domains, e.g. EAM.
Change Impacts of UML Models and Programming Languages
The work of Briand et al. [BLO03] describes the impacts of change requests to
UML diagram elements. In this context, potential consequences of a change are
identified and it is determined what modifications need to be made to accomplish
a change. This work is limited to only UML diagrams and does not allow any
other self-defined model types, e.g. SSTM. In contrast to this thesis, the paper
of [BLO03] is not focused on safety-critical aspects. The publications of Ren
et al. [Ren+04] as well as [RT01] propose an Eclipse based tool with the name
Chianti and analyses change impacts of regression or unit tests. By means of
the execution behaviour a set of affected changes is determined for each affected
test. Chianti does not analyse change impacts on models but on Java code. The
work of [Ren+04] and [RT01] enable textual based change impacts in the form
of Java code. In this context, it is not the aim of [Ren+04] and [RT01] to enable a
maximum degree of SST by means of the change impact analysis. The publication
of [Fis+05] presents an software suite called Margrave which verifies and analyses
change impacts of access-control policies. In this context, a “semantic differencing
information between versions of policies” [Fis+05] is performed. It is noted that
there is no attributed change impact analysis as proposed in this chapter of the
thesis. Moreover, the reference to SCSs is not given. Therefore, the approach
presented in this chapter of the thesis seems to be novel.
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Multi-Concerns in Software
Product Lines
The last main chapter describes application of Multi-Concerns in Software Product
Lines. First, the term Software Product Line is defined and their necessity is given
in Section 5.1. The subsequent Section 5.2 describes the concept of the current
chapter including a helpful overview picture in detail. The first essential part of
this chapter is covered in Section 5.3.1. Thereby, it is generally described how
MCDMs for SPLs have to be realised and performed to get an optimal result for
each safety-critical SPL. However, calculating trade-offs is getting more complex
since SPLs are getting more extensive. For this reason, an algorithm is specified
to reduce complexity and to cluster semantically equivalent features of SPLs.
Thereby, structural and KPI based algorithms are used which are specified in
detail in Section 5.3.2. Since there may be change requests which concern SPLs
the impact ruling of Section 4.3 needs to be extended by four more rule types,
namely FM → FM, SM → FM, SSTM → FM and FM → SSTM. To internalise
content of this chapter, the methodology is exemplified by means of a selected
example. Finally, related publications are referenced and the topic of this chapter
is delimited from them in Section 5.6. This chapter is mostly based on the authors’
work [LB19] and is therefore no further cited.
5.1. Software Product Lines
Nowadays, customers prefer a variability of software products to choose the
product which is adapted to one’s own needs. In this context we speak about
Product Line Engineering (PLE). From the company’s point of view it is the
aim to meet (SST) requirements of the customers. Furthermore, it is essential to
save money, effort and time. Moreover, companies are concerned about reusing
their know-how and artefacts [PBD05] This process is divided into two phases
as illustrated in Figure 5.1: Domain engineering and application engineering.
Thereby, it is purpose of the domain engineering process to specify potential
products by defining commonalities and variabilities of the corresponding product
family. Application engineering on the other hand defines the methodology of
building products by applying specifications of the domain engineering process
and to prepare an implementation therefrom. Product variants are defined by
selecting features from the underlying FM which represents the SPL in a graphical
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notation. Product lines are used in several business and application units. [Sch18]
However, this thesis is focused on SPL, i.e. software is built on the basis of PLE.
Domain engineering
Product Line Engineering
Application 
engineering
applies
Commonalities Variability
Product family
Products Implementation
Outcome
SS
T 
re
q
u
ir
e
m
en
ts
Figure 5.1.: PLE process
Definition 5.1 (Software Product Line). According to Harmann et al. [Har+14] a
SPL is specified as a collection of software products with similar properties which
vary in several aspects but also have a common basic functionality.
In general, applying SPLs have advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand
SPLs increase maintenance since it concerns more than one software product vari-
ation usually. Furthermore, applying SPLs enables easier testing under certain
circumstances since a set of similar features can be tested in the same test cycle.
Moreover, fulfilment of functional requirements is given by modelling of features
by means of FMs. On the other hand, due to large number of variability it is not
always easy to find an optimal software product configuration. [Har+14] This is
also reflected in the context of embedded and SCSs since there is a large number
of parameters and it is pretty hard to find the optimal configuration.
In the present thesis SPLs are used to model software-based features of SCSs by
means of FMs. Depending on individually selected SPL configurations the MCDM
is performed with the advantage that we have not to create a separate SSTM for
each SPL configuration. For this reason, only the relevant branches within the
hierarchical SSTM are taken into account for calculation of the optimal trade-off.
5.2. Concept
This section describes the concept of applying MC in context of SPLs and is
subdivided into two parts which can be read independently of each other. First, it
is explained in general terms which steps are necessary to realise a MCDM using
SPL techniques. This methodology is extended by a procedure which reduces
complexity in a way that not all SPLs have to be analysed. The second part is a
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complement of the change impact analysis of Chapter 4 and includes the first part
into the approach. The necessary individual steps are illustrated in Figure 5.2.
Part I: Trade-Offs for safety-critical Software Product Lines
Step 1: Overall approach Step 2: Complexity reduction
Part II: Impact ruling extension
FM modelling
Linking FM ↔ SSTM
FM  FM
Linking FM ↔ SM
SST Annotation of features
POV attribution
SM  FM
SSTM  FM
FM  SSTM
Figure 5.2.: Logical concept of applying MCs in SPLs
When performing a MCDM, it is essential to take necessary steps into account as
described in Chapter 3. The same applies when applying a change impact analysis.
Hereinafter, it is described which steps are necessary if a MCDM for safety-critical
SPLs should be realised. Realising a MCDM for safety-critical SPLs requires an
existing SSTM which should be minimised or hide irrelevant elements of them
according the corresponding SPL. Furthermore, it is conveyed how impact rules
have to be extended to calculate change impacts regarding MC in SPLs.
Part I→ Step 1: First, we need a FM which represents all the variabilities and fea-
tures of the safety-critical SPL. For instance, there may be a FM which represents
ADASs of an automotive vehicle. To enable MCDMs for safety-critical SPLs it is
essential that there is a SM and SSTM (cf. Section 3.3.2 and Section 3.4.1) as a basis.
First, we need to link features of the FM with the underlying system components
of the SM. In this way, relevant system components on system level are discovered
which will be later transferred on the SSTM. Afterwards, all the features are linked
with the corresponding POVs of the SSTM in order to determine necessary POVs
for corresponding SPLs. For instance, an ACC SPL configuration may only take
ACC POVs into account for the MCDM. This ensures that only relevant POVs are
considered for calculation of the optimal trade-off and the results are not falsified.
Part I→ Step 2: Step 2 is a continuation of Part I→ Step 1 to reduce complexity
for calculating trade-offs of safety-critical SPLs. This step is necessary because
conventional SPLs cover a large number of configurations which can not be taken
into account completely to get an optimal trade-off. Therefore, it is essential
to cluster semantically equivalent features with approximately identical SST re-
quirements. First, all features need to be annotated with SST tags to determine
the corresponding safety-critical concerns of the individual features. Secondly,
a feature related attribution of POVs within the SSTM is needed to take further
safety-critical characteristics into account. These include, e.g. risk assessments
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(FMEA calculations).
Part II: In practice, there are permanent change requests of SPLs, i.e. the under-
lying models need to be enhanced. This means, modifications of the FM yield
amendments of the FM itself and the linked SSTM. Besides this, the SM and
SSTM may be modified as source model and have effects on the FM as target
model. Consequently, there are new change impact rules of type FM→ FM, SM
→ FM, SSTM→ FM and FM→ SSTM. As already described in Section 4.3 the
impact rules are differentiated between BC and WC, i.e. there is a minimum and
maximum set of effects.
5.3. Trade-Offs for Safety-Critical Software Product
Lines
The current section covers Part I of the concept picture which is subdivided
into two steps. First, an overall approach is described in detail to realise SPL
techniques for calculation of an optimal trade-off. The subsequent and final
subsection outlines how to reduce the complexity of them to calculate trade-offs
more efficiently.
5.3.1. Overall Approach
In general, the overall approach covers three steps and consists of necessary de-
pendencies between FM, SM and SSTM which are illustrated in Figure 5.3.
Step 1: To realise trade-offs for safety-critical SPLs it is first essential to model
functional demands in a standardised and hierarchical manner. For this purpose
FMs (cf. Section 2.3.2) have been established to model such functional demands.
The individual features are annotated with flags to consider SST concerns. Thereby,
features can derive SST annotations from their parent features. Let us assume we
want to determine trade-offs regarding ADASs. In this case it is modelled which
combinations of different ADASs are permissible and which are not. For instance,
if an ACC is included in the current configuration, a simple CC is excluded auto-
matically since an ACC has all functionality of a CC. However, SPL combinations
are often restricted by structural measures, e.g. built-in sensor technology. In this
way, the MCDM needs to find out whether sensor fusion of a SPL configuration is
acceptably safe. It is therefore the aim of SPL based MCDM to inspect whether a
SPL configuration is acceptably safe. In this manner, manufacturers can test before
market launch profitability of such configurations. Therefore, cost-intensive recalls
could be avoided.
Step 2: As already indicated in Figure 1.4 SMs are part of functional demands.
Therefore, it is obvious that a FM also needs to be linked with system components
(and their subcomponents) of SMs. To calculate trade-offs which have to fulfil a
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System is acceptably safe
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Figure 5.3.: Dependencies between FM, SM and SSTM
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certain degree of safety a SSTM is required. As described in Section 3.4.1 a SSTM
entails alternative solutions which are derived from an underlying SM. Depending
on selected SPL configuration alternative solutions are relevant or not or need to
be updated if applicable. In this way, relevant solutions regarding the selected
feature path are enabled. Therefore, a linking between FM and SM is mandatory
to determine involved system components of a selected SPL configuration. For
instance, if there is a feature ACC which can either be equipped with a radar
sensor or a camera then alternative solutions referencing on either radar, camera
or both are applicable.
Step 3: It is the main objective for calculation of optimal trade-offs to fulfil qual-
itative requirements, i.e. a linking between FM and SSTM is mandatory. I.e.,
each relevant feature of the SPL configuration is linked with the corresponding
POVs of the underlying SSTM. In this way, the MCDM considers only linked
POVs and its associated goals up to the root goal for calculation of trade-offs of
individual SPL configurations. According to Definition 2.16 the MCDM is based
on an hierarchical approach which calculates local priorities to determine global
priorities, i.e. percentage distribution of the corresponding alternative solutions.
Since SPL enable customised configurations it is usual to only consider a subset of
child-goals or POVs to calculate the individual local priorities. However, disabling
a child-goal or POV yields another percentage distribution of the individual child-
goals or POVs and thus influences calculating of trade-offs. For instance, if there
is matrix A with AHP weights for child-goals A1, A2 and A3 (cf. Table 5.1) with
A1  A2  A3 the local priorities are
• A1 : 75, 1%
• A2 : 17, 8%
• A3 : 7, 0%
A =

A1 A2 A3
A1 1 5 9
A2 15 1 3
A3 19
1
3 1
 A′ = [
A1 A2
A1 1 5
A2 15 1
]
Table 5.1.: AHP matrices with weights for A1  A2  A3
Let us assume there is a SPL configuration which does not take goal A3 into
account (cf. Table 5.1), the reduced matrix A′ has the following local priorities:
• A1 : 83, 3%
• A2 : 16, 7%
When comparing the individual local priorities A1 and A2 it is noticeable that
percentage distribution for A1 better results than for A2. It still applies A1  A2,
118
5.3. TRADE-OFFS FOR SAFETY-CRITICAL SOFTWARE PRODUCT LINES
i.e. there is no further scaling necessary. Furthermore, it needs to be explained
the effects of the risk assessment which is part of the MCDM as well. Since the
FMEA assessment depends on alternative solutions and POVs (cf. Section 3.7.1)
the FMEA only needs to be updated if there are changes regarding the individual
alternative solutions. The necessity of them has been described in the previous
paragraph concerning the linking between FM and SM.
In summary, the overall approach needs three essential steps which are written
down prototypically in Algorithm 5.1. First, we need a FM to represent SPLs
configurations. Subsequently, each feature of the individual SPLs configurations
has to be linked with relevant system components of the underlying SM (cf. line
3) to identify correct alternative solutions. Finally, each of the features needs to be
linked with POVs and associated goals (cf. line 4) to fulfil qualitative requirements.
Afterwards, the MCDM can be performed for the individual SPL configuration.
Algorithm 5.1 Overall approach of the SPL based MCDM
1: procedure SPLOVERALLAPPROACH(splConfig, systemModel, sstModel)
2: for all Feature f ∈ splConfig do
3: setSystemComponents(f, systemComponents)
4: setPOVs(f, POVs)
5: setPathsPOVRoot(POVs)
6: end for
7: performMCDM(splConfig)
8: end procedure
5.3.2. Clustering of Semantically Equivalent Features
The preceding section covered how trade-offs of SPL configurations are calculated.
However, complexity and functionality of software systems continue to increase
(we talk about millions of SPL configurations) and thus the complexity needs to
be reduced to calculate trade-offs of SPL configurations. Therefore, it is the aim of
this section to extend the algorithm of Section 5.3.1 and to describe an algorithm
to reduce complexity as far as possible in a way that all SST requirements are met
and thus elements of the SSTM with same requirements are only included once for
calculation of the optimal trade-off to reduce overhead. In general, the algorithm
consists of five essential steps which are illustrated in Figure 5.4 and are essential
part of this section. The green dotted relations refer to the linkings which have
already been introduced in the preceding section whereas the blue relations refer
to the algorithm of the current section.
Step 1: When selecting a SPL configuration only system components are consid-
ered which are used by the current SPL configuration due to the linking between
FM and SM as described in the second step of the previous section. According to
the SPL configuration the set of alternative solutions for determining the optimal
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Figure 5.4.: Logical concept of clustering semantically equivalent features
trade-off may be extended to achieve better results for the MCDM in the end. For
this purpose, we need to identify commonly used dependencies in the underlying
SM. Afterwards, these dependencies have to be squared with the intuitive set
of alternative solutions to take more of them into account and to use them for
the MCDM. Let us assume there is a SPL configuration which uses Feature F#1
and Feature F#2, whereas Feature F#1 depends on System component C#1 and Feature
F#2 depends on System component C#2. In this context, Solution AS#1 is derived
from System component C#1 whereas Solution AS#2 depends on System component
C#2. Besides, there is also System component C#3 which is associated with System
component C#1 and System component C#2, i.e. System component C#3 is a commonly
used system component. There is also a Solution AS#3 which is derived from Sys-
tem component C#3, i.e. we need to take Solution AS#3 into account for calculation
of the optimal trade-off as well. The example which has been explained in this
paragraph textually is illustrated in Figure 5.5.
Step 2: It is the aim of this algorithm to determine which features have similar
SST demands to reduce elements for calculation of trade-offs. I.e., we need to
determine the individual concerns (SST) for each feature of the corresponding SPL
configurations by annotating them with relevant SST tags (cf. Figure 2.9). For
instance, there may be features which are safety- and timing-critical or features
which are only safety-critical. Since there is a linking between features and POVs
it is ensured that each concern is covered by at least one POV. If there are two or
more POVs with equivalent characteristics but different concerns for the features
clustering is not possible since semantic characteristics are violated. The reason
is that POVs are applied by individual features. If the individual POVs are used
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Figure 5.5.: Correlations between commonly used system components
by features with different SST requirements the POVs cannot be clustered for
complexity reduction since the corresponding POVs are used in different ways.
Step 3: The last two steps covered necessary prerequisites for the actual complexity
reduction. The third step is now responsible for semantic analysis of POVs. For this
purpose we need a KPI based attribution as already proposed in Definition 4.3., i.e.
there are one or more triples for each POV which consist of attribute key, attribute
function and attribute threshold. Only when two or more POVs have identical
attribution functions all further necessary steps for complexity reduction can be
continued. For instance, if there are two POVs with attribution function (timeLimit,
max, 200) respectively:
1. The probability of detecting a threatening obstacle in time is acceptable for ACC
video camera and
2. The probability of detecting a threatening obstacle in time is acceptable for LA video
camera.
Since in both cases the attribution function requires a time limit of 200 ms the
prerequisites are fulfilled so far and the next steps can be continued to accomplish
the complexity reduction.
Step 4: The last prerequisite before the complexity reduction is accomplished
concerns risk assessment by means of the FMEA. As described in Section 3.7.1 the
FMEA is performed for individual alternative solutions depending on correspond-
ing POVs. To apply final complexity reduction it is necessary to check that risk
assessment between individual alternative solution and POV has been classified
with same risk of error (cf. Table 2.1). If the risk of error has been identically
classified for all the alternative solutions of a POV and this condition applies to at
least one more POV the complexity reduction can be performed if all preceding
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requirements are fulfilled. Finally, there is one last question: Which POV is used
for the calculation of the trade-off and which is eliminated? To achieve the best
possible result for the MCDM the average RPN values of the FMEA are used and
the best one is applied for the analysis whereas the remaining POVs will be elimi-
nated. For instance, if there are two solutions and two POVs as listed in Table 5.2,
POV#1 has an average RPN of 38 whereas POV#2 has an average RPN of 72,5.
Furthermore, POV#1 and POV#2 have identical risk of error for both alternative
solutions. Therefore, POV#1 is used for the MCDM and POV#2 is eliminated.
Alternative Solution POVs RPN Risk of error
Solution AS#1
POV#1
POV#2
36
70
Acceptable
Medium
Solution AS#2
POV#1
POV#2
40
75
Acceptable
Medium
Table 5.2.: FMEA clustering of semantically similar features
Step 5: Before the trade-off for the individual SPL configuration can be calculated
the corresponding paths within the underlying SSTM needs to be enabled. For this
purpose, all remaining POVs have to be enabled. Subsequently, all these POVs
enable all overlying goals up to the root. Afterwards, all remaining alternative
solutions (cf. step 1) have to be linked with the enabled POVs (cf. Section 3.8)
unless it is already done. Finally, the trade-offs for individual SPLs configurations
can be determined.
The five steps which have been described in the last paragraphs are summarised
in Algorithm 5.2. Thereby, step 1 is realised in line 2 when the method enableS-
olutions is called to determine commonly used system components and thus to
enable corresponding solutions. Line 4 and 5 cover step 2 and are responsible for
assigning SST concerns to the individual features. Subsequently, the verification
regarding semantics is realised in line 7 and 8. Step 4, i.e. the FMEA clustering is
checked in line 13 before the final paths will be built in line 16 and the trade-off is
calculated.
Definition 5.2 (Complexity Reduction of MC in SPLs). The level of complexity
reduction when using SPLs for MC to calculate trade-offs is defined as:
1− ∑
l
i=1 m−∑nj=1 v
w with following interpretation of the variables:
• l: Number of paths after complexity reduction.
• m: Number of goals and POVs in the corresponding paths.
• n: Number of commonly used goals within different paths.
• v: Indicates the number of multiple use of commonly used goals.
• w: Number of goals and POVs before complexity reduction.
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Algorithm 5.2 Clustering approach of the SPL based MCDM
1: procedure SPLCLUSTERINGAPPROACH(splConfig, systemModel, sstModel)
2: enableSolutions(splConfig, systemModel)
3: for all Feature f ∈ splConfig do
4: setSSTFlag(f)
5: checkSSTFlag(f)
6: for all POV pov ∈ getLinkedPOVs(f) do
7: setAttribution(pov)
8: checkAttribution(pov)
9: end for
10: end for
11: for all Solution s ∈ getEnabledSolutions(sstModel) do
12: for all POV pov ∈ getLinkedPOVs do
13: checkFMEAClustering(s, pov)
14: end for
15: end for
16: disablePOVsAndPathFormation(splConfig, sstModel)
17: performMCDM(splConfig)
18: end procedure
5.4. Extension of Change Impact Ruling
So far, change impacts which only concerns calculating a standalone MCDM have
been considered. It is the aim of this section to take change impact ruling into
account which enables MCDMs of SPL configurations. Therefore, we introduce
four new rule types: FM→ FM, SM→ FM, SSTM→ FM and FM→ SSTM.
5.4.1. FM to FM
The FM is a hierarchically structured model and is an essential part of the MCDM
when realising MC in SPL. If functional requirements and thus the FM is changed
by external influences, e.g. due to market demands it may have effects on model
elements within the FM itself. When applying rules with the syntactical scheme
A.X→ B.Y (cf. Section 4.3) which are listed in Table 5.3 it is distinguished between
three rule types [LSB15]: Feature→ Feature (↓), Feature→ Feature (↑) and Feature
→ Feature (require/exclude). I.e., there are impact rules which calculate effects
bottom-up and top-down whereas bottom-up rules are more lightweight than
top-down rules. Furthermore, there are rules which take require and exclude rela-
tionships between different hierarchy levels into account.
When extending a feature there are no effects on child features or parent features
in BC if there is only a marginal extension. However, in WC the child features and
parent features need to be modified since the extension may have any functionality
of them and thus it is mandatory to adapt them. In another case, if a lightweight
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Source/Target element BC WC
Feature→ Feature (↓)
A.ext → B.noChange A.ext → B.mod
A.mod → B.noChange A.mod → B.mod
A.del → B.del A.del → B.del
Feature→ Feature (↑)
A.ext → B.noChange A.ext → B.mod
A.mod → B.noChange A.mod → B.mod
A.del → B.mod A.del → B.ext
Feature→ Feature (requ./excl.)
A.ext → B.noChange A.ext → B.ext
A.mod → B.noChange A.mod → B.mod
A.del → B.noChange A.del → B.del
Table 5.3.: Impact rules of dependencies FM→ FM
feature is modified the corresponding child features and parent features remain
unchanged. The situation is different if a mighty feature is modified. In this case,
the corresponding target features need to be modified since missing information
of the source features has to be transferred to the target features. When deleting a
feature the underlying child features are deleted as well since they cannot exist
without parent features. However, if a feature is deleted the corresponding parent
features are modified in BC and extended in WC. This is justified by the fact that
modifying a feature is associated with less effort than to develop a extending
feature. FMs support the functionality of requiring or excluding features which are
located on different hierarchy levels. To extend a feature, which has a require or
extend connection, has no effects on target feature in BC. The target feature needs
to be extended if the source feature is more important since the information of
extension of the source feature has to be transferred to the target feature. When
modifying a source feature there are no impacts for lightweight source features.
However, target features need to be modified in WC since information get lost
otherwise. The last case covers deleting a feature which is connected via require or
exclude relation. In this case, the target feature remains unchanged in optimal case.
Only in WC the target feature is deleted since dependencies are too strong.
To avoid potential conflicts when applying impacts rules, which are listed in
Table 5.3, it is mandatory to define corresponding preferences for BC and WC:
mod BC ext BC del and
ext WC mod WC del
In both cases deleting has lowest priority since information get lost. In optimal case
it is better to modify features than to extend it since it is more difficult to provide
new features than to adapt existing ones. Only in WC it is higher prioritised to
extend features than to modify it, since the WC analysis is not intended to conserve
resources.
All the change impact rules which have been defined within this section have
to be applied by means of a individual algorithm. This algorithm is specified
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Algorithm 5.3 Calculation of impacts of dependencies FM→ FM
1: procedure CALCULATIONIMPACTS-FM-FM(feature, operation)
2: for all f ∈ getChildFeatures(feature) do
3: if checkPrefAndApplyRule(feature, f) then
4: CalculationImpactsFM-FM(f, getOperation(f))
5: end if
6: if checkReqExcl(feature, f) then
7: CalculationImpactsFM-FM(f, getOperation(f))
8: end if
9: end for
10: Feature f← getParentFeature(feature)
11: if checkPrefAndApplyRule(feature, f) then
12: CalculationImpactsFM-FM(f, getOperation(f))
13: end if
14: if checkReqExcl(feature, f) then
15: CalculationImpactsFM-FM(f, getOperation(f))
16: end if
17: end procedure
in Algorithm 5.3 and mainly consists of methodology which defines top-down
and bottom-up rules and cross-links between individual features on different
levels. First, all child features of an individual feature are determined and the
preferences, which have been explained in the last paragraph, are checked to avoid
conflicts. Subsequently, the corresponding impact rules are applied top-down
and the method is invoked recursively with the new operation or effect type from
the current target feature (cf. lines 4-6). In addition, it is revised whether there
are require or exclude relations and the corresponding impact rules are applied if
applicable. Afterwards, the method is invoked recursively with the corresponding
target feature and effect type (cf. lines 7-9). Following, the parent feature is
determined based on the current feature and the same procedure is accomplished
once again bottom-up for the relation current feature→ parent feature (cf. lines
11-17). This algorithm has the same structure regarding method invokes, i.e.
the complexity is O(|V|+ |E|) for all relevant features |V| and connections |E|
between them.
5.4.2. SM to FM
As already described in Section 5.3 there is a dependency between SM and FM or
more precisely the FM depends on the underlying SM to derive commonly used
system components. The corresponding impact with the syntactical scheme A.X
→ B.Y are listed in Table 5.4 [LSB15]. In this context there are only impact rules of
the type: Component→ Feature, i.e. in this case there are no hierarchy related rules.
When extending a system component, e.g. by adding new ports, to consider
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Source/Target element BC WC
Component→ Feature
A.ext → B.mod A.ext → B.ext
A.mod → B.noChange A.mod → B.mod
A.del → B.noChange A.del → B.del
Table 5.4.: Impact rules of dependencies SM→ FM
sub-components, the corresponding features which are linked with the system
components need to be modified in BC or extended in WC. There is less effort to
modify a feature than to extend it since extending yields providing new functional-
ity whereas modifying means to update existing ones with minor changes. In other
cases if the source components are modified the corresponding target features only
need to be modified in case of major changes. For instance, the use of a new sensor
technology requires adapting target features to this technology. Otherwise the
individual target features are not adapted. Deleting a source system component
yields also deleting target feature if we consider a maximal set of effects. For
instance, if a feature depends only on one system component the corresponding
feature needs to be deleted. Otherwise there are no notable changes. As already
mentioned in the preceding section, conflicts can arise when applying several
change impact rules. Therefore, it is necessary to define preferences to get correct
results:
mod BC ext BC del and
ext WC mod WC del
Deleting a source system component has lowest priority since it means that the
knowledge has to be replaced in other ways. In BC it is easier to modify a system
component than to extend it. To modify a system component yields in many cases
changing the manufacturer where the technology is identical. However, in the less
common cases it is better to provide new system components than to update an
existing technology if the set of effects should be as minimal as possible.
Algorithm 5.4 Calculation of impacts of dependencies SM→ FM
1: procedure CALCULATIONIMPACTSSM-FM(component, operation)
2: for all feature ∈ getAssociatedFeatures(component) do
3: if checkPref(component, feature) then
4: applyRule(component, feature)
5: end if
6: end for
7: end procedure
This section covers impacts for dependencies between two different model types,
i.e. we first need to fetch all features which have been linked to the component. The
calculation method getAssociatedFeatures is invoked by means of that component.
Subsequently, it is mandatory to synchronise with the above specified preferences.
Only if the method checkPref returns true the corresponding impact rule can be
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applied. Finally, the complexity of Algorithm 5.4 is analysed: The algorithm is not
called recursively, i.e. there is a linear complexity of O(|V|+ |E|) for all relevant
system components and features |V| and |E| connections between them.
5.4.3. SSTM to FM
As already stated in Section 5.3 there is a linking between SSTM and FM. This
dependency is necessary to enable calculation process of MC in SPLs. When
changing a POV due to external influences it will consequently have effects on the
corresponding linked features, i.e. there is no hierarchy between the linking. The
necessary impact rules are listed in Table 5.5 and cover change impacts of the type
POV→ Feature.
Source/Target element BC WC
POV→ Feature
A.ext → B.mod A.ext → B.mod
A.mod → B.noChange A.mod → B.mod
A.del → B.noChange A.del → B.del
Table 5.5.: Impact rules of dependencies SSTM→ FM
When extending a POV it means that the current POV is converted into a goal, i.e.
the corresponding target feature needs to be modified since there is no linking
between goal and feature. In this context, the new POV which has been extended
or another POV needs to be set once more. In other cases, if individual lightweight
POVs are modified there are no effects on the corresponding features which
belong to SPL configurations. Only if more important POVs are modified the
corresponding features need to be adapted. For instance, if there is a POV Road sign
recognition is acceptably safe which is linked with the feature Road sign recognition
and the aforementioned POV is modified to Speed limit road sign recognition is
acceptably safe, the feature Road sign recognition needs to be modified. In this case,
the feature is either renamed to Speed limit road sign recognition or the feature needs
a linking with additional POVs for recognition of danger road signs. The last
change impact rule covers deleting a POV. In this case, the corresponding target
feature is only deleted if the feature only depends on the source POV. Applying
different change impact rules may yield conflicts, therefore we need to define
preferences in order to avoid those conflicts over several iterations (e.g. FM→ FM
and SSTM→ FM):
mod BC ext BC del and
mod WC ext WC del
In this application there is no difference between BC and WC. Thereby, deleting
has the lowest priority since deleting a feature may yield destroying a SPL config-
uration. Furthermore, modifying is ranked better than extending since extending
a feature may require adapting the corresponding SPL configuration. This does
not apply for modifying a feature.
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Algorithm 5.5 Calculation of impacts of dependencies SSTM→ FM
1: procedure CALCULATIONIMPACTSSSTM-FM(component, operation)
2: for all feature ∈ getAssociatedFeatures(pov) do
3: if checkPref(pov, feature) then
4: applyRule(pov, feature)
5: end if
6: end for
7: end procedure
Similar to the preceding section dependencies between two different model types
need to be considered, namely the FM and the SSTM. Algorithm 5.5 specifies the
methodology of the corresponding change impact ruling. First, we need to deter-
mine all the features which have been associated with the corresponding POVs.
The method body getAssociatedFeature (cf. line 2) is responsible for determining
all involved features depending on relevant POVs. Subsequently, it is mandatory
to check preferences which have been defined within this section. If positive,
the corresponding change impact rule which is part of Table 5.5 can be applied.
The complexity of this algorithm is linear, i.e. O(|V|+ |E|) steps are necessary to
perform this algorithm where |V| corresponds to all relevant POVs and features
with |E| connections between them.
5.4.4. FM to SSTM
Changes to the FM yield fundamental effects on the SSTM and thus on the cal-
culation of trade-offs. The last sections covered defining impact ruling sets to
easily calculate effects with minimal effort. In this case it is not possible to define a
rule set since calculation of trade-offs in SPLs in consideration of MC depends on
several steps and factors (cf. Section 5.3.2). When changing elements of the FM
there are three opportunities:
1. SST flags of the features: by modifications of qualitative requirements SST
flags of the individual features may change. This consequently has impacts
on the subsequent semantic clustering.
2. Adapting POV links of a feature: POVs may change due to external influences
(functional requirements) and have to be adapted accordingly. This entails
adjusting the links between individual features and POVs.
3. Extending a feature: by extending a feature, functionalities of existing features
may be redistributed to new features. This may affect both the SST flags and
the modification of POV links.
If one of the aforementioned changes is made, a new calculation has to be per-
formed as described in Section 5.3.2 to ensure the quality of the MCDM. In this
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case, there are too many interdependencies concerning the clustering of semanti-
cally equivalent features which have been described in Section 5.3.2 and would
falsify the final result of the MCDM.
5.5. Example
The current section exemplifies the clustering of semantically equivalent features
for the calculation of trade-offs. The example is illustrated in Figure 5.6 and repre-
sents the necessary models for calculating trade-offs regarding ADASs.
First, there is a FM which allows the selection of three ADASs: ACC, LA and
LDP. In this case study, we choose the SPL configuration with the feature ACC.
Furthermore, there is an underlying SSTM consisting of necessary, goals, POVs
and alternative solutions. Moreover, a SM is used to calculate commonly used
system components (cf. step 1 of Section 5.3.2) and thus to enable corresponding
alternative solutions which are essential for calculating trade-offs. When checking
the ACC dependencies one realises that the ACC system component is using a
radar sensor and a wide-angle camera. However, the wide-angle camera is used by the
LA and the LDP. Since the LDP uses an additional ultrasonic sensor, only the ACC
and LA system component is used to enable the ACC and ACC + LA alternative
solutions for calculating trade-offs. All three ADASs are SST-critical, i.e. they
are tagged with corresponding SST flags (cf. step 2 of Section 5.3.2). I.e., all of
them provide the same combination of SST concerns. Subsequently, attribution
functions need to be assigned to the POVs to ensure semantic correctness (cf. step 3
of Section 5.3.2). These KPIs can be taken from Figure 5.6. The result is that POV#1
≡ POV#3 as well as POV#2 ≡ POV#4. The reason is that POV#1 and POV#3 require
a SIL level of at least 3 and POV#2 and POV#4 require an encryption algorithm
with a key length of at least 128 bit. Since the linked features Adaptive Cruise
Control and Lane Assist provide same SST concerns semantic equivalence between
POV#1 and POV#3 as well as between POV#2 and POV#4 is almost fulfilled. A
FMEA clustering is still missing (cf. step 4 of Section 5.3.2). The corresponding
RPN values, average values, risks of error are listed in Table 5.6.
POV RPN ACC RPN ACC + LA ∅ RPN Risk of error
POV#1 36 40 38 Acceptable
POV#2 60 64 62 Medium
POV#3 42 40 41 Acceptable
POV#4 70 75 72,5 Medium
Table 5.6.: MC in SPLs: FMEA values of the example
POV#1 and POV#3 as well as POV#2 and POV#4 have identical risk of error, i.e. the
two pairs are semantically equivalent. Since the average RPN of POV#1 < RPN
of POV#3 and the average RPN of POV#2 < RPN of POV#4, POV#1 and POV#2 are
enabled for calculating trade-offs. Subsequently, all goals bottom-up from the
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Figure 5.6.: Example of using MC in SPLs
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two POVs are enabled up to the root. Consequently, a suitable trade-off can be
calculated using the enabled branches within the SSTM.
Finally, the degree of complexity reduction is determined by applying Defini-
tion 5.2. In this way, we get a complexity reduction of 1− 3+3−1−110 = 0,6 The
complexity has been reduced by more than 50% in compliance with qualitative
requirements. The entire SSTM contains 10 goals and POVs whereas the selected
SPL configuration only needs 4 nodes.
5.6. Related Work
There are some scientific publications regarding MC in SPLs which are presented
within this section. First, there are publications which cover SPLs in general and
are differentiated to the work of this thesis. Furthermore, related work is presented
which covers consideration of MC in SPLs. Finally, we discuss publications which
handle complexity reduction of SPL in different contexts.
SPLs in General
The work of [PBD05] serves as baseline for SPLs. In this thesis, definitions and
scopes of SPLs are introduced in detail. This chapter of the thesis extends the work
of [PBD05] by safety-critical concerns, e.g. SST. Furthermore, there is no clustering
of semantically equivalent elements in [PBD05]. In [Poh+18], the extent of FMs is
measured and analysed by means of worst-case execution analyses to improve
state-of-the-art analysis tools. The approach improves complexity in the context
of state-of-the-art analysis tools whereas this chapter of the thesis is focused on
complexity reduction in safety-critical environment. Furthermore, our approach is
focused on the clustering semantically similar features.
Consideration of MC in SPLs
The work of [Bra+12] aims to optimise model-driven SPL engineering process to
certify embedded systems in safety-critical environment. For this purpose, a meta-
model is proposed to enable the certification process. The work of this thesis is not
only focused on certification of safety-based systems. We also consider influences
and interrelations between individual safety-critical systems. Furthermore, we
reduce complexity of SPLs while maintaining all SST requirements. The paper of
[LDL07] proposes an approach which integrates a model-based safety analysis
for SPLs. The authors use state-based models to realise SPLs and to integrate
model-based safety analysis within them. In this thesis we additionally provide an
approach which provides clustering of semantically equivalent POVs to calculate
trade-offs taken SST into account. Finally, there is another publication of [Met+07],
dealing with MC in SPLs. Thereby, it is the aim to “analyze whether the product
line artifacts are flexible enough to build all the systems that should belong to
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the product line.” [Met+07] In this context, the product line artefacts correspond
to the individual concerns. This work does not primarily consider safety-critical
concerns. In contrast, it is not aimed to calculate trade-offs on the basis of SPLs.
Complexity Reduction of SPLs
[Li+18] propose an approach which analyses relations between variants, i.e. fea-
tures within a FM to finally reduce the number of them. In this thesis, the com-
plexity is reduced by linking the FM with a underlying SM and SSTM. In this
way, we use an equivalence-based approach to reduce complexity. Moreover,
we considered safety-critical requirements, e.g. SST whereas Li et al. [Li+18]
only considered economical requirements. The authors of [Pol+12] presented an
approach how to realise model-based SPL techniques into a framework which
can handle with a large number of SPLs. In this context, complexity and depen-
dencies between individual requirement, test and implementation artefacts are
analysed to derive products therefrom. In this thesis the complexity is reduced by
means of a equivalence-based clustering algorithm which is not part of [Pol+12].
Moreover, their approach has not been extended to calculate trade-offs taken SST
into account. Furthermore, there is the work of [HK18] which proposes a con-
cept to optimise feature selection to choose the elements which are reused most
commonly. The focus of [HK18] is on economic goals such as cost minimisation.
In contrast, in this chapter of the thesis safety-critical requirements are preferred.
In this context, it may have fatal consequences if only most commonly reused
features are considered. Finally, there is the paper of [Ben+08] with the aim to “[...]
propose an approach to support dynamic or runtime variability in systems that
must adapt dynamically to changing runtime context. The approach is founded
on reflective component-based technologies to support the dynamic variability at
the architecture level.” [Ben+08] In this paper the focus is on dynamic runtime
variability whereas this chapter of the thesis is focused on complexity reduction of
SPLs taken MC into account by clustering semantically equivalent features.
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6
Realisation and Evaluation
The current chapter provides the reader with details on implementation and eval-
uation. First, Section 6.1 gives an introduction on the Eclipse frameworks, Eclipse
Modeling Framework (EMF) and Sirius and how they interact. Subsequently (Sec-
tion 6.2), details about implementation are clarified. This information is provided
by means of underlying prototypical meta-models. Section 6.3 covers the actual
evaluation which is performed by means of selected scenarios to show satisfiability
of individual quality attributes. Finally, two selected case studies are presented in
Section 6.4 to demonstrate the approaches of this thesis by means of case studies.
6.1. Eclipse EMF and Sirius
The concepts, which have been presented in the preceding three chapters, have
been implemented prototypically as a proof of concept. The EMF and Sirius
framework has been used to realise the presented concepts. Figure 6.1 illustrates
the three tiers of EMF and Sirius.
Presentation 
 Logic
Data 
Si
ri
u
s
EM
F
Figure 6.1.: Three-tier architecture of EMF and Sirius [Fen16]
The three-tier system architecture consists of data, logic and presentation. The
data tier is covered by EMF whereas logic and presentation is covered by Sirius.
It is built upon a model which is created by means of the EMF meta-model.
Sirius provides the diagram editor which represents the presentation tier. On
the basis of the individual EMF meta-models of the concepts Sirius creates the so
called business model which is responsible for representing the logic tier. Sirius
provides a representation model which is used to outline the business model in a
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graphical editor. This part covers Sirius’ presentation tier. [EF19] Sirius does not
strictly comply with multi-tier architecture since there is direct access to EMF data
structures from the Sirius presentation tier.
6.2. Prototypical Implementation
The concept of this thesis is divided into three parts: MCDM, change impact
analysis and MC in SPLs. To realise each of them, an underlying meta-model was
developed. Hereinafter, the individual meta-models are explained in more detail.
6.2.1. Multi-Concerns and Multi-Criteria Decision Making
As already described in Section 3.4.1, the SSTM is an essential part of the MCDM,
i.e. a trade-off cannot be calculated without any SSTM. When recalling Chapter 3
the following information is required to realise a MCDM:
1. There is an hierarchically structured SGH which enables modelling of SST
goals.
2. For each goal there is a matrix which defines importance of the underlying
sub-goals or POVs.
3. There is a FMEA risk assessment for each POV depending on the individual
alternative solutions.
4. Each security goal can be optionally extended by an ADT to enable an ADTA.
All the information listed above has to be transferred into an EMF meta-model
which is illustrated in Figure 6.2. First, there is class SSTModel which represent the
root element, i.e. the diagram itself. A unique name has to be assigned to the ele-
ment. All model nodes, i.e. goals, POVs and alternative solutions are represented
by the class SSTObject, characterised by an identifier. Furthermore, there are
two classes: SSTObjectCanSupport and SSTObjectCanBeSupported. Objects of type
SSTObjectCanSupport can be refined by objects of type SSTObjectCanBeSupported.
Hence, the class SSTObjectCanBeSupported is complemented by ratioMatrixData
which represents the AHP pairwise comparisons. Moreover, there are two fur-
ther classes SSTGoal and SSTSolution where the first one represents goals and
POVs. The SSTGoal needs information about the corresponding concern and the
extended ADT diagram if applicable. Moreover, the boolean variable enabled in-
dicates whether the goal or POV should be taken into account for the calculation
of trade-offs. Since a goal or POV can support and can be supported it is derived
from the corresponding two presented classes. The class SSTSolution has two
attributes: The parameter solutionDataContainer covers risk assessment by means
of the FMEA as described in Section 3.7.1. Furthermore, it is considered whether
the individual solutions should be taken into account for the MCDM. Since an
alternative solution only provides can support functionality it is derived from
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SSTObjectCanSupport. Alternative solutions depend on system components, i.e.
an association between SMComponent and SSTSolution where SMComponent refers
to class of an external meta-model which represents system modelling
SSTObject
- identifier: String
SSTModel
- name: String
members
SSTObjectCanBeSupported
- ratioMatrixData: RatioMatrixData
SSTObjectCanSupport
SSTGoal
- concern: Concern
- enabled: Boolean
- adt: ADTDiagram
supportedBy
supports
SSTSolution
- solutionDataContainer: SolutionDataContainer
- enabled: Boolean
SMComponent smComponents* 1
1
1*
*
*
1
Figure 6.2.: Abstract meta-model of the SSTM
As already described in the preceding paragraph, a SSTGoal can be optionally
extended by an ADT diagram to perform an ADTA and thus to determine suitable
CMs. When recalling Section 3.4.2 there are three essential constituents which
need to be considered:
1. Attack node: Represents an external attack.
2. Action node: Specifies how an attack is realised.
3. CM node: Developed method to avoid actions.
The EMF meta-model is illustrated in Figure 6.3. First, there is a class called
ADTDiagram which represents the root element. There is an attribute name which
represents an unique name for ADTDiagram. The class ADTDiagram is associated
with an abstract class Node which only identifies attack, action and CM nodes,
i.e. the classes AttackNode, ActionNode and CMNode are derived from class Node.
The class AttackNode has an attribute logicalOperator which identifies the logical
operation (AND, OR) of the attack node. As described in Section 3.7.2 some
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parameters are needed to calculate ROI and ROA in context of ADTA. Therefore,
the variable af is assigned to class AttackNode. For the same reason, parameters
ef and aro are assigned to class ActionNode whereas variables csi, rm, cost, loss
are assigned to class CMNode. Finally, the relations between the individual node
types are defined by associations. An attack node is represented by any number of
action nodes whereas an action node is counteracted by any number of CM nodes.
ADTDiagram
- name: String
Node
- identifier: String
members
ActionNode
- ef: Float
- aro: Float
AttackNode
- logicalOperator: LogicalOperator
- av: Float
CMNode
- csi: Float
- rm: Float
- cost: Float
- loss: Float
actionNodes cmNodes
1
*
1 * 1 *
Figure 6.3.: Abstract meta-model of the ADT
6.2.2. Change Impact Analysis
The change impact analysis as proposed in Chapter 4 concerns different model
types including SSTM, ADT, SM and FM. However, each model has its own
characteristics. Nevertheless, we define an universal EMF meta-model which
enables calculation of change impacts independent of the respective model type.
In advance we want to collect all necessary information which should be covered
by the meta-model:
1. There is a stakeholder which initiates a change request.
2. A change impact can be calculated by two algorithms: A structural approach
or a KPI based approach.
The EMF meta-model, which provides the necessary information, is illustrated in
Figure 6.4. First, there is a class ChIAModel which represents the root element with
an unique name. Within this ChIAModel we need any number of stakeholders
which are identified by unique names. Furthermore, a class ChangeRequest is
created which has a large number of attributes to enable calculation of change
impacts. At first, there is a textual description of the change request to assign it to
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stakeholders. Moreover, there is a variable methodology which determines the
type of algorithm, i.e. a calculation of impacts is performed on a structural or
KPI based approach. As described in Section 4.5.2 for calculation of KPI based
impacts we need the attributes deltaFMEA and allAttributes. In case of structural
impacts we need a trigger operation, i.e. an operation (ext, mod or del) by which
the change impact analysis is started. The impact rules itself are implemented by
means of Java code. For both methodologies there has to be an affected model
element which concerns a model node of the SSTM, ADT, SM or FM.
Stakeholder
- identifier: String
ChIAModel
- name: String
members
ChangeRequest
- description: String
- methodology: Methodology
- deltaFMEA: Int[]
- allAttributes: Boolean
- triggerOperation: Operation
- affectedModelElement: <anyModelElement>
changeRequests
1
*
1 *
Figure 6.4.: Abstract meta-model of the ChIA
6.2.3. Multi-Concerns in Software Product Lines
To enable MC and thus MCDM for SPLs it is essential to define FMs. I.e., we have
to define an EMF meta-model which has the characteristics of a FM to enable MC
in SPLs. When recapitulating Chapter 5 the meta-model has to fulfil the following
requirements:
1. Features are annotated with SST flags to determine whether a feature is
safety-critical or not.
2. There is a tag for (sub-)features whether they are mandatory. Moreover it
has to be possible to define logical operator for them.
3. Features can require or exclude another features.
4. For the complexity reduction features are linked with system components
and POVs.
Figure 6.5 represents the EMF meta-model which fulfils all listed requirements.
First, there is a class called FMDiagram which represents the root element. This
FMDiagram has an unique name. All child nodes of FMDiagram are derived from
class FMObject which have to be identified uniquely. Further, it is distinguished
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between features, which can be parent features and sub-features. This context is re-
alised by two classes: FMFeatureCanBeParentFeature and FMFeatureCanBeSubFeature.
The first one is refined by FMFeatureCanBeSubFeature. Sub-features are extended
by boolean variables. It is indicated whether a feature is mandatory or optional.
Furthermore, logical combinations are specified for sub-features (OR and XOR).
The main class FMFeature contains three boolean attributes for SST flags. Fur-
thermore, there is a boolean attribute which indicates whether the corresponding
feature is abstract or concrete. Moreover, there are several associations based on
class FMFeature. On the one hand there are associations between FMFeature and
FMFeature which represent require and exclude relations. On the other hand there
are associations between FMFeature and SMComponent as well as FMFeature and
SSTGoal. These associations are necessary for the complexity reduction.
FMDiagram
- name: String
FMObject
- identifier: String
FMFeatureCanBeSubFeature
- isMandatory: Boolean
- isALT: Boolean
- isOR: Boolean
FMFeatureCanBeParentFeature
members
subFeatures
FMFeature
- isSafetyCritical: Boolean
- isSecurityCritical: Boolean
- isTimingCritical: Boolean
- isAbstract: Boolean
SSTGoal
- concern: Concern
- enabled: Boolean
- adt: ADTDiagram
SMComponent associatedComponents associatedGoals
requiresexcludes
1
*
1
*
* 1
1 *
1
*
1 *
Figure 6.5.: Abstract meta-model of SPL modelling
6.3. Scenario Based Evaluation
This thesis is evaluated qualitatively, i.e. it is investigated by means of selected
scenarios whether quality demands are fulfilled. In this context, the approach of
this thesis as well as the SuD, which is analysed by the approach, is evaluated (cf.
Figure 6.6).
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Evaluation
Approach
System under 
Development
Adaptability Scalability Reusability Maintainability Adaptability Modularity Extensibility Maintainability
Figure 6.6.: Evaluation of the thesis
The evaluation investigates the following quality attributes:
1. Adaptability: The approach and SuD has to be modifiable to perform changes
with minimal effort.
2. Scalability: The approach of this thesis has to be scalable.
3. Reusability: Individual modules within a system should be reusable to save
overhead and resources.
4. Maintainability: In principle, it cannot be ruled out that a system is flaw-
less. Furthermore, new features and change request should be considered.
Therefore, maintainability has to be ensured.
5. Modularity: Various sub-modules are combined to form an entire module or
system.
6. Extensibility: The SuD has to be extended or exchanged by further function-
ality at any time.
Each of these quality attributes is either evaluated by means of the approach of
this thesis or the SuD which uses the approach of the thesis in the development
phase. For this purpose, suitable scenarios are defined to determine corresponding
quality demands. First, the evaluation is performed for the concept of this thesis.
Subsequently, it is assessed in context of genuine systems. In both cases, the
definition of the corresponding quality attributes is given first if it has not yet been
defined. Following, the scenarios by which the quality attribute are evaluated is
presented before the actual evaluation is performed.
6.3.1. Approach Evaluation
The current section covers evaluation of the developed concepts. In this con-
text, quality attributes adaptability, scalability, reusability and maintainability are
evaluated.
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6.3.1.1. Adaptability
First, it is evaluated by means of selected scenarios whether the concept of this
thesis fulfils the property of adaptability. Therefore, we first define the term
adaptability:
Definition 6.1 (Adaptability). According to [SC01] adaptability is defined as a
process which changes the behaviour of a software or system. Thereby, the desired
functionality is preserved.
The field of application of the concept, which has been developed in context of
this thesis, covers various domains, e.g. automotive industry, avionics or railway.
However, different modelling notations or risk assessment procedures are used in
the corresponding environments. Regardless of which modelling notation or risk
assessment procedure is used the functionality of the developed approach has to
be ensured. In this context, three parts are evaluated:
1. System modelling: Within the concept of this thesis system modelling is used
to determine suitable alternative solutions for the MCDM. Furthermore,
dependencies and commonalities are calculated in context of the SPL based
MCDM. Finally, structural as well as KPI based impacts can be calculated
based on SMs.
2. Safety risk assessment: This procedure is mandatory to estimate risks of alter-
native solutions depending on corresponding POVs preventatively. Thereby,
risks are classified into different levels.
3. Security risk assessment: To protect a system against malicious attacks of third
parties appropriate CMs are needed. Thereby, individual risks are assessed
by means of the ADTA which is based on the ADT.
The approach which has been presented in this thesis uses the UML component
diagram for system modelling. When adapting the type of system modelling, vari-
ous modelling notations are available. These include, e.g. the Systems Modeling
Language (SysML) from the Object Management Group (OMG) or the Architecture
Analysis & Design Language (AADL). The functionality of the concept is being
evaluated by means of a scenario which uses SysML block diagram as system
modelling language instead of component diagrams. To derive alternative solu-
tions from the component diagram it is essential that there are system components,
ports and connections between them. This feature is supported by SysML block
diagram. The block diagram uses system components and different types of re-
lationships, e.g. to refine, derive or trace correlations between them. In this way,
alternative solutions can be determined. Furthermore, components, ports and
connections are needed to calculate dependencies and commonalities for semantic
clustering of SPLs. The SysML block diagram provides a copy relationship which
checks commonalities and thus dependencies from corresponding system compo-
nents. Therefore, the SysML is suitable for this calculation. Since it is possible to
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represent interrelations between different components a structural impact analysis
based on component diagrams is enabled. To enable this feature for SysML block
diagram the trace relationship has to be used. Components can be annotated with
attributions and thus KPI based impact analysis can be realised. In this way, UML
component diagrams can be replaced by SysML block diagrams.
The FMEA is used in the concept of this thesis to assess risks and to calculate
trade-offs. It is now evaluated whether trade-offs can be calculated if the FMECA
is used instead of the FMEA. In general, it is important that a measurable numeri-
cal value is available to assess the individual risks. For this purpose, the FMEA
provides the RPN which can range between 1 and 1000. The MCDM approach of
this thesis normalises the corresponding RPN value to calculate trade-offs. When
applying the FMECA instead of the FMEA the risk is additionally classified into
different criticality levels. Subsequently, if the FMECA classification is normalised
the calculation of the trade-offs can be performed by means of RPN calculations
as proposed in the concept of this thesis as well as by means of the criticality level.
The ADTA is performed by means of the ADT which mainly consists of the attack
and the corresponding developed CMs. It is purpose of the ADTA to assess the
individual CMs. In the following, it is evaluated whether the ADT can be replaced
by EIDs to ensure correctness for the ADTA. The main difference is that the ADT
is built top-down based on an attack which is refined to CMs, whereas the EID is
built bottom-up based on CMs which prevent corresponding attacks. However,
both of them provide possible CMs for individual attacks. Calculations for the
ADTA require a set of CMs for an attack. This condition is fulfilled for both of
them the ADT and EID.
Given the fact that all presented scenarios can be successfully applied the quality
attribute adaptability (cf. Definition 6.1) is fulfilled for the approach of this thesis.
6.3.1.2. Scalability
The section evaluates whether the quality attribute scalability is fulfilled for se-
lected scenarios. First, we define the term scalability:
Definition 6.2 (Scalability). According to [TH19] scalability is defined as follows:
Scalability is a property which describe the capability of a process or software
system to “to grow and manage increased demand.” [TH19] Scalability is often an
indicator for stability and competitiveness of the software system since it increases
productivity and handles a variety of belated demands.
The scope of the individual models presented within the concept of this thesis
may grow over time independently of the respective domain. This includes the
presented models SM, SSTM, ADT as well as the FM. In this context, modular
sub-systems are often extended. Hereinafter, it is shown how far scalability may
concern the individual model types:
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1. SM: When extending a modular sub-system to a whole system, the underly-
ing SM needs to be scaled accordingly to take necessary system components
into account for the MCDM.
2. SSTM: If a sub-system is extended to a whole system it is mandatory to scale
the SSTM as well. I.e., it is extended by additional goals and POVs to be able
to calculate trade-offs in consideration of the whole system.
3. ADT: When scaling the SM and SSTM an ADT must also be scalable to
develop and consider appropriate CMs for a security goal or POV within
the SGH.
4. FM: In case of providing new functionality the corresponding FM needs to
be extended and thus it has to be scalable. I.e., SPLs, which depend on the
FM, have to be scalable.
Nowadays, final products in safety-critical environments are usually very com-
plex, i.e. the underlying system structure is also very extensive. To keep the
overview, however, sub-systems are first developed which are then combined to
form a complete system. A scenario is now used to evaluate the extent to which
modular sub-systems can be scaled to an overall system during system modelling.
It is assumed that all these sub-systems are modelled correctly. As described
in Section 3.3.2 the individual system components communicate via ports and
interfaces. Conversely, i.e. the individual modular sub-systems are linked via
ports and interfaces to form a consistent system. For instance, the individual SMs
representing ACC, LA and LDP are summarised to an entire SM which considers
all ADASs. In this way, several sub-systems can be scaled to a holistic system
without loss of any functionality. The new alternative solutions are derived from
the ADAS SM, i.e. sub-systems ACC, LA and LDP are taken into account which
are essential to calculate corresponding trade-offs by means of the MCDM.
In the next step, the SSTM needs to scale as well. In this context, a root which
represents the whole system has to be created. Each modular sub-system is a direct
child node of this root node. For instance, a root goal node ADAS is acceptably
safe is created which is refined by three further goals: ACC is acceptably safe, LA is
acceptably safe and LDP is acceptably safe. Subsequently, it is necessary to create a
comparison matrix of the root node as described in Section 2.4.1 and to weight
the individual modular sub-systems against each other, i.e. local priorities for the
goals ACC/LA/LDP is acceptably safe have to be determined. Since there are already
pairwise comparisons for the sub-systems there are no further improvements
needed. Finally, the risk assessment between alternative solutions and POVs has
to be adapted to the scaled set of alternative solutions (cf. previous paragraph) if
applicable to consider the entire set of solutions for the MCDM modes PCM (cf.
Section 3.8.1) and RCM (cf. Section 3.8.2).
When scaling a SSTM it has to be considered that there are ADTs extensions with
the purpose of developing appropriate CMs. These ADTs can also be scaled and
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extended to provide CMs which are available for the entire system and not only
for the individual modular sub-systems. For instance, CMs have to be developed
which prevent security attacks of ADAS instead of ACC, LA or LDP standalone.
This has no effects on the the calculation procedure of the ROI and ROA (cf. Sec-
tion 3.7.2).
When realising SPLs it is necessary to create FMs to model functionality of the
corresponding systems. Merging two or more modular sub-systems the proce-
dure is quite similar to the SSTM. First, a root node is needed which summarises
the entire functionality, e.g. the root feature ADAS is created. Subsequently, the
individual sub-features of the sub-systems, e.g. ACC, LA and LDP including their
relationships between them can be attached. In this way, the scaled FM can be
used to apply MC in SPLs and to calculate trade-offs by means of the MCDM.
According to Definition 6.2 the presented scenario ensures full functionality, i.e.
the quality attribute is fulfilled.
6.3.1.3. Reusability
This section evaluates the quality attribute reusability by means of a selected
scenario. First, we define the term reusability:
Definition 6.3 (Reusability). According to [SR90] reusability is defined as the reuse
of software or hardware artefacts in different formats within the product develop-
ment process.
The individual modular model components of the concepts of this thesis can be
reused to reduce and save overhead. Only minor adjustments should be necessary
to respond to current needs. Afterwards, it is analysed which kind of model types
are involved by quality attribute reusability:
1. SM: If there are similar systems with minor changes, the SM can be reused
with appropriate adjustments.
2. SSTM: There is a SCS with similar SST requirements with minor changes. In
this case the SSTM can be reused with appropriate enhancements.
3. ADT: Analogue to SSTM there may be similar security vulnerabilities. Di-
vergences has to be taken into account for development of CMs.
4. FM: If the requirements change slightly, an existing FM can be reused as-
suming that the corresponding FM is adapted.
The quality attribute reusability is evaluated by the following scenario: A system
component of a system is replaced by another system component, e.g. a radar
sensor is replaced when changing the manufacturer. This is checked by means of
the developed change impact analysis. As a result the current concerned system
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component needs to be removed including all ports, interfaces and connections
between other system components. The replaced radar sensor system component
has to be added and linked with corresponding system components via ports and
interfaces, e.g. with the ACC system component. Since the replaced system com-
ponent influences individual alternative solutions (cf. Section 3.3.3), the solutions
has to be adapted accordingly. In this way, an existing system modelling can be
reused by only adjusting minor and minimal changes.
Since there is a linking between system components and goals/POVs (cf. Fig-
ure 1.4), unused goals or POVs, which are accompanied by the replacement of the
system component, can be removed. In this context, all the linked goals and POVs
have to be reused for calculating trade-offs by means of the MCDM. Furthermore,
it is essential to consider the replaced system component, e.g. the new radar
system component. Therefore, corresponding goals and POVs may be needed
which are individualised according to the replaced radar sensor, e.g. consideration
of special weather conditions. Moreover, the risk assessment between POVs and
alternative solutions may be adapted (cf. Section 3.7.1). The SSTM can be reused
with a minimal adjustment.
Next, the ADT, which is interconnected with a security goal within the SSTM,
can be reused. This exactly applies when the corresponding security goal is not
affected by the replacement of the linked system component of the scenario. For
instance, the security goal Radar sensor acceptably secure against manipulation and
hacking attacks is always necessary, i.e. it applies to the replaced radar sensor as
well. In this case, no further adjustments are necessary since a security goal is
extended by exactly one ADT. I.e., the corresponding ADT with its developed
CMs can be reused.
The FM can be reused as well. Since there is a linking between features and system
components, features with an existing linking can be reused. For instance, the
ACC feature is still provided by the radar sensor. Additionally, the FM is extended
according to the replacement of the corresponding system component.
Thus it was shown that the developed concept of this thesis is reusable as defined
in Definition 6.3.
6.3.1.4. Maintainability
The quality attribute maintainability is evaluated within this section. First, the
term maintainability is defined:
Definition 6.4 (Maintainability). According to [Dhi06] maintainability is defined as
the probability that a system or parts of them can be repaired or changed within a
given time frame that an operable state is restored.
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The individual parts of the concepts of this thesis should be maintainable to
guarantee functionality at any time. This should be done with minimal effort in a
short time frame. In the following, the individual partial concepts are introduced
with regard to maintainability:
1. Multi-Concerns and MCDM: This part is the basis for the concept of this
thesis. I.e., all further parts of this thesis are based on it and therefore an easy
maintenance is mandatory.
2. Change Impact Analysis: Impacts are clearly identifiable and traceable. There-
fore, an effective maintenance of the procedure is of great interest.
3. Multi-Concerns in SPLs: It is not possible to check each SPL configuration
with regard to SST requirements. For this purpose, an efficient maintenance
has to be ensured to calculate trade-offs for SPLs in safety-critical context.
The quality attribute maintainability is evaluated by the following scenario: The
construction of an underlying SM is enhanced due to failures regarding their
structure. For instance, the communication between the radar sensor and an ECU
has been set wrong, i.e. the SM needs to be maintained. As stated in the meta-
model of Multi-Concerns and MCDM in Section 6.2.1 the SM is an essential part
for performing the MCDM as the alternative solutions depend therefrom. Since
the SSTM meta-model references the corresponding SM an update can be easily
done by referencing the enhanced SM. In this way, the set of alternative solutions
including FMEA risk assessments may be adapted according to structure changes
of the SM if applicable. This exactly applies if the communication with the ECU
is part of the alternative solutions. In this case, the FMEA assessments between
alternative solutions and POVs have to be set again. Finally, the MCDM can be
performed with the maintained SM and trade-offs can be calculated. Therefore,
the first approach of this thesis supports maintainability.
When reviewing the meta-model of the change impact analysis (cf. Figure 6.4)
the change impact analysis is triggered by an individual model element. The
updated SM is mandatory to calculate an optimal trade-off, i.e. without updating
the underlying SM impacts that concern the SSTM and thus the MCDM could
not be taken into account or the results are falsified since there may be incorrect
relationships. Consequently, maintaining the SM of the use case scenario considers
the change impact analysis as well.
The approach, which concerns Multi-Concerns in SPLs, depends on system mod-
elling. As described in Section 6.2.3 or illustrated in Figure 6.5 the FM, which is
necessary for representing SPLs, is linked with the SM to get a mapping between
feature↔ system component. Therefore, updating the SM of the introduced sce-
nario influences maintainability and functionality of the approach is ensured. Oth-
erwise, clustering of semantically equivalent features as proposed in Section 5.3.2
is calculated incorrectly. I.e., the subsequent MCDM calculates the trade-offs based
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on insufficient SST goals.
In this way, it has been shown that maintainability as specified in Definition 6.4 is
fulfilled for the selected use case scenario.
6.3.2. System under Development Evaluation
The scenario based evaluation, which has been covered in Section 6.3.1, aimed to
evaluate the developed concept of this thesis. It has not been evaluated how far
the SuD is influenced by the approach of this thesis. This part is the aim of this
section.
6.3.2.1. Adaptability
There are a lot of reasons for adaptability, e.g. requirements change over time.
Furthermore, supplier of individual system components may change. Moreover,
it is possible to detect a more cost-effective alternative. For this reason, the SuD
should be adaptable, i.e. impacts of change requests have to be determined
correctly. Furthermore, the impacts have to be traceable as described in Objective
2 of Section 1.2. Afterwards, it is evaluated how far the change impact analysis is
fulfilled for the selected scenario which is defined hereinafter: There is an existing
airbag system of an automotive vehicle. In this context, the air pillows of the
current system should be replaced by another air pillows of a competitive supplier.
We evaluate the two different types of change impact analysis by means of the
selected use case scenario with regard to the following properties:
1. Structural impacts: It is evaluated how far the calculated impact complies
with the principle of traceability over the process chain.
2. KPI based impacts: It is also reviewed whether qualitative requirements with
regard to SST are fulfilled.
When replacing an air pillow system component by another air pillow, which
is identical in construction, the structural change impact analysis is triggered
by a mod operation since the current system component of the underlying SM is
modified. In this context, BC and WC analysis is performed, i.e. a minimum and
maximum set of affected components is calculated for replacing the air pillow
system component. As described in Section 4.3 modifying an underlying SM has
subsequent impacts on the SM itself as well as the SSTM which is mainly respon-
sible for calculating trade-offs by means of the MCDM. This means replacing, i.e.
modifying an air pillow has effects on another system components, e.g. the trigger
mechanism. Moreover, the replacement of the air pillow influences the calculation
of trade-offs since the replacement of the air pillow may require an adaption
of the solution set which is an essential part for calculating the corresponding
trade-offs. For instance, the new air pillow may be only combined with individual
gas mixture and has a maximum permissible inflation pressure. When applying
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the corresponding impact rules of the concerned model types as described in
Section 4.3.1 and Section 4.3.2 traceability is fulfilled due to the dependencies
between the individual system components and alternative solutions. In this way,
the entire chain of effects is identified if an air pillow is replaced.
Air pillows of an airbag have to fulfil SST requirements. In this context, usually
the SILs have to be met. Furthermore, real time requirements have to be fulfilled
since the air pillow is inflated with a gas mixture to protect vehicle occupants
in case of an impact. Therefore, when replacing, i.e. modifying the air pillow,
care has to be taken to ensure that elements with identical SST properties may be
concerned as well by this process. In this way, the communication via bus system
may be affected as well. The KPI based calculation of impacts as described in
Section 4.5.2 identifies in this way goals and POVs which fulfil same SST require-
ments as the corresponding system components representing the air pillow to be
replaced. Afterwards, the identified goals and POVs can be correctly adapted to
get an unadulterated result of the MCDM. Neglecting the KPI based impacts may
yield the realisation of the wrong trade-off and thus to delayed or faulty releasing
the airbag in case of an emergency. It has been shown that adaptability of the SuD
is possible by means of the presented approach of the change impact analysis.
It has been evaluated by means of a selected use case scenario that applying the
structural and KPI based impacts fulfils the desired functionality completely.
6.3.2.2. Modularity
This section evaluates whether the quality attribute modularity is fulfilled for a
SuD by means of the presented approach of this thesis. First, the term modularity
is defined in detail:
Definition 6.5 (Modularity). According to [BC06] modularity defines to which
extent a software system or application is divided into smaller and more clear
software construction modules. The process of merging single software modules
is necessary to ensure functionality of the entire software system or application.
As described in Objective 3 of Section 1.2 safety-critical software systems have
to fulfil variability in context of trade-off calculations. This aim is achieved by
providing a variety of functionality and quality in SPLs (cf. Definition 5.1). In
practice, companies develop independently of each other in different departments
the individual functionality of the entire software system. For instance, an ACC is
developed in another department than the LA. In this way, modularity of the SuD
has to be supported to finally provide MCDM for safety-critical MC. In the follow-
ing it is evaluated by means of a selected use case scenario whether modularity
supports MC in SPLs: The individual ADASs ACC, LDP and LA are developed
modularly and are merged to an ADAS functionality.
149
6. REALISATION AND EVALUATION
When developing a single ADAS, each ADAS has its own SM to model dependen-
cies between individual hardware and software components. Since the result set
of the MCDM depends on the underlying SM it is an essential part for calculating
trade-offs. I.e., it is possible for every modular ADAS to calculate individual
trade-offs. Therefore, the first property of modularity (cf. Definition 6.5) is ful-
filled. Furthermore, modularity means to combine several standalone systems to
guarantee functionality for the entire system according to the SPL configuration
set. In this use case scenario the SPL configuration set corresponds to the ADASs
as described in the previous paragraph. The SMs of the individual ADASs, i.e.
ACC, LA and LDP have to be merged via port connections and interfaces. In
this way, there is a result set of alternative solutions which considers the three
ADASs. Consequently, the entire ADASs are taken into account when performing
the MCDM which is customised for the SPL configuration. The calculation has
to comply with the linkings and annotations as described in Section 5.2. Since
the approach of this thesis can be applied to the modular systems of the scenario
and is capable to combine and apply them to a SPL configuration set the quality
attribute modularity as specified in Definition 6.5 is fulfilled.
6.3.2.3. Extensibility
It is evaluated by means of a selected scenario whether a SuD is extensible if the
approach of this thesis is applied. However, we first define the term extensibility
for understanding:
Definition 6.6 (Extensibility). According to [Ber+95] extensibility is defined as the
capability to extend a software (system) dynamically by new functionality. In this
context, existing functionality of the software (system) has not to be impaired.
As stated in Objective 3 of Section 1.2 variability has to be ensured for SPL. To
achieve this goal, it has to be possible to extend functionality at any time. In this
context, functionality means that the calculation process of trade-offs by using
MCDM is ensured and thus Objective 1 is fulfilled. In practice, functionality is
extended by research and development in the corresponding domains. Hereinafter,
the quality attribute extensibility is evaluated by the following use case scenario:
An autonomous ADAS is released for general public. Thereby, the functionality
has already been implemented but has not yet been activated due to regulations
which have been decided by the government.
Since, the functionality has already been implemented but it has not activated
the underlying SMs exist which are necessary for the basic operating principle.
The modular SMs merely need to be merged to a entire software system. This
part has already been evaluated in Section 6.3.2.2. Providing autonomous driving
functionality requires extending the underlying FM to supply variability for the
MC in SPLs. In this context, the extended features, i.e. autonomous driving
package are accordingly linked with the SM and attributions and annotations
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have to be completed as described in Section 5.2 to enable semantic clustering.
The calculation of the extended functionality has to be possible independently of
the already existing functionality to comply with the principle of SPLs and thus
Objective 3. Obviously, the same applies for other functionality of the software
system. The extended operations can be seen as modular elements since it is
integrated within a SPL. Therefore, it has to work isolated as well as it may be
part of the entire software system and functionality of the automotive vehicle.
However, this part reflects the quality attribute modularity and has already been
evaluated successfully in Section 6.3.2.2. I.e., the scenario can be extended by the
approach of this thesis without any restrictions of functionality and the calculations
of trade-offs (Objective 1) in consideration of individual SPLs (Objective 3) are
fulfilled.
6.3.2.4. Maintainability
Maintainability as defined in Definition 6.4 is an essential part of software de-
velopment process. Lack of maintainability leads to flaws in the final product
which should be commercialised. Therefore, it is useful to develop single modular
software modules to keep a better overview of the software development process
of the final product. It has already been evaluated in Section 6.3.2.2 that a SuD
fulfils modularity. Furthermore, a SuD has to be adaptable as needed to integrate
belated changes flawless and with minimal effort. It has already been proven in
Section 6.3.2.1 for a selected use case scenario that a SuD is adaptable when apply-
ing the approach of this thesis. Moreover, maintainability means that a software
system is extensible to provide additional desired functionality. This part has been
successfully evaluated in Section 6.3.2.3. Since the system to be applied fulfils
modularity, adaptability and extensibility the quality attribute maintainability is
fulfilled.
6.4. Case Study
It is the aim of this section to present two case studies by which the concept of this
thesis is performed. The first case study covers a Turn Indicator (TI) example from
an automotive vehicle. Thereby, the complete MCDM as proposed in Chapter 3
is applied. Moreover, the structural impact analysis is performed which is an
essential part of Chapter 4. The second case study deals with an extensive ACC
example from the automotive industry. In this case study the focus is on MC
in SPLs as proposed in Chapter 5. Furthermore, the KPI based change impact
analysis is performed for this selected case study.
6.4.1. Turn Indicator
Each vehicle needs to be equipped with a TI to participate in road traffic. However,
flaws of TI may impair safety of road users. For instance, failure of emergency
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indicators may lead to rear-end collision and thus endanger safety of passengers.
It is therefore the aim of this section to perform the MCDM to determine the best
hardware and software configuration of a TI. Moreover, it is evaluated which
impacts the replacement of a necessary system component will have. Finally, it
has to be mentioned that the TI case study is based on [Pel+11].
6.4.1.1. System Model
A TI has to fulfil several hardware and software requirements, which has to be
realised by means of a SM. First, there is the flashing when opening or closing
the car via the radio key. The crash or emergency flashing is responsible for
concurrent flashing in case of an accident or congestion. Moreover, the turn
flashing is activated when operating the lever to signal change of direction. In
addition to the turn flashing there is the comfort flashing which activates turn
flashing three times when softly applying the lever. Furthermore, theft flashing
serves as a small protection against thieves. In this process, the flashing lamps
light up at shorter intervals in combination with the horn. Usually commands are
sent via bus infrastructure. In this case study, the focus is on the communication
between the individual flashing modules. Therefore, we abstract from the bus
infrastructure. Nevertheless, the communication between individual flashing
modules has to be encrypted and thus a system component Encryption is needed
which is regulated via the central component Turn Indicator. The underlying and
associated SM is illustrated in Figure 6.7.
Turn Indicator (C#1)
Encryption (C#7)
Open/Close 
flashing (C#2)
Crash/Emergency 
flashing (C#3)
Comfort flashing 
(C#4)
Theft flashing (C#6)
Turn flashing (C#5)
Figure 6.7.: SM of the TI case study
6.4.1.2. Trade-Offs and Counter Measures
As described in Section 3.4.1 to calculate an optimal trade-off we first need an
appropriate SSTM. The SSTM which is illustrated in Figure 6.8 represents the root
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goal that a Turn Indicator (TI) is acceptably safe. The root goal is refined by four
further sub-goals which are responsible that the TI module, software and flashing
is working correctly. Furthermore, it is important that the TI communication is
acceptably reliable. Each of the four sub-goals is refined by at least two POVs which
are essential to calculate trade-offs. The goal TI module is working correctly considers
by means of POVs that failures are sufficiently mitigated if TI lever returns to its
starting position after steering movement as well as if Acoustic signal sounds when
activating the Turn Indicator. The goal TI software is working correctly ensures that
results are correct without any failures. Furthermore, the results must be available
in time and delays are sufficiently mitigated. Moreover, it is covered by a POV
that the Software is acceptably secure against manipulation and hacking attacks. The
goal which is responsible for correct flashing is refined by two further POVs in
consideration of mitigating failures of affected lamps and flashing modules. The
goal which is responsible for a reliable TI communication is refined by four POVs:
It is considered that the communication is acceptably secured against data theft
and manipulation. Moreover, importance is attached to the fact that messages
arrive in time and are transferred correctly with acceptable reliability. Finally, there
are two alternative solutions for which the trade-off is calculated by means of the
MCDM. First, there is an alternative solution consisting of a basic TI functionality.
Besides, there is a solution which additionally considers a comfort TI.
Turn Indicator  (TI)
is acceptably safe (G#1)
TI module is working 
correctly (G#2)
TI software is working 
correctly (G#3)
TI flashing is working 
correctly (G#4)
TI communication is 
acceptably reliable (G#5)
Failure of affected lamps is 
sufficiently mitigated. (SA) 
(G#11)
Failure of flashing module is 
sufficiently mitigated. (SA) 
(G#12)
Results are correct. Errors 
are sufficiently mitigated. 
(SA) (G#8)
Results are calculated in 
time. Delays are sufficiently 
mitigated. (TI) (G#9)
Software acceptably secure 
against manipulation and 
hacking attacks (SE) (G#10)
TI lever returns to its 
starting position after 
steering movement. Failures 
are sufficiently mitigated. 
(SA) (G#6)
Acoustic signal sounds when 
activating the turn indicator. 
Failures are sufficiently 
mitigated. (SA) (G#7)
Communication is 
acceptably secured against 
data theft (SE) (G#13)
Communication is 
acceptably secured against 
manipulation (SE) (G#14)
Messages arrive in time with 
acceptable reliability (TI) 
(G#15)
Messages are transferred 
correctly with acceptable 
reliability (SA) (G#16)
Basic TI (AS#17)
Basic TI + 
comfort 
flashing (AS#18)
Figure 6.8.: SSTM of the TI case study
Subsequently, it is mandatory to perform the AHP algorithm for the goal hierarchy
within the SSTM. I.e., a pairwise comparison as described in Section 2.4.1 has to
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be performed based on G#1, G#2, G#3, G#4 and G#5. Since it is most important that
flashing and the TI models are working correctly the resulting priorities for G#1
are G#4  G#2  G#5  G#3. Flashing has highest priority since flashing is the
expected functionality. Software on the other hand has lowest priority since it must
be designed redundantly. The probability is very low that all redundant software
components do not calculate correct results. In case of G#2 it is more important that
the TI returns to its starting position after steering movement than to sound an
acoustic signal when activating the TI. The reason is that the functionality of the
TI is given if no acoustic signal sounds. Therefore, the following applies for G#2:
G#6  G#7. Furthermore, there is goal G#2 representing that TI software should
work correctly. In this case it is most important that calculated results are correct
since wrong results may lead to wrong direction indicator. The timing aspect is
important but less important than calculating correct results. Usually, software
components are designed redundantly, i.e. the probability is very low that all
redundant software modules do not fulfil the timing constraints. In conclusion,
the following applies for G#3: G#10  G#8  G#9. G#4 covers that TI flashing is
working correctly. In the course of this, it is more important that failures of flashing
modules are sufficiently mitigated than the failures of affected lamps. The reason
is that lamps can not flash without corresponding flashing module. Obviously, the
priorities are for G#4: G#12  G#11. When considering the local priorities of G#5 it
is noticeable that it is most important that messages are transferred correctly. It
is, however, less important that the communication is acceptably secured against
data theft since in case of data theft functionality is still ensured in most cases.
Therefore, the following local priorities apply for G#5: G#16  G#15  G#13  G#14.
The exact distribution of the priorities including consistency ratios can be taken
from Table 6.1 to Table 6.5.
G#1 =

G#2 G#3 G#4 G#5
G#2 1 3 14 3
G#3 13 1
1
4
1
2
G#4 4 4 1 3
G#5 13 2
1
3 1

Goal Local Priority
G#2 24,5 %
G#3 8,7 %
G#4 53,4 %
G#5 13,4 %
CR 9,14 %
Table 6.1.: AHP matrices and local priorities of the TI case study (G#1)
G#2 =
[G#6 G#7
G#6 1 4
G#7 14 1
] Goal Local Priority
G#6 80,0 %
G#7 20,0 %
CR 0,0 %
Table 6.2.: AHP matrices and local priorities of the TI case study (G#2)
After calculating local priorities it is necessary to perform FMEA assessments as
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proposed in Section 3.7.1. In this context, the RPN needs to be determined for the
alternative solutions depending on the corresponding POVs. As a reminder: The
RPN is the product of OSD as defined in Definition 2.7. The complete FMEA risk
assessment of the TI case study is listed in Table 6.7. When comparing the RPN
values between the two different alternative solutions it is conspicuous that AS#17
performs better than AS#18. Furthermore, it can be stated, that the assessments
between the alternative solutions and the POVs, which belong to G#2, perform
best whereas the POVs of G#5 have the worst assessments. The reason is that
the communication and data transfer of the TI offers the most attack capabilities.
G#3 and G#4 are in balance and ranked between G#2 and G#5 since the software
and flashing cannot work without any communication whereas the TI module is
almost independently of the communication.
G#3 =

G#8 G#9 G#10
G#8 1 6 3
G#9 16 1
1
3
G#10 13 3 1

Goal Local Priority
G#8 65,5 %
G#9 9,5 %
G#10 25,0 %
CR 1,74 %
Table 6.3.: AHP matrices and local priorities of the TI case study (G#3)
G#4 =
[G#11 G#12
G#11 1 13
G#12 3 1
] Goal Local Priority
G#11 25,0 %
G#12 75,0 %
CR 0,0 %
Table 6.4.: AHP matrices and local priorities of the TI case study (G#4)
G#5 =

G#13 G#14 G#15 G#16
G#13 1 13
1
5
1
7
G#14 3 1 13
1
5
G#15 5 3 1 13
G#16 7 5 3 1

Goal Local Priority
G#13 5,5 %
G#14 11,8 %
G#15 26,2 %
G#16 56,5 %
CR 4,41 %
Table 6.5.: AHP matrices and local priorities of the TI case study (G#5)
All the prerequisites are now fulfilled to calculate trade-offs by means of the
MCDM as described in Chapter 3. I.e., MCDM modes as proposed in Section 3.8
can be applied. The results can be taken from Table 6.6. It is noted that the PCM
uses an even distribution of OSD whereas the PCM (modified) ranks severity
better than occurrence and detection. However, no matter which algorithm is
applied, AS#17 is the better trade-off than AS#18. The results can be justified as
follows: As defined in Table 6.1 G#4 has the highest priority. Furthermore, the
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FMEA assessments between the associated POVs G#11 or G#12 and the alternative
solutions are better for AS#17. Consequently, the AS#17 is better fulfilled when
applying the PCM. AS#17 fulfils the modified PCM to a greater extent since the
assessments for severity are identical for both alternative solutions, but AS#17 has
better assessments for occurrence and detection than AS#18. AS#17 complies with
RCM better than AS#18 since each RPN is better for AS#17 than for AS#18.
MCDM mode AS#17 AS#18
RCM 60,7 % 39,3 %
PCM 59,8 % 40,2 %
PCM (modified) 55,9 % 44,1 %
O S D Local Priority
O 1 13 1 20,0 %
S 3 1 3 60,0 %
D 1 13 1 20,0 %
Table 6.6.: Results of the TI case study
When analysing the RPNs of Table 6.7 it is noticeable that the RPN of G#10 has the
worst assessments for both, AS#17 and AS#18. Therefore, we evaluate by means
of the ADTA whether there is an appropriate CMs to mitigate the risk. I.e., we
assess the ROI and ROA of corresponding CMs. The underlying ADT which
should mitigate G#10 is illustrated in Figure 6.9. There are two types of attacks to
manipulate the software of a car: Gaining violent and non-violent access to the
car. In this context there are three attacks possible for the violent access in the
following order: Break down the door, Exploit vulnerability and Go out unobserved.
For the non-violent access the attack order may be: Spy the key, Open the car with
the key, Exploit vulnerability and Go out unobserved. For each attack there is at least
one CM which should avoid the risk of an attack. These CMs can be taken from
Figure 6.9. It is now evaluated which of the nine CMs has the greatest benefit
to enable a higher degree of security for the SSTM goal Software acceptably secure
against manipulation and hacking attacks.
Manipulation of the 
car software (AG#1)
Gain violent access 
to the car (AG#2)
Gain non-violent 
access to the car 
(AG#3)
Break down 
the door
Exploit 
vulnerability
Exploit 
vulnerability
Go out 
unobserved
Install alarm 
system
(CM#1)
Install strong 
authentication 
mechanism 
(CM#3)
Install strong 
authentication 
mechanism 
(CM#8)
Install a video 
surveillance 
equipment 
(CM#9)
Gain wireless access 
(AG#4)
Go out 
unobserved
Install a video 
surveillance 
equipment 
(CM#4)
Install 
security lock 
(CM#2)
Spy the key
Open the car 
with the key
Change key at 
regular intervals 
(CM#5)
Install signal 
activation button 
on key (CM#6)
Install multi-
factor authen-
tication (CM#7)
Figure 6.9.: ADT of the TI case study
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As defined in Definition 3.6 calculation of ROI requires some other variables.
These include AV, EF, ARO and CSI. The AV is assigned to 70.000 e for the TI
case study. The EF is set to 85 % for AG#2, 90 % for AG#4 and 95 % for AG#3. I.e.,
the loss on the asset value is greatest when realising non-violent access to the car
since there is more expensive equipment installed. The ARO is set 0,1 for AG#2;
0,2 for AG#4 and 0,3 for AG#3. Subsequently it is mandatory to determine RM
for each CM which can be taken from Table 6.8. Thereby, CM#1 and CM#2 has
the best risk mitigation for the violent access whereas CM#6 mitigates the risk to
best degree in case of non-violent access. If the first step of a violent access is
prevented the entire attack can be prevented with a higher probability. For the
non-violent access it is most secure to activate signal activation button on the key
on demand. This ensures that the key signals are not spied out at any undesired
moment. Finally, we need to determine the costs for security investment for each
CM. These vary from 1.500 e in case of CM#5 and CM#6 up to 3.000 e in case of
CM#1, CM#4 and CM#9. If the formula as defined in Definition 3.6 is applied for
each CM, CM#6 has the best value. The reason is that the risk mitigation as well as
the costs for security investment are best. Furthermore, EF and ARO are on good
average.
CM#1 CM#2 CM#3 CM#4 CM#5 CM#6 CM#7 CM#8 CM#9
RM 0,8 0,8 0,6 0,35 0,4 0,8 0,7 0,6 0,35
CSI (e) 3000 2800 2700 3000 1500 1500 2000 2700 3000
Cost (e) 1000 1000 2000 500 3000 3000 3000 2000 500
Loss (e) 3500 5000 3500 2000 3000 5000 5000 5000 2000
ROI 3,76 4,10 2,97 1,08 2,36 5,72 3,41 3,43 1,33
ROA 11,11 8,33 9,10 20,00 8,33 6,25 6,25 7,14 20,00
Table 6.8.: ADTA of the TI case study
As stated in Definition 3.7 the ROA requires three variables to apply the formula.
These include GI, Cost and Loss. In case of a successful attack for an attacker
the GI is assigned to 50.000 e. The values of Cost and Loss can be taken from
Table 6.8. The higher the Cost and Loss the better the resulting ROA. In our TI
case study CM#6 and CM#7 are the most expensive CMs for attackers to overcome
them. When comparing the results of ROI and ROA CM#6 fulfils ROI and ROA
best, i.e. it is recommended to realise this CM.
6.4.1.3. Structural Change Impact Analysis
The last part of the TI case study covers the structural change impact analysis
with the aim of traceability. It is evaluated by means of a change request which
kind of impacts it has when modifying the encryption (C#7, cf. Figure 6.7). As
proposed in Section 4.3 it is distinguished BC and WC change impacts, i.e. there
is a minimal and maximal set of effects. The structural change impact analysis
is therefore triggered by C#7 which represent the encryption system component.
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Since this system component is linked with the individual flashing modules, in
the first iteration C#2, C#3, C#4, C#5 and C#6 need to be modified in WC. In BC
there are no further effects. When continuing the WC structural change impact
analysis the Turn flashing system component is affected in all further iterations
by the component Comfort flashing with mod. As proposed in Section 3.3.2, al-
ternative solutions are derived from the SM, i.e. the impacts of the individual
system components affect the alternative solutions of the corresponding SSTM
(cf. Figure 6.8). The necessary modification of Turn flashing has effects on both
alternative solutions AS#17 and AS#18 since turn flashing is the basic functionality
of TI. AS#18 is affected by Comfort flashing system component. All the applied
impact rules are listed in Table 6.9.
Source/Target element BC WC
SM→ SM
C#7.mod→ C#2.noChange C#7.mod→ C#2.mod
C#7.mod→ C#3.noChange C#7.mod→ C#3.mod
C#7.mod→ C#4.noChange C#7.mod→ C#4.mod
C#7.mod→ C#5.noChange C#7.mod→ C#5.mod
C#7.mod→ C#6.noChange C#7.mod→ C#6.mod
SM→ SSTM
C#4.mod→ AS#18.mod
C#5.mod→ AS#17.mod
C#5.mod→ AS#18.mod
Table 6.9.: Impact rules of structural impacts of the TI case study
6.4.2. Adaptive Cruise Control
In the age of advancing autonomous driving the ACC is an essential part therefrom.
As with the TI, flaws of the ACC may impair safety of road users. For instance,
delayed braking of the ACC may lead to a life-threatening rear-end collision. In
practice, there are several variants of an ACC supporting SPLs. Therefore, it is
the aim of this section to apply the MCDM on a safety-critical SPL as proposed
in Chapter 5. Furthermore, a KPI based change impact analysis is performed as
described in Section 4.6. For the most part, the ACC case study is based on [LFB18]
and [LB19].
6.4.2.1. System Model and Feature Model
An ACC must fulfil several hardware and software requirements which must be
specified within the underlying SM. There is a system component Sensor technology
which covers installed and used sensor types of an ACC, e.g. radar or video
camera. The actuator technology is responsible for accelerating or decelerating of the
corresponding automotive vehicle. Furthermore, the components Engine control
and Brake control regulate internal process with regard to throttling and braking.
Both of them need the input of sensor and actuator technology. Moreover, the Brake
control and Engine Control interact with each other, i.e. they are interconnected. To
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adapt the maximum permissible speed of the ACC a Cruise switch is needed. In
general, all commands of the ACC are sent via a bus architecture. This case study
is focused on the communication between the individual presented modules of the
ACC. Therefore, we abstract from the bus architecture. To communicate between
the individual modules a central system component Adaptive Cruise Control is
required. Furthermore, it is necessary to transmit the data using encryption
algorithms. Therefore, a system component Encryption is used which is used by
all other system components. The facts of the SM described in this paragraph are
also illustrated in Figure 6.10.
Adaptive Cruise 
Control (C#1)
Encryption (C#7)
Sensor technology 
(C#2)
Engine control (C#3)Brake control (C#4)
Cruise switch (C#6)
Actuator technology 
(C#5)
Figure 6.10.: SM of the ACC case study
All the functional features, which represent the collectivity of all available SPLs,
are specified in Figure 6.11. There is an abstract feature Adaptive Cruise Control
which supports four abstract and concrete features. First, it is distinguished
between two cruising speeds, 160 km/h and 210 km/h. In this process, only one of
them can be selected for the SPL configuration. Furthermore, there is an optional
feature Congestion assistance which accomplishes accelerating and braking up to
30 km/h. Moreover, a mandatory dynamic distance control can be configured
either by three or five available levels. Finally, a dynamic speed limit is possible,
i.e. the maximum permissible speed is either registered via Global Positioning
System (GPS) or via a road sign recognition. It should be noted that the dynamic
speed limit via road sign recognition is only configurable if a cruising speed of 210
km/h is selected.
6.4.2.2. SST Model and FMEA
To calculate trade-offs for individual SPLs we first need a SSTM which is presented
in this section. There is a root goal that the ACC is acceptably safe. This root
goal is refined by four essential sub-goals. First, a sub-goal covers that ACC
sensors are working correctly. Furthermore, it is considered that the ACC software
is working correctly. Moreover, the ACC actuators have to work correctly which
are responsible for accelerating and braking. A reliable ACC communication is
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Adaptive Cruise 
Control (F#1)
Cruising speed (F#2)
Congestion 
assistance (F#5)
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Figure 6.11.: FM of the ACC case study
an essential part of the correct functionality of the entire ACC system. Each of
the sub-goals has to be fulfilled by at least two POVs. If the correct functionality
of the ACC sensors is considered it has to be taken into account that missing an
obstacle can be ruled out with sufficient certainty. Furthermore, care has to be taken
to ensure that distance to an obstacle, e.g. a vehicle driving ahead is acceptably
accurate. The goal ACC software is working correctly is refined by two POVs. The
first one ensures that the software is acceptably secure against manipulation and
hacking attacks. The second POV covers calculating results in time. If there are any
delays it is sufficiently mitigated. When considering goals that an ACC actuator
is working correctly it has to be taken into account that brake failure and engine
failure is sufficiently mitigated. The ACC communication goal requires that the
corresponding communication is secured against data theft and manipulation.
Furthermore, it is necessary that the individual messages arrive in time and thus
are reliable. Within the SSTM alternative solutions are defined which are essential
for calculating trade-offs. In general, they are derived from the underlying SM.
Since there is a linking between FM and SM, the corresponding features are
considered in the alternative solutions. Hereinafter, the alternative solutions are
presented with the following features:
1. Cruising speed: 160 km/h, dynamic distance control: 3 levels, dynamic
speed limit: GPS
2. Cruising speed: 210 km/h, congestion assistance, dynamic distance control:
5 levels, dynamic speed limit: road sign recognition
3. Cruising speed: 160 km/h, congestion assistance, dynamic distance control:
5 levels, dynamic speed limit: GPS
The complete SSTM in graphical representation is illustrated in Figure 6.12.
As usual for every MCDM, it is mandatory to rank the individual underlying
goals or POVs by each other. In the course of the root goal the local priorities of
the sub-goals are ranked as: G#4  G#2  G#5  G#3. Since the actuator performs
braking and accelerating it is most important whereas software has lowest priority
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Figure 6.12.: SSTM of the ACC case study
since braking and accelerating should work without software support in emer-
gency case. The exact values can be taken from Table 6.10.
G#1 =

G#2 G#3 G#4 G#5
G#2 1 3 14 3
G#3 13 1
1
4
1
2
G#4 4 4 1 3
G#5 13 2
1
3 1

Goal Local Priority
G#2 24,5 %
G#3 8,7 %
G#4 53,4 %
G#5 13,4 %
CR 9,14 %
Table 6.10.: AHP matrices and local priorities of the ACC case study (G#1)
When comparing the individual POVs considering sensors by each other the fol-
lowing applies: G#7  G#6. It is, in general, most important to keep distance to the
vehicle driving ahead. Furthermore, in case of ACC software it is most important
that the results are calculated in time since the probability of hacking attacks is also
possible but lower than timing aspects. In detail, it applies: G#9  G#8. In case of
actuators it is more important that brake failures are sufficiently mitigated than to
mitigate engine failures. The reason is that functioning brakes prevents accidents
in higher grade than the engine. Obviously, the following applies: G#11  G#10.
When comparing the POVs of goal G#5 it has to be noted that it is more important
that messages arrive in time with acceptable reliability than the communication is
secured against data theft and manipulation. The justification for this is similar to
that for G#3. Consequently, the local priorities are: G#13  G#12. The individual
local priorities can be taken from Table 6.11 to Table 6.14.
Subsequently, it is necessary to determine FMEA assessments for the alternative
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solutions AS#14, AS#15 and AS#16 depending on the individual POVs. The detailed
RPNs can be taken from Table 6.15. AS#14 has the best RPNs for the POVs concern-
ing ACC actuators since it has the least configurations. AS#15 has the maximum
configuration, consequently the software for the alternative solution has to work
properly. AS#16 has best RPN values for ACC actuators since it only supports a
speed limit of 160 km/h with three installed sensor types.
G#2 =
[G#6 G#7
G#6 1 14
G#7 4 1
] Goal Local Priority
G#6 20,0 %
G#7 80,0 %
CR 0,0 %
Table 6.11.: AHP matrices and local priorities of the ACC case study (G#2)
G#3 =
[G#8 G#9
G#8 1 15
G#9 5 1
] Goal Local Priority
G#8 16,7 %
G#9 83,3 %
CR 0,0 %
Table 6.12.: AHP matrices and local priorities of the ACC case study (G#3)
G#4 =
[G#10 G#11
G#10 1 6
G#11 16 1
] Goal Local Priority
G#10 85,7 %
G#11 14,3 %
CR 0,0 %
Table 6.13.: AHP matrices and local priorities of the ACC case study (G#4)
G#5 =
[G#12 G#13
G#12 1 14
G#13 4 1
] Goal Local Priority
G#12 20,0 %
G#13 80,0 %
CR 0,0 %
Table 6.14.: AHP matrices and local priorities of the ACC case study (G#5)
RPN G#6 G#7 G#8 G#9 G#10 G#11 G#12 G#13
AS#14 54 60 36 60 24 24 48 72
AS#15 48 60 18 24 96 96 32 48
AS#16 48 60 36 60 32 32 48 72
Table 6.15.: FMEA assessments of the ACC case study
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When applying the MCDM without consideration of SPLs the global priorities
(regardless of the selected MCDM mode) are: AS#14  AS#16  AS#15. Since G#4
has the highest local priority for G#1 (cf. Table 6.10) and AS#14 has the best FMEA
assessment for G#10 and G#11, AS#14 is the best trade-off and AS#15 is the worst
alternative solution. The detailed results can be taken from Table 6.16.
RCM PCM
AS#14 43,0 % 36,7 %
AS#15 23,0 % 29,2 %
AS#16 34,1 % 34,1 %
Table 6.16.: Results of the conventional MCDM of the ACC case study
6.4.2.3. Software Product Lines and Trade-Offs
The last section covered a conventional MCDM. However, no SPLs as proposed
in Chapter 5 have been taken into account. It is the aim of this section to continue
the ACC case study considering SPLs. As a reminder, some prerequisites have to
be fulfilled (cf. Section 5.3) to enable such a MCDM:
1. There is a SM, FM and SSTM.
2. Next, there is a linking between the individual features of the FM and the
system components of the SM.
3. Furthermore, there is a linking between features of the FM and the individual
POVs of the SSTM.
4. Commonly used system components are determined for the selection of
alternative solutions.
5. The features are annotated with SST flags to determine the individual con-
cerns.
6. The KPI attribution for all the POVs is specified.
7. The FMEA assessments of the individual POVs are clustered.
8. Finally, a bottom-up path formation within the SSTM can be performed.
The SM, FM and SSTM have already been introduced in the two sections before.
Therefore, we continue with the linkings between FM, SM and SSTM which are
listed in Table 6.17.
For the linkings between FM and SM only the concrete features are relevant since
abstract features are not selectable. If a cruising speed of 160 km/h or 210 km/h
is chosen the system component Cruise switch is responsible within the SM. Fur-
thermore, the congestion assistance is mapped to Sensor technology since radar
164
6.4. CASE STUDY
FM SM SSTM
F#3 C#6 G#6, G#7, G#8, G#10, G#11, G#12
F#4 C#6 G#6, G#7, G#8, G#10, G#11, G#12
F#5 C#2 G#8, G#10, G#11
F#7 C#2 G#6, G#7, G#8
F#8 C#2 G#6, G#7, G#8
F#10 C#5 G#9, G#13
F#11 C#5 G#9, G#13
Table 6.17.: Linkings between FM, SM and SSTM of the ACC case study
sensors control the functionality. The three levels dynamic distance control uses
primary the same system component since it is driven by radar sensors as well. If
there is a dynamic speed limit via GPS or road sign recognition the functionality is
very demanding, i.e. the features are linked with the system component Actuator
technology.
When using a cruising speed of 160 km/h or 210 km/h within a SPL, we need
to link all the POVs which are responsible for the sensor technology. It has to be
ensured that the software is secured against manipulation and hacking attacks.
Furthermore, it has to be considered that brake failure is sufficiently mitigated.
Moreover, a link with all the communication POVs is necessary to enable a reli-
able communication. In case of the congestion assistance feature we also need
a software which is secured against third parties. In addition, all the actuators
have to fulfil functional scope properly. When linking the concrete features of the
dynamic distance control it is essential that the ACC sensors are working correctly.
Furthermore, it is advisable to link it with the POV which is responsible for secure
software and against manipulation and hacking attacks. Finally, the dynamic
speed limits require a linking with two POVs: The first one covers timing aspects
in context of ACC software. The second one concerns ACC communication, in
detail it ensures that messages arrive in time with acceptable reliability. In this
context the timing aspect is very important since speed limit is only valid for a
specific road section.
For this case study, a SPL is selected consisting of a maximum cruising speed of
160 km/h, a dynamic distance control of three levels and a dynamic speed limit
via GPS. In this way, alternative solution AS#16 is supported for the subsequent
MCDM. However, as stated in step 1 of Section 5.3.2 we need to check regarding
commonly used system components. In this process Table 6.18 in cooperation
with Table 6.17 may be helpful.
It is stated that C#2 is used by the features F#5, F#7 and F#8 which are part of AS#14
and AS#15. I.e., all three alternative solutions are taken into account for calculating
the optimal trade-off.
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Solution Supported features
AS#14 F#3, F#7, F#10
AS#15 F#4, F#5, F#8, F#11
AS#16 F#3, F#5, F#8, F#10
Table 6.18.: Supported features of individual solutions of the ACC case study
When calculating trade-offs by means of SPLs it is necessary to minimise the
underlying SSTM to reduce complexity for the analysis process (cf. Section 5.3.2).
For this purpose, we need to determine SST flags for each feature defined in the
FM. Only features with identical SST annotations can be summarised to the same
cluster. The SST annotations of the ACC case study can be taken from Figure 6.11
(for legend: cf. Figure 2.9). In general, the ACC supports SST concern. For the
cruising speed safety and security are important since manipulating of the correct
cruising speed may endanger human life. The same applies to the congestion
assistance. If the ACC does not respond with the correct braking or accelerating
amount road users are also in danger. The dynamic distance control also reflects
safety and security aspects since a manipulation of the distance may lead to se-
rious rear-end collisions. In case of dynamic speed limit safety and timing are
significant. If a speed limit road sign is recognised too late with unacceptable
delay it may cause serious accents. Since there is a linking between FM and SSTM
(cf. Table 6.17) the SST annotations of the features can be transferred logically to
the POVs of the SSTM.
Since SST annotations are not enough to form clusters we need to define attribu-
tions for each POV within the SSTM. These attributions are listed in Table 6.19. In
this case study for each POV two KPIs are specified. In this context, SST attribu-
tions are taken into account. There is the SIL which is used to assess safety POVs.
Furthermore, encryption is used to ensure a higher degree of security. Finally, time
indicates whether time limits must be observed. KPIs can be eliminated for the
calculation of trade-offs if the SST flags and the corresponding annotated KPIs
are identical. This applies to G#8 and G#12 as well as G#9 and G#13, i.e. one of each
cluster can be eliminated. The reason is as follows: KPI 1 and KPI 2 are identical
for G#8 and G#12 as well as for G#9 and G#13.
Furthermore, a safety and security annotation is assigned to G#8 and G#12 whereas
a safety and timing flag is assigned to G#9 and G#13. Table 6.20 shows the individual
clusters with the corresponding related POVs. The optimisation is finished if each
cluster consists of one POV, i.e. the eliminated POVs have not be taken into
account for the calculation of trade-offs.
In the next step we have to decide which of the similar POVs are eliminated for the
calculation of the trade-offs. For this purpose, we compare G#8 and G#12 as well as
G#9 and G#13 regarding classifications and average RPNs. It is mandatory that the
classifications of the RPNs are identical. Otherwise they would deviate too much
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POV KPI 1 KPI 2
G#6 (sil, min, 3) (fmea, max, 50)
G#7 (sil, min, 3) (fmea, max, 60)
G#8 (encryption, min, 128) (fmea, max, 60)
G#9 (time, max, 150) (fmea, max, 60)
G#10 (sil, min, 2) (fmea, max, 96)
G#11 (sil, min, 2) (fmea, max, 100)
G#12 (encryption, min, 128) (fmea, max, 60)
G#13 (time, max, 150) (fmea, max, 60)
Table 6.19.: KPIs of the ACC case study
Cluster Related POVs
Cl#1 G#6
Cl#2 G#7
Cl#3 G#8, G#12
Cl#4 G#9, G#13
Cl#5 G#10
Cl#6 G#11
Table 6.20.: Clusters of the ACC case study
and, if applicable, cause new risks . As listed in Table 6.21 the classifications are
identical. Consequently, G#8 has the better RPN ranking in comparison with G#12.
Moreover, G#9 compared with G#13 has the better RPN values. For this reason G#12
and G#13 is eliminated for the calculation of the trade-offs.
Classification G#8 G#9 G#12 G#13
AS#14 Acceptable Medium Acceptable Medium
AS#15 Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable
AS#16 Acceptable Medium Acceptable Medium
∅ RPN 30 48 43 64
Table 6.21.: Average RPNs and classifications of the ACC case study
In this way, the POVs G#6, G#7, G#8, G#9, G#10 and G#11 are used for the calculation
of trade-offs. All the paths up to the root goal G#1 are enabled. I.e., the local
priorities of G#1 are updated since G#5 has been eliminated due to G#12 and G#13.
Afterwards, the updated local priorities of G#1′ are listed:
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G#1′ =

G#2 G#3 G#4
G#2 1 3 14
G#3 13 1
1
5
G#4 4 5 1

Goal Local Priority
G#2 22,6 %
G#3 10,1 %
G#4 67,4 %
CR 8,14 %
Table 6.22.: AHP matrices and local priorities of the ACC case study (G#1′)
Finally, the MCDM can be performed. The results can be taken from Table 6.23.
Thereby, AS#14 has the best trade-off whereas AS#15 has the worst trade-off. When
comparing these results with those of Table 6.16 it can be determined that the
results differ minimally from each other. In this way it can be determined that
the complexity reduction returns the same ranking of the individual alternative
solutions. However, considering SPLs for the calculation of trade-offs saves time,
costs and resources. According to Definition 5.2 there is a complexity reduction of
25 %.
RCM PCM
AS#14 43,4 % 36,9 %
AS#15 21,5 % 28,4 %
AS#16 35,1 % 34,7 %
Table 6.23.: Results of SPL based MCDM of the ACC case study
6.4.2.4. KPI Based Change Impact Analysis
The TI case study covered a structural change impact analysis. In this section KPI
based change impact analysis is performed on the already known ACC case study.
First, the SM, which has been introduced in Section 6.4.2.1, is annotated with at
least one KPI. The mappings between the individual system components and
KPIs can be taken from Table 6.24.
System component KPI 1 KPI 2
C#1 - -
C#2 (sil, min, 3) (encryption, max, 128)
C#3 (sil, min, 1) (encryption, min, 64)
C#4 (sil, min, 3) (encryption, min, 64)
C#5 (sil, min, 2) (encryption, max, 128)
C#6 (sil, min, 3) (encryption, max, 128)
C#7 (encryption, min, 64) (time, max, 150)
Table 6.24.: KPIs of the ACC System Model
In general, there are KPIs which specify that a certain SIL has to be reached.
Thereby, the Sensor technology, Brake control and Cruise switch require the strictest
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demands. Furthermore, security KPIs have to be considered by means of key
length of encryption. In this context the key length vary 64 bit up to 128 bit. For
instance, the sensor technology can require a 128 bit encryption. There are also
strict timing requirements which must be taken into account. In general, the
encryption may not exceed timing frames of 150 ms.
In this case study it is evaluated which elements of the individual models impair
the calculation of trade-offs if a change request is performed. Hereinafter, the
change request is defined (cf. Section 4.5.2):
1. The radar sensor is replaced by another radar sensor, i.e. the system compo-
nent Sensor technology is replaced by another one.
2. The new radar sensor have some new attribution triples:
a) (sil, min, 4) and
b) (encryption, min, 256).
3. allAttributes = true
4. ∆FMEA = (0,−1,−1)
When comparing with the current radar sensor the new sensor technology has
better safety and security demands. The change impact analysis takes effects if
both KPI triples are not fulfilled for the corresponding elements. If the analysis
affects some POVs the severity and detection decreases by 1 when performing the
FMEA at a later stage.
When performing the KPI based change impact analysis the following elements
are affected by the sensor replacement:
1. SM: C#6, C#8, C#10.
2. FM: F#3, F#4, F#5, F#7, F#8.
3. SSTM: G#6, G#7, G#8, G#10, G#11, G#12.
Since the current installed sensor technology requires a SIL of 3 and a maximum
key length of 128 bit with regard to encryption only C#6 share these demands. As
described in Section 6.4.2.3, the SM is linked with the FM and SSTM (cf. Table 6.17).
Therefore, the corresponding affected features and POVs can be determined. In
summary, the cruising speed of 160 km/h and 210 km/h, the congestion assistance
as well as the dynamic distance control with three and five levels are affected by
the radar sensor replacement.
In the following, let us assume the radar sensor and all affected elements has been
replaced correctly and we want to perform the MCDM based on SPLs again as
described in Section 6.4.2.3. To do this, the corresponding RPNs (cf. Table 6.15) are
updated automatically according the rule ∆FMEA = (0, -1, -1). The updated RPN
values can be taken from Table 6.25.
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RPN G#6 G#7 G#8 G#9 G#10 G#11 G#12 G#13
AS#14 30 32 16 60 12 12 30 72
AS#15 30 32 8 24 60 60 18 48
AS#16 30 32 16 60 18 18 30 72
Table 6.25.: Improved FMEA assessments of the ACC case study
Subsequently, it has to be checked again whether there is a change in the elimina-
tion of POVs. The average value of G#8 and G#12 have changed but the classifica-
tion has not changed. The updated values are listed in Table 6.26.
Classification G#8 G#9 G#12 G#13
AS#14 Acceptable Medium Acceptable Medium
AS#15 Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable
AS#16 Acceptable Medium Acceptable Medium
∅ RPN 13 48 26 64
Table 6.26.: Updated average RPNs and classifications of the ACC case study
Finally, the MCDM algorithm can calculate the global priorities for the individual
alternative solutions once again. The actual results does not change, i.e. the
following applies: AS#14  AS#16  AS#15. The percentage distribution has
changed a little bit. This has to do with the fact that local priorities of the individual
alternative solutions vary in the updated process of the FMEA assessment. The
updated results are listed in Table 6.27.
RCM PCM
AS#14 45,9 % 44,8 %
AS#15 20,2 % 20,6 %
AS#16 33,9 % 34,6 %
Table 6.27.: Results of updated SPL based MCDM of the ACC case study
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Conclusion and Outlook
In the previous chapters several approaches have been presented which deal with
the compliance of the safety concern taken SST into account. These approaches
have been evaluated qualitatively and two extensive case studies have been per-
formed to show the benefits and advantages in MC engineering techniques. In
this chapter, the thesis and their results are summarised and a final statement
is made whether the objectives, which have been defined in Section 1.2, were
accomplished. Furthermore, a short outlook and improvements are given how
future works could be realised to continue the research work of this thesis.
7.1. Summary
In this thesis, three approaches on MC techniques have been introduced. These
include Multi-Concerns and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, the change impact
analysis as well as Multi-Concerns in Software Product Line. These concepts
have been consecutively developed where each approach aims to improve the
antecedent algorithmic to finally provide an optimal overall approach. In this
context, each of the proposed approaches aimed to solve the objectives which have
been presented in Section 1.2 of this thesis.
In general, all the approaches or objectives aim to guarantee a maximum degree
of safety in context of safety-critical systems. However, each of them presented
different methodologies to achieve the goal. In the first approach, the focus was
on calculating optimal trade-offs by means of MCDM taken SST concerns into
account. The change impact analysis, which was part of the second main chapter,
aimed to determine structural and KPI based effects triggered by a change request.
Finally, the third concept focused on calculating trade-offs by enabling modelling
of SPLs.
7.1.1. Multi-Concerns and Multi-Criteria Decision Making
In Chapter 3, an approach has been presented, which allows calculating trade-offs
taken SST into account, to solve mutual conflicts of the individual concerns. In this
context, a systems engineering process has been introduced which is a necessary
prerequisite to perform the MCDM. As requested in Objective 1, defining func-
tional and qualitative requirements including failure modes and goals formed the
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basis to trigger the process. Based on these requirements, SMs are needed to model
the dependencies of the SuD. From this, in turn, the sets of alternative solutions,
as also required in Objective 1, can be derived for which the final trade-off is
calculated.
Subsequently, it has been described that knowledge of failures modes and goals
have to be transferred into a hierarchical structure to receive more accurate results
of the MCDM. In this context, the SSTM has been presented which additionally
includes modelling of the alternative solutions. As an extension the ADT has been
described which allows modelling of CMs for individual security attacks. Without
modelling of SSTM and ADT appropriate trade-offs as well as CMs cannot be
finished. Since Objective 1 requires modelling of MC this part is also covered by
the proposed approach.
Furthermore, it has been explained how to apply the AHP on the hierarchical
structure of the SSTM. In this way, it has been described that it is mandatory for
the calculation of trade-offs to carry out pairwise comparisons for all the goals
modelled within the SSTM. It enables determining the relative importance or local
priorities of the individual goals by means of comparison matrices. In this context,
an algorithm for improving consistency has been presented since it is mandatory
to achieve an appropriate level of transitivity.
Moreover, two techniques for risk assessment or risk mitigation as demanded in
Objective 1 have been presented for the calculation of trade-offs. The first one is
the FMEA, which assess the risk of individual alternative solutions depending on
so-called POV by means of the RPN. In this way, probabilities of three multipliers
have been considered: Occurrence, severity and detection. Furthermore, the ADTA
has been proposed which is based on the ADT. By means of probability values and
cost values the efficiency of CMs is evaluated which can be applied to mitigate risk.
Finally, two algorithms have been proposed for the calculation of the final results.
In this way, a percentage distribution between the individual previously specified
alternative solutions is calculated. The RCM and PCM algorithm, which have
been presented at the end of Chapter 3, are mainly based on the local priorities
of the AHP and the FMEA risk assessment. Furthermore, an optimisation of the
PCM is possible when adapting the local priorities of the multipliers of the FMEA.
In summary, Objective 1 has been covered the approach which has been proposed
in Chapter 3. On the one hand MC are modelled within the SSTM. On the other
hand, risk assessment and mitigation has been taken into account to guarantee a
maximum degree of safety or security. The final trade-off calculation is done by
means of realising the AHP.
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7.1.2. Change Impact Analysis
Chapter 4 presented an approach which enables calculating effects based on trig-
gering change requests. As required in Objective 2 horizontal traceability has
been realised by developing individual change impact rules which differentiate
between BC and WC, i.e. a minimum and maximum set of affected elements. In
this context, all presented model types are involved including SM, SSTM, ADT
and FM (topic of Chapter 5). In this way, the entire effect chain can be retraced as
also demanded in Objective 2.
To retrace the whole effect chain, as required in Objective 2, it is necessary to
release the change impact analysis. For this purpose, it has been presented how to
define a change request. First, a stakeholder is needed to trigger a change request.
Moreover, a requirement change has to be enjoined, e.g. due to new regulations.
The change request has to be triggered by an affected model element, e.g. a goal
and a triggering operation, e.g. modify.
To combine change requests and developed impact rules algorithms have been
developed to fulfil Objective 2. First, a methodology has been developed to enable
horizontal traceability over the entire effect chain based on previously specified
change requests. In this case, the results of the impacts are differentiated between
BC and WC. To avoid cycles, that may occur, a prioritisation of the applied change
impact rules has been introduced. Furthermore, Objective 2 had the demand
to guarantee still a maximum degree of safety in the course of the change im-
pact analysis. Therefore, a second methodology, a KPI based technique has been
presented. Based on attribution annotations of the release element items with
identical qualitative requirements are identified.
In summary, Objective 2 has been realised in the course of Chapter 4 since trace-
ability is enabled when combining change requests and impact rules. Further-
more, qualitative aspects have been considered when using the attributed impact
methodology.
7.1.3. Multi-Concerns in Software Product Lines
In Chapter 5, an approach has been presented which enables calculating trade-offs
based on SPL specifications taken SST requirements into account. As demanded
in Objective 3 it is required to model functional variability to model SPLs. Further-
more, it was required to combine SPL techniques with Objective 1, i.e. a linking
between FM and SM as well as SSTM is mandatory to select the alternative solu-
tions and POVs or goals according to the SPL configuration set. In this way, the
demand of Objective 3 for variability modelling and support has been fulfilled.
Moreover, it has been required in Objective 3 to cluster issues with similar SST re-
quirements to reduce complexity and to enable reusability. To achieve this demand,
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the commonly used system components within the SM have to be determined.
Moreover, it was the need to annotate features within the FM regarding SST con-
cerns. Furthermore, for the actual semantic clustering a KPI based attribution of
the individual POVs is needed. Finally, the FMEA classification of the alternative
solutions within the SSTM is necessary to complete the semantic clustering.
In Chapter 5, the change impact rules which have been introduced in Chapter 4
have been extended by rules which enable a change impact analysis for MCDM
taken SPLs into account. In this way, horizontal traceability is possible as required
in Objective 2. Furthermore, the entire effect chain is retraceable by using struc-
tural change impact methodology. In this context, four impact rule types have
been added which concern FM, SM and SSTM. In this way, the change impact
analysis supports variability management.
In summary, Objective 3 has been fulfilled when realising the concept of Chapter 5
since variability modelling via FMs is possible. Furthermore, reducing overhead
for the calculation of trade-offs is realised by the semantic clustering algorithm.
Finally, Objective 2 has been fulfilled since the presented approach of Chapter 5
has been extended by corresponding change impact rules.
7.2. Future Work
The approaches which have been presented in this thesis can be applied in safety-
critical domains, e.g. the automotive industry. Especially, when using SPLs the
models increase and are not easy to handle. For instance, the pairwise comparison
matrices for more than five sub-goals or POVs can no longer be set manually since
the quality with regard to consistency or transitivity underneath otherwise. For
future works it might be useful to modularise systems into smaller sub-systems to
reduce overhead. In this way, the individual models are getting smaller but no
necessary details are neglected as a result. In this context, the first step should be
to calculate trade-offs for individual sub-systems. Based on those results of the
modular sub-systems the trade-offs will be determined for the overall system by
merging the partial results. In that case, priorities of the individual sub-systems
have to be set to follow up on the AHP and the MCDM in general.
Furthermore, it might be useful for future work to insert empirical values for
FMEA, AHP, ADT assessments. For that purpose, a big database needs to exist for
which the individual RPN values, pairwise comparisons, ROI and ROA multiplier
have been set. The values could be taken from the database if a combination
of FMEA, AHP or ADT assessments has been used for calculation of trade-offs
beforehand. Moreover, the entries in individual databases may be labelled how
far they contribute to get an optimal trade-off and thus solve conflicts. In this way,
the results of the MCDM can be improved and thus safety of the SuD is getting
better and better.
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7.2. FUTURE WORK
The testability of the concept of this thesis may be considered in future works. For
this purpose, the work of Christian Saad [Saa15] which covers model-based data
flow analysis should be integrated. It might be helpful to define invariants for the
FMEA assessments as well as for the AHP pairwise comparisons. This ensures
that no invalid values are used for the calculation of trade-offs. Moreover, the data
flow analysis allows to trace local priorities of the corresponding goals or POVs
and to compare them with the results of the final MCDM.
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